TRAVELING GNP LAWMAKERS SEEK TO REAFFIRM US TIES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000394

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2014
TAGS: PREL PNUC KS KN
SUBJECT: TRAVELING GNP LAWMAKERS SEEK TO REAFFIRM US TIES

Classified By: Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b,d).

SUMMARY
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1. (SBU) Rep. Kim Deog-ryong, one of the opposition Grand
National Party's (GNP) most senior lawmakers, told the
Ambassador on February 1 that he and five other GNP Assembly
Members intended to travel to Washington February 7 to 10 to
emphasize the strength of the bilateral U.S.-ROK
relationship. The discussion with the Ambassador covered
topics that could arise during their trip, including
strategic flexibility and the transfer of wartime operational
control, free trade agreement negotiations, and
counterfeiting. END SUMMARY.

FRIENDSHIP MISSION TO WASHINGTON
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2. (C) During a February 1 breakfast meeting with the
Ambassador, GNP Assembly Members Kim Deog-ryong, Nam
Kyung-pil, Chun Yu-ok, Hwang Jin-ha and Park Hyung-joon
outlined their February 7 to 10 trip to Washington. The
purpose of the trip would be to affirm the strength of the
relationship, "restore trust," and clarify misperceptions
about Korean sentiment toward the U.S. According to Kim, the
group was trying to schedule meetings with Sen. George Allen,
Sen. Hillary Clinton, Sen. Richard Lugar and Sen. John
Warner, Rep. Henry Hyde, and Speaker Dennis Hastert. The
group also hoped to meet with Deputy White House Chief of
Staff Karl Rove and Vice President Dick Cheney. Several
think tanks would also be on the schedule. The Ambassador
offered to convey requests for meetings with State Department
officials, if the group desired.



3. (C) The GNP lawmakers planned to use their meetings to
convey to USG leaders and opinion-makers that Korea remained
committed to its friendship and to the U.S.-ROK alliance.
Rep. Kim expressed concern that statements by President Roh
had confused both Koreans and Americans about the state and
importance of the U.S.-ROK relationship. He and his
colleagues hoped to help clear the air of confusion. The
Ambassador agreed that there were some misunderstandings and
misperceptions about the relationship in both countries, but
he noted the reality was better than it seemed. Despite
media fretting about the health of the relationship, the
Ambassador observed that the two countries had achieved much
recently, including the strategic flexibility agreement and
other measures designed to modernize the alliance.


STRATEGIC FLEXIBILITY AND WARTIME OPERATIONAL CONTROL
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4. (C) Pointing to the recent agreement on strategic
flexibility, the Ambassador said that the defense and
security relationship was extremely strong. This was a
development from which both countries would benefit.
Strategic flexibility encompassed the notion that the Korean
people should have a say in their country's participation in
a regional crisis. Also, Korea would benefit from strategic
flexibility because U.S. Forces stationed elsewhere could
quickly be mobilized to assist Korea in a time of crisis.


5. (C) However, the Ambassador continued, some sensitive
issues were still outstanding, such as the transfer of
operational control and ROK forces during wartime. When
Secretary Rumsfeld was in Korea last year, he said that the

SIPDIS
U.S. was prepared to work on the proposal in the spirit of
giving responsibility to the ROK commensurate with its
growing strength. The Ambassador noted that some false
expectations about when this transfer would happen might have
arisen. The U.S. was ready to develop a roadmap with the
Korean government, but implementation could take some years.
This would be a momentous step that should be taken
carefully, with full consideration of the existing threats on
the Peninsula and the modernization of Korea's military
capabilities.


6. (C) Rep. Hwang (a retired general and member of the
Defense Committee) agreed that it would be prudent to be
cautious regarding transfer of wartime operational control.
The process of modernizing Korea's military would be
extremely expensive and take many years. Hwang stressed that
the ROK should consider the threat and its capabilities
before discussing the assumption of wartime control.

FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
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7. (C) The Ambassador noted that the trip to Washington
would be well-timed to discuss the start of FTA negotiations,
which would have just been announced. The Ambassador
anticipated "lively" public hearings in the ROK on the issue,
but was pleased that the government was committed to moving
ahead. All the studies indicated that the U.S. and ROK would
be very suitable partners in an FTA. Issues such as
agriculture would be sensitive, but any transition periods
that might be negotiated should be used to help Korean
farmers adapt to a more open market. In today's world, it was
very expensive to subsidize sectors that were not competitive
in world markets. The U.S. struggled with these issues also,
and had found that sometimes the least protected products
ended up being the most competitive in the world market. The
Ambassador encouraged the Assembly Members to discuss these
issues with their counterparts in the Congress.


8. (C) Rep. Nam Kyung-pil said that it would take courage
for Assembly Members to resist the farmers. To date,
lawmakers had been afraid of the farmers, and instead of
addressing the real issues had just given out subsidies.
Lawmakers needed to explain why continuing these subsidies
would be harmful and to prepare the Korean people not just
for an FTA with the U.S., but also eventually one with China.
He believed an FTA with China was inevitable and would spark
even more resistance than a U.S. FTA. Rep. Chun Yu-ok said
that there was a perception among Koreans that any FTA signed
with a stronger party would serve the interest of the more
advanced economy.

MISUNDERSTANDING ON COUNTERFEITING
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9. (C) The Ambassador said there was a misperception in the
ROK that U.S efforts to deal with North Korean illicit
activities were efforts to overthrow the regime. In fact,
law enforcement efforts to protect U.S. currency were
compatible with pursuit of a diplomatic solution to the
nuclear problem through the Six Party Talks. Both aimed at
encouraging a change in North Korean behavior.


10. (C) Rep. Park Hyung-joon said that many Koreans were
concerned that the U.S. had shifted from a moderate to a
harsh stance in dealing with the counterfeit issue. If the
law enforcement efforts were viewed in conjunction with PSI
intercepts, they could have a "messy impact" on the Six Party
Talks. The Ambassador replied that, in the end, North Korea
needs to understand that it has more to gain by returning to
the Six Party Talks than by insisting on a linkage between
U.S. law enforcement actions and the Six Party process.


11. (C) The Ambassador also pointed out that the law
enforcement actions were merely the continuation of efforts
going back many years. Investigations involving Asian
criminal groups and an Irish Workers' Party radical activist
all reached the indictment stage last year, which was the
time conclusions could be drawn regarding the Banco Delta
Asia in Macau. In fact, all these investigations began
several years ago.


12. (C) In addition, U.S. concerns about proliferation and
WMD were not limited solely to North Korea, the Ambassador
noted. This was a global effort. PSI intercepts involving
Libya, for example, were instrumental in persuading Qadhafi
to give up his nuclear program and make a strategic change in
policy. Qadhafi was once demonized in the U.S. Now
relations between the countries had normalized and U.S.
investors were increasingly visiting Libya. It was thus
possible for the U.S. to change very quickly if the other
side changed its behavior. We hoped that Kim Jong-il would
follow the same logic, he said, even if the odds were slim.


13. (C) Rep. Chun attributed some of the tension over the
counterfeiting issue to a "cultural misunderstanding." She
advised that if the U.S. had framed the issue in more
personal terms to Koreans -- "How would you feel if another
country was printing and distributing your currency?" --
Koreans would have better understood the nature of the
problem and the justification for American actions.

TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS
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14. (C) We understand that, contrary to what Rep. Kim and
his delegation have told reporters (and the Ambassador),the
group was not invited by the Korea Caucus or any other
Congressional person or entity. The program is being
arranged by the Asia America Initiative, headed by former
Rep. Dana Rohrabacher staffer Albert Santoli.
VERSHBOW