Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06SEOUL3922
2006-11-14 05:42:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Seoul
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR U.S.- ROK MINISTERIAL AT APEC

Tags:  PARM PREL MNUC KNNP KN KS 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #3922/01 3180542
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 140542Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1295
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 1508
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 8290
RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI PRIORITY 2019
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1599
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 003922 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS TO EAP A/S HILL AND EAP/K DIRECTOR KIM AT
APEC IN HANOI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2016
TAGS: PARM PREL MNUC KNNP KN KS
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR U.S.- ROK MINISTERIAL AT APEC

Classified By: AMB. ALEXANDER VERSHBOW. REASONS 1.4 (b/d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 003922

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS TO EAP A/S HILL AND EAP/K DIRECTOR KIM AT
APEC IN HANOI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2016
TAGS: PARM PREL MNUC KNNP KN KS
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR U.S.- ROK MINISTERIAL AT APEC

Classified By: AMB. ALEXANDER VERSHBOW. REASONS 1.4 (b/d)


1. (C) Madam Secretary: Your November 18 meeting with South
Korean National Security Advisor and Foreign
Minister-designate Song Min-soon comes as the Republic of
Korea (ROK) has entered a period of significant transition.
In the foreign policy arena, change began with the October 9
DPRK nuclear test. It will end when a new South Korean
president comes to power in little more than a years' time
and establishes his/her policy direction. In the interim,
President Roh has appointed a new national security team and
begun to readjust (albeit reluctantly) his North-South policy
in response to Pyongyang's provocation and the will of the
international community. I would like to highlight some of
the more important challenges and opportunities this presents
to the U.S.-ROK relationship.

-- The October 9 North Korean nuclear test prompted a
domestic reassessment of South Korea's engagement policy with
the North; a process that has only just begun, and is being
resisted by current ROK leadership, but one that will likely
lead to a less forward-leaning and more conditional approach
toward Pyongyang. I highly recommend you encourage
FM-designate Song to engage in that rethinking.

-- North Korea's provocative actions have reminded the Korean
people of the continued value of the U.S.-ROK Alliance.
Simultaneously, a highly contentious debate over the transfer
of wartime operational control (OPCON) has caused many to
question the long-term commitment of the United States to its
ally. You can alleviate that concern by assuring we remain
fully committed to the defense of South Korea, while at the
same time encouraging the ROK to demonstrate its commitment
to us by moving forward on military transformation without
further delay, and by accepting a 50/50 share in the
non-personnel stationing costs for U.S. Forces Korea (USFK).

-- In addition to seeking reaffirmation of the Alliance,

FM-designate Song will want to explore with you a diplomatic
way ahead for Six-Party talks, to prevent further
destabilization of the situation on the Korean Peninsula. He
will above all be interested in consulting closely with you
on the "early harvest" aspect of the approach the U.S.
delegation will bring to the next round of the Six-Party
Talks.

-- While not a part of our foreign policy agenda, South
Korean domestic politics is also undergoing a state of
transition that will impact U.S.-ROK relations in the lead up
to the 2007 ROK presidential election. President Roh
currently has an approval rating of only 12 percent, and has
come under heavy fire for both his failed engagement policy
towards the North, and for doing damage to ROK relations with
Washington by deliberately appealing at times to
anti-American sentiment. FM-designate Song added to that
problem last month when he appeared to fault the United
States for engaging in more wars than any other country. A
good response to that would be to remind him of the
constructive role the United States has played in the modern
history of South Korean development, note the important
democratic principles shared by our two governments, and hold
out the prospects for the warmer relations that would
accompany a Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement and admission of
the ROK into the U.S. visa waiver program.

-- Your meeting also provides an opportunity to highlight and
encourage the continuation of valuable ROK contributions
around the world, as was highlighted by the President during
his September 2006 summit meeting with President Roh. These
include the South Korean troop dispatch to Iraq, ROK
willingness to lead a Regional Reconstruction Team (RRT) in
Irbil, the transition of ROK engineers and medical personnel
under NATO command in Afghanistan, as well as an upcoming
decision by the ROKG to make a sizable troop contribution to
the UNIFIL peacekeeping effort in Lebanon.

--------------
SUNSHINE POLICY SHAKEN, BUT NOT YET STIRRED
--------------


2. (C) The South Korean government was understandably shaken
by the news of the DPRK nuclear test. Speaking to the nation
that day, President Roh was typically frank, airing deep
personal doubts about the viability of his engagement policy.
He said it would be difficult to maintain his "Peace and
Prosperity" policy in the aftermath of the test, because
South Korea could not "have patience on everything, make
concessions on everything, and accept everything that the
North does." Since that day, however, and despite strong
criticism of his failed policy from conservative opponents
and the mainstream media, Roh has refused to apply sanctions
consistent with the strong tone of his condemnation of the
test. While many called on Roh to fire his national security
team, he has instead opted to name his leading foreign policy
advisor -- Song Min-soon -- to replace Ban Ki-moon as foreign
minister. Then, on November 13, the ROKG made three rather
disappointing announcements indicating after careful review
that it would make only minor adjustments to its North-South
policy, would support the letter (but hardly the spirit) of
UNSCR 1695 and 1718, and would "support" but not "endorse"
PSI. These decisions clearly demonstrate President Roh's
desire to try and salvage, rather than overhaul, his
engagement policy towards the North.


3. (C) Immediately after the nuclear test, the ROK announced
it was reviewing the entire engagement policy. As a first,
minor adjustment, the Roh government suspended emergency
shipments of cement and food that it had offered the DPRK
after the serious floods in the North in July. It also
decided to continue to suspend shipments of routine
humanitarian aid announced after the missile launches in
July, and totaling over a hundred million dollars. The real
debate, however, came down to what to do about the two
flagship engagement policy projects -- the Kaesong Industrial
Complex (KIC) and the Mount Kumgang tourism project. As you
are aware, these two projects vary considerably in terms of
financial benefits to the DPRK regime:

-- The Kaesong Industrial Complex, launched in 2002, houses
13 South Korean companies, employs more than 9,000 North
Koreans with the goal of introducing free-market economics
into the DPRK. It is estimated to bring the DPRK regime
roughly USD 150,000 per month in revenue, largely from the
DPRK government's "cut" of the salaries paid to KIC workers.

-- The Mt. Kumgang tourist area, since its launch in 1998,
has attracted more than one million South Korean visitors to
an enclave in which there is virtually no real contact
between South and North Korean citizens. It earns the DPRK
government a much more significant USD 1 million per month.

Given UNSCR 1718's narrow focus on WMD and WMD-related
financing, however, the Roh Administration has argued that
there is no requirement for them to freeze or curtail
activities at either Kaesong or Mt. Kumgang. You may wish to
once again stress our case that a literal, minimalist
interpretation of UNSCR 1718 fails to send the proper message
to Pyongyang, and that Seoul should, at a minimum, cut back
on the cash-cow Mt. Kumgang project.


4. (C) Despite the Roh Administration's efforts to justify
continued engagement with the North, deep division over the
efficacy of that policy is clearly evident within the
government, and throughout Korean society as a whole. The
powerful Ministry of Unification (MOU),which oversees all
aspects of the engagement policy, alongside members of the
ruling Uri Party, strongly oppose abandoning, or even scaling
back, North-South cooperation. Meanwhile, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT),Ministry of National
Defense (MND),and National Intelligence Service (NIS) have
argued for an immediate freeze of engagement projects so as
to send a strong signal to the DPRK and the international
community. Embassy contacts have confirmed that a fierce
inter-agency domestic political battle has consumed the
government over the past month at the highest levels. In
response to this deep political divide, the South Korean
government has, at long last, begun a serious reassessment of
its engagement policy with the North. While it is a process
that has only just begun, it will continue throughout the
upcoming ROK presidential campaign, most likely leading
toward a less forward-leaning, more conditional approach
toward Pyongyang in the future.

--------------
POLITICAL COMPROMISE ON PSI
--------------


5. (C) Whether to fully endorse the Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI) has also been hotly debated within the ROK
government since the October DPRK nuclear test. To date, the
Koreans have been participating on a selective basis as an
observer in certain PSI activities, but have declined to
endorse the Statement of Interdiction Principles. Efforts by
then-Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon, and Foreign
Minister-designate Song to bring the ROKG to endorse PSI have
met with a hostile reaction from members of the ruling Uri
party, led by Party Chairman Kim Geun-tae, who has falsely
alleged that joining PSI would require the ROK to engage in a
Cuban Missile Crisis-like naval blockade of the North,
breaking the Armistice and possibly triggering a war.
Efforts made to counter this misinformation have gained back
some ground, but the government remains reluctant to engage
in a bloody domestic political battle over the issue.
-------------- --
RESPOND TO THE NORTH BY SHORING UP THE ALLIANCE
-------------- --


6. (C) While the Roh Administration fights a rear-guard
action to rescue its besieged engagement policy, there is
widespread agreement in Seoul that the U.S.-ROK Alliance is
more necessary than ever to South Korean national security
interests; so necessary, the USG push for early transfer of
wartime operational control has prompted a backlash from many
segments of Korean society concerned that OPCON transfer will
lead to a diminished U.S. commitment to defend the ROK.
While you will find it difficult to persuade FM-designate
Song to change his thinking on the engagement policy, you may
find him more receptive to arguments that shoring up the
U.S.-ROK Alliance constitutes an important and appropriate
response to provocative behavior by the North. Following up
on the October Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) in
Washington, it would be particularly helpful to USFK if you
were to urge the ROK to demonstrate its support for the
Alliance by moving forward with us on military
transformation, and by agreeing to pay a 50 percent share of
USFK's non-personnel stationing costs. In turn, you can
greatly alleviate the security concerns of the Korean people
by assuring we remain fully committed to the defense of South
Korea.

--------------
THE WAY AHEAD ON SIX-PARTY TALKS
--------------


7. (C) As National Security Advisor to President Roh, and now
his Foreign Minister-designate, Song Min-soon is regarded as
President-Roh's closest advisor on South Korean foreign
policy issues in general, and the North-South policy in
particular. I recommend you use your meeting with him to
forge closer cooperation on encouraging the DPRK to begin the
process of implementing the September 2005 Joint Statement.
The South Koreans are with us on the need to send a strong
message to Pyongyang, but want to synchronize sanctions with
diplomacy. Song could be an important ally in delivering the
message to the North that it would be far wiser for Pyongyang
to choose the beneficial path ahead outlined in the joint
statement, than to continue on the road of sanctions and
international condemnation. You should make clear to Song
that the ROKG, whose reaction to the October 9 test has so
far been disappointing, needs to be prepared to put its
inter-Korean engagement policy on the line in order to test
the North Koreans' claim that it remains committed to giving
up its nuclear programs. Song should be encouraged to make
that clear to Pyongyang as well.


8. (C) You will find Song eager to focus your discussion on
achieving a diplomatic solution through the provision of
carrots to the DPRK. However, you can remind him that it was
the brandishing of the stick -- UNSCR 1695 and 1718 -- that
did far more than South Korean generosity or Chinese patience
to convince the DPRK to return to the talks. He will agree
that in light of the DPRK nuclear test it is not enough
simply for the North Koreans to return to the talks with the
same old demands. Rather, the United States, South Korea,
and our other partners at the Six-Party process need to focus
on the initial steps required of Pyongyang to reverse the
course of North Korean nuclearization.


9. (C) As National Security Advisor, Song shared with us his
preferred diplomatic approach. He recognized that in the
aftermath of the nuclear test the DPRK would need to
"front-load" its side of any deal aimed at restarting the Six
Party Talks. In his view, the key elements would be:

-- Commitments by North Korea to establish a new moratorium
on missile launches and nuclear tests upon resumption of the
Six Party Talks, as well as reaffirmation of the September
2005 Joint Statement and the 1992 North-South Declaration on
Denuclearization.

-- Agreement by North Korea to suspend operation of the
Yongbyon 5-megawatt reactor and invite IAEA inspectors at a
very early stage after the resumption of the Six Party Talks,
and to implement the rest of the Joint Statement on an
accelerated basis.

-- Corresponding agreement by the U.S. to address the frozen
DPRK accounts in Banco Delta Asia and hold bilateral
discussions on financial matters within the context of the
renewed Six Party Talks, as discussed in our earlier
consultations with the ROK.

--------------
FOCUS ON A BRIGHT FUTURE
--------------


10. (C) While North Korea remains one of your greatest
foreign policy challenges, U.S.-ROK relations are
by-and-large a good news story. In less than a generation,
the South Korean people have transformed their country from
an underdeveloped authoritarian regime to a full-fledged
democracy with the world's 11th-largest economy and home to
the next UN Secretary General. What has not changed,
however, is the deep importance the overwhelming (albeit too
often silent) majority of South Koreans attach to their
nation's relationship with the United States, as evidenced by
numerous opinion polls. Madam Secretary, these Koreans will
look to you to reaffirm our commitment to defend South Korea.
They also will support efforts to forge a more unified
diplomatic approach to the North.


11. (C) President Roh has earned his abysmally low 12
percent approval rating by, among other things, doing damage
to relations with Washington by playing to anti-American
sentiments. This makes the Korean people nervous at a time
when they have rediscovered their need for that alliance.
Song mimicked Roh's destructive tendency several weeks ago
when he appeared to blame the United States for engaging in
more wars than any other country. An appropriate response
would be to remind him of the constructive role the United
States has played in the modern history of South Korean
development, note the important democratic principles shared
by our two governments, and hold out the prospects for the
still warmer relations that would evolve from a Korea-U.S.
Free Trade Agreement and admission of the ROK into the U.S.
visa waiver program.


12. (C) Finally, your meeting provides an excellent
opportunity to follow up on the President's comments at the
September summit, and Under Secretary Nick Burns' strategic
dialogue with the ROKG on November 7, both of which
highlighted and encouraged continuation of valuable ROK
contributions around the world. These include the Zaytun
troop dispatch to Iraq (the third largest contingent there),
ROK willingness to lead a Regional Reconstruction Team (RRT)
in Irbil, the transition of ROK engineers and medical
personnel under NATO command in Afghanistan, and most
recently, their pending decision to send a sizable
contribution of ROK troops to the ongoing UNIFIL peacekeeping
effort in Lebanon. I encourage you to end your meeting with
FM-designate Song by highlighting these very positive aspects
of our larger relationship, for despite some difficulties in
the Alliance, we enjoy a more mutually-beneficial
relationship with the ROK than with almost any other country
in the world.
VERSHBOW