U/S JOSEPH NONPROLIFERATION TALKS WITH AMBASSADOR

S E C R E T SEOUL 003970

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO T: ISN PDAS MCNERNEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2016
TAGS: PARM PREL MNUC MARR JA KS KN CH IR
SUBJECT: U/S JOSEPH NONPROLIFERATION TALKS WITH AMBASSADOR
PARK IN-KOOK

Classified By: DCM BILL STANTON. REASONS 1.4 (b/d).

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SUMMARY
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1. (S) Under Secretary Joseph and his delegation met with
Deputy Foreign Minister for Policy Planning and International
Organizations, Park In-kook, on November 7 to discuss
implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution
(UNSCR) 1718, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI),
and other key counterproliferation initiatives. In a meeting
and working lunch with DFM Park, U/S Joseph and his
delegation urged close ROK cooperation on implementation of
UNSCR 1718, South Korea's full participation in PSI, and ROK
support for strengthening nonproliferation inspection
architecture worldwide. Park indicated that the South Korean
government broadly supported U.S. actions and would fully
implement 1718, noting that the ROKG had created an
interagency task force that would produce a report to the
UNSC by November 13.


2. (S) Pressed for specifics, Park said the ROK was still
considering what to include in its response, and was
constrained by domestic political concerns about sparking
conflict with Pyongyang. He said the ROK was moving toward
participation in PSI, but worried that interdiction of DPRK
vessels in Korean waters might rupture the Armistice
Agreement. Park indicated the ROK had no problem with the
Container Security Initiative, but does have some concern
over the scope of the International Container Scanning
Network (ICSN) program. He nonetheless welcomed the ICSN
technical team's planned November 13 visit to Pusan. He also
indicated the ROKG was considering better ways to monitor
shipments moving to/from the North through the DMZ
transportation corridors, and briefed on the limitations of
the South-North Agreement on Maritime Transportation.
Acknowledging that his government was still "studying" many
of these issues, Park agreed the United States and ROK should
consult again on implementation of UNSCR 1718 after each side
had finished preparing its report to the UN Security Council.
END SUMMARY

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U/S Joseph's Nonproliferation Meetings in Seoul
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3. (S) Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and
International Security Robert Joseph met with Ambassador Park
In-kook, Deputy Foreign Minister for Policy Planning and
International Organizations, on November 7, 2006 to discuss
implementation of UNSCR 1718, PSI, and other
counterproliferation initiatives. DFM Park told U/S Joseph
he had been doing his "homework" on these issues following
their previous discussions and in response to North Korea's
nuclear test. The ROK had created an interagency task force,
co-chaired by himself and Assistant Minister for Unification
Lee Kwan-sei, Park explained. The task force, which had met
several times, including the previous day, was drafting the
ROK's report to the UN Security Council on measures to
implement UNSCR 1718, as required by the resolution.


4. (S) U/S Joseph informed DFM Park that the Secretary's
meetings in Beijing that followed the October 9 DPRK nuclear
test had been encouraging, and that China appeared committed
to full implementation of UNSCR 1718. In addition, he said he
had just held productive trilateral discussions in Tokyo with
nonproliferation officials from Japan and Australia. U/S
Joseph described the steps the U.S. Government was taking in
support of UNSCR 1718. Stressing that the USG highly valued
close cooperation with the ROK on 1718, PSI, and in
strengthening counterproliferation inspection architecture
worldwide, U/S Joseph asked Park to describe current ROK
thinking, and planned actions, in support of these important
counterproliferation measures.


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Implementation of UNSCR 1718
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5. (S) "Broadly speaking, I think that U.S. actions are
headed in the right direction," Park said, while quickly
adding that as he understood it, the 1718 Sanctions Committee
was leaving it up to individual countries to decide what
North Korean individuals, entities and goods to sanction. He
thanked U/S Joseph for the USG listing of items we would like
to see banned as exports to the North, calling it
"instructive," but made it clear the ROK was developing its
own list, which he promised to share with the USG. Park said
a list that was "shorter was better," while U/S Joseph
encouraged the ROK officials in the room to embrace the
spirit, and not merely follow the letter, of the resolution,
and to make every effort to ensure close compatibility
between our respective lists.

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Enhancing Inspection Architecture
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6. (S) U.S. delegation member, ISN PDAS Patricia McNerney,
briefed DFM Park and his colleagues on the need for increased
scrutiny of North Korean shipping through enhancements to
inspection architecture in the region. She explained that
the USG would like to see expanded and strengthened
inspections at ROK ports and within its territorial waters,
as well as keener scrutiny of overflights, road and rail
transportation. The USG also thinks that ROK participation
in PSI could be an important counterproliferation tool, while
also contributing to implementation of UNSCR 1718. DFM Park
asked where we anticipated any required boarding of suspect
DPRK vessels would take place: "On the high seas?" PDAS
McNerney explained that would only occur as a last resort.
An example of the preferred method, she noted, was to ask a
PSI partner state to inspect the vessel when it reached its
next port of call. Noting public misperceptions to the
contrary, she emphasized that PSI member states worked within
their own national legal authorities, and preferred to take
action where they had the maximum domestic legal authority to
do so. U/S Joseph rejected DFM Park's contention that "some
elements of PSI appear to exceed UNSCR 1718," pointing out
that actions taken by PSI member states were entirely
voluntary and consistent with international law.


7. (S) Asked to describe how the ROK's observance of PSI
exercises had affected its thinking about endorsing the
statement of interdiction principles, Park replied that the
matter was currently under study within the ROKG. Pressed
further, Park explained that while the ROK viewed PSI as
"helpful" and was "moving toward participation," a key
domestic political factor -- sensitivity regarding how North
Korea would respond -- had so far kept ROK leaders from fully
and openly endorsing PSI. Because North Korea was a major
domestic political issue for South Korea, ROK bureaucrats had
to "wait until the dust settles," Park said. Complicating
the issue was the fact that there were serious public
misunderstandings about PSI within Korean society, he added,
explaining that in the minds of many on the Korean Peninsula,
interdiction was tantamount to a blockade, giving rise to
worries that actions taken under PSI would rupture the
Armistice Agreement.

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Deterring Proliferation of Nuclear Materials
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8. (S) Delegation member William Tobey, Deputy Administrator
for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation at the Department of
Energy, briefed the ROK representatives on the $1.7 billion
U.S. effort to detect, secure and dispose of nuclear
materials. Tobey describe our primary mission as deterrence

through a combination of measures, including increased use of
various detection mechanisms. In particular, he said the USG
wanted to expand the following initiatives:

-- Megaports
-- Second Line of Defense
-- Container Security Initiative (CSI)
-- Aircraft Inspections
-- Opportunistic Inspections
-- Commodity Identification Training

While the United States was mindful the DPRK was unlikely to
proliferate through the ROK, we welcomed ROK support to deter
any proliferation from happening, Tobey concluded.


9. (S) Responding to Mr. Tobey's presentation, DFM Park
pointed out that while CSI only entailed random document
inspections, it would be far more difficult for the ROK to
participate in the International Container Scanning Network
(ICSN) because it would require the ROKG to check
approximately 16,000 shipping containers a day. Park
nonetheless said he welcomed the upcoming November 13 visit
to Seoul by the ICSN technical team, adding that he would
urge his staff to work closely with them to address all
concerns.

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Better Monitoring of N-S Shipments
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10. (S) Refocusing the discussion on concerns about North
Korea, U/S Joseph pointed out that the overall amount of DPRK
shipping was relatively small, and thus far more easily
monitored. DCM Stanton raised concerns over the reported
cursory inspections currently taking place along the east and
west transportation corridors between North and South Korea.
He asked whether, in light of UNSCR 1718, the ROK was
considering strengthening its monitoring of goods flowing to
and from the North. DFM Park replied that the ROKG was
giving the matter some thought, adding that new restrictive
measures would likely be included in the ROKG's November 13
report to the UN Security Council. Calling the current N-S
inspection regime a "terrible system," Park explained that
vehicles heading either North or South entered a joint
inspection area, after passing through their respective
Customs, Immigration and Quarantine (CIQ) areas. He said the
gates leading into and out of the joint inspection area
opened and closed every 30 minutes during regular work hours
to allow the vehicles to pass between the North and South
Korea.


11. (S) Asked about luxury goods going to the North, Park
told U/S Joseph that the ROK Ministry of Unification was in
the process of making its own "exhaustive list" of items to
be banned. NSC Director for Counterproliferation Strategy
David Stephens cautioned on the need for the United States
and ROK to work together on the list to prevent it from
becoming a bilateral issue between our two countries. DFM
Park agreed, but jokingly fretted about what would happen to
whisky currently being sent to the North for consumption by
South Korean workers there "who otherwise would not volunteer
to work in the DPRK."

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South-North Agreement on Maritime Transportation
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12. (S) During a follow-on working lunch, DFM Park briefed
the delegation on the content of the South-North Agreement on
Maritime Transportation that came into force on August 1,

2005. Asked if the agreement allowed the ROK to interdict a
North Korean vessel carrying WMD in ROK territorial waters,
Park replied that it did not, since the language in the
agreement specified that permission had to be asked and
granted by either side. He added, however, that in light of

UNSCR 1718, the ROK was now re-thinking how it would choose
to exercise the agreement. He said 70 DPRK vessels had been
granted permission so far this year to transit the waters
between Cheju Island and the southern tip of the Korean
Peninsula, pointing out that this saved the DPRK captains 4.5
hours at sea when navigating between eastern and western DPRK
ports. Park further pointed out that if the DPRK wanted to
move WMD clandestinely from one of its coasts to the other,
it could simply move it overland or take a longer
international route and therefore did not need to sail it
through ROK territorial waters. To date, the ROK had never
denied a DPRK vessels' request to transit the area, Park
said. He added that the DPRK did not transship through ROK
ports and that its ships had passed through ROK territorial
waters 140 times over the past year. On 40 of those
occasions, the DPRK vessels had stopped at a ROK port to pick
up needed shipments of humanitarian aid.

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Other Issues Requiring Continued Consultations
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13. (S) DFM Park and U/S Joseph agreed the United States
and ROK should consult again on implementation of UNSCR 1718
after each side had finished preparing its respective reports
to the UN Security Council. Park inquired about automatic
sanctions under the Glenn Amendment and asked when this might
come into effect. U/S Joseph replied that the President
would make the final decision on that. Whatever sanctions
the U.S. chose to implement would send an important symbolic
message, he added.


14. (S) Asked about ROK banking activities with the DPRK,
Park said that the ROKG has taken a close look, but had found
no transactions with suspect DPRK entities. That was because
South Korean banks were very cautious about dealing with the
DPRK since "they do not wish to be branded," Park explained.
He said he did not believe the DPRK would conduct a second
nuclear test "because the USG had already confirmed to the
world that the DPRK is, in fact, a nuclear power." He
claimed a second test would result in a significant change in
ROKG policy toward the North. U/S Joseph indirectly
contested Park's judgment, noting the most significant
threshold had been crossed with the first test.


15. (S) DFM Park expressed doubt about the capability of the
DPRK's longer range missiles, noting that a Chinese official
had told him the PRC had tested its ICBM missiles at the rate
of one a month for 15 years before perfecting that
capability. He encouraged the United States to work closely
with China on implementation of UNSCR 1718, pointing out that
the 1,400 km border between the PRC and DPRK was a large
vulnerability within the global nonproliferation regime.
Turning to the Six-Party Talks, Park argued that blocking the
DPRK's proliferation of nuclear materials was subordinate to
our primary task of convincing Pyongyang to give up those
materials in the first place. In making this point Park
employed phrasing our Blue House contacts have attributed
directly to President Roh -- that we need to deal with the
nuclear issue both vertically (through the 6PT) as well as
horizontally (through nonproliferation efforts). U/S Joseph
pointed out that the USG had made a tremendous diplomatic
effort through its participation in the Six-Party Talks, but
that pressure resulting from UNSCR 1718 was clearly key to
Pyongyang's decision to return to the talks. Continued
pressure was the only way the talks would have a chance of
succeeding, he told Park.


16. (S) At the conclusion of their working lunch, DFM Park
briefly raised the issue of Iran's nuclear program, asking
for U/S Joseph's views on Iran's ultimate goals, and
expressing concern that the nuclear nonproliferation regime
-- Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) -- did not appear up to the task
of halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Both agreed

Iran sought to use nuclear status to become the leading
country in the Middle East. If the DPRK, Iran and other
countries continue on the road toward the development of
nuclear weapons, perhaps we need to look at changing the
modalities of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime,
Park suggested.


17. (SBU) U/S Joseph has cleared this message.
VERSHBOW