FORMER GYEONGGI GOVERNOR SOHN HAK-KYU ON NORTH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 003861

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL ABLD KS KN
SUBJECT: FORMER GYEONGGI GOVERNOR SOHN HAK-KYU ON NORTH
KOREA AND DOMESTIC POLITICS


Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) Over lunch with the Ambassador on November 3, GNP
Presidential hopeful and former Gyeonggi Province Governor
Sohn Hak-kyu asked many probing questions about where
U.S.-ROK relations were headed and offered his views on North
Korea and his assessment of the ROK political scene,
including his interpretation of the strategies of his
competitors in the race to obtain the GNP's candidacy. Sohn
gave a clear indication of his support for the U.S.-ROK
alliance, stating that the majority of Koreans were behind
the alliance and thanked the Ambassador for U.S. efforts to
restart the Six Party Talks. He said the Korean people
appreciated how much the U.S. had done for the peace and
economic prosperity they now enjoy. Sohn said he thought
Koreans were looking for a reform-minded conservative as
their next leader and suggested he was just such a candidate.


NORTH KOREA POLICY
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2. (C) During Sohn's 100-day tour of Korea from July to
October, Sohn made three political statements condemning
provocative acts by North Korea. Sohn said he supported
engagement with the North with the goal of inducing reform
and openness through exchanges and economic interaction. He
did not, however, think that the ROK should continue to
extend goodwill to the North in light of their recent
provocative acts. The ROK should stand firmly against the
North and express anger at the DPRK's nuclear test. He
regretted that because of the Roh administration's
reluctance, the ROK had lost an opportunity to improve
relations with the U.S. The Ambassador said the U.S. wanted
the ROK to take a strong stance in response to the nuclear
test, but emphasized that the U.S. was not telling the ROK
what to do.


3. (C) Because of the poor response by the ROKG to the
October 9 nuclear test, Sohn was worried that the ROK had
lost some of the trust of the U.S. He outlined the three
principles he thought the ROK should follow regarding North
Korea: first, the ROK cannot accept a nuclear North Korea;
second, if North Korea acts responsibly, they should be
rewarded with aid, and if they act irresponsibly, there
should be consequences; third, close cooperation with the
U.S. and the international community should be paramount.

ENGAGEMENT: DEBATE?
--------------


4. (C) Sohn agreed that now was the time to debate the
merits of the Sunshine Policy and the best way to conduct an
engagement policy. He said he wished former President Kim
Dae-jung had not recently spoken out in favor of continued
engagement with the North. Instead, Kim should have come out
strongly against the nuclear test by the North. If there
were a firm response from the ROK, then moving back to
engagement later would make sense. In all cases, it was
important to define the purpose of any engagement with the
North to encourage reforms and openness. The Ambassador
noted he had met earlier in the year with former President
Kim and Kim's private statements were more reasonable than
some of his public statements.

NEW CABINET
--------------


5. (C) The Ambassador asked Sohn if he thought the new
Unification Minister designate, Lee Jae-jeong, would
institute a change in policy toward North Korea. Sohn said
Lee Jae-jeong had no special knowledge about unification
issues and that Lee was "not a professional," and added that
now MOU would play a less important role in the policy
process. Sohn then asked the Ambassador what he thought of
Song Min-soon as the Foreign Minister-designate. He
mentioned that Song, before going to the NSC, was Sohn's
foreign policy advisor in Gyeonggi Province. The Ambassador
said Song had done many good things as National Security
Advisor and previously as the Six Party Talks representative,
but noted Song could benefit from being more careful about
some of his public statements. With the new cabinet coming

in, Sohn said the main issue was that if Roh continued to
attach a higher priority to North-South relations than to
international cooperation, ROK diplomatic failures would
continue to mount.

SIX PARTY TALKS
--------------


6. (C) The Ambassador explained the advantages of the Six
Party Talks in comparison with bilateral talks, noting that
each party had different forms of leverage vis-a-vis North
Korea. The most important thing in the wake of the nuclear
test was for North Korea to show through some early measures
that it was ready to dismantle its nuclear program. The next
round of the Six Party talks could not just be talk - there
must be results.


7. (C) Sohn asked if the U.S. was more concerned with the
proliferation of the North's nuclear technology than with
eliminating its nuclear programs. The Ambassador said that
the U.S. was equally concerned with stopping proliferation
and dismantling the North's nuclear program. If the North
dismantled its program, it would not be able to proliferate.
There was a problem with the 1994 Agreed Framework, according
to Sohn, since inspectors were only allowed into certain
areas so the North simply developed their nuclear program in
other places. The Ambassador agreed that the limited nature
of the inspections under the Agreed Framework was one of its
major flaws. This time, the North needed to open up for
nation-wide inspections to assure the world that such
deception could not occur again. If there are no early
commitments by the North to allow inspections, we will know
they are not serious about dismantlement.

THE "REAL TARGET" OF THE USG
--------------


8. (C) Sohn asked what the USG expected out of the ROKG in
response to the DPRK's nuclear test. The Ambassador said we
did not have specific demands but hoped that the ROK would
decide to respond in a clear and strong manner, befitting a
close ally. Even if the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) and
Mt. Kumgang projects continued, the ROKG could make
adjustments to limit cash flows to the DPRK regime that could
benefit its WMD programs, thereby sending a strong signal to
the North.

UNSCR 1718-WHAT DOES IT MEAN?
--------------


9. (C) Sohn asked if there was any meaning to A/S Hill's
statements that he preferred KIC to Mt. Kumgang. The
Ambassador replied that A/S Hill's personal statements
reflected the views of many who thought that KIC represented
a means to promote internal change in the DPRK by exposing
North Korean workers to capitalism, whereas Kumgang had
little transformational effect.

PSI CONFUSION
--------------


10. (C) The Ambassador responded to Sohn's inquiry about PSI
and said that participation in PSI did not require any
specific actions -- each country could choose the scope of
its involvement. PSI clearly did not equal war at sea as
some Korean critics claimed. In addition, PSI was based on
national and international law. The ROK could become a full
participant by endorsing the PSI principles, but refrain from
maritime interdictions. If the ROK decided not to
participate fully, it could continue to be an observer.

FUTURE OF NORTH KOREA
--------------


11. (C) Sohn said the most important factor for the future
of North Korea was the desire of China to continue to support
the regime. Some experts say that even though China wants to
maintain the KJI regime, transformation from within may occur
either through a coup d'etat or collapse. The Ambassador
said he hoped that at some point China decided that North
Korea was becoming an excessive burden and would start to
work to effect internal change. Sohn said that former

speaker of the Assembly Park Kwan-youn had told him that
unification may come as a landslide after a sudden collapse
in the North. He said many experts were expressing this view
more and more. While a soft landing was preferable, collapse
of the North had to be considered, the two agreed.


12. (C) President Bush cares deeply about the suffering of
the North Korean people, the Ambassador said. The President
wanted to use the Six Party Talks to encourage internal
change and reform in the North. The challenge was to
convince DPRK leaders that internal change was not the same
thing as regime change.

SPY SCANDAL
--------------


13. (C) Turning to domestic politics, Sohn said that the
recent arrest of five former student activists for suspected
collaboration with a Korean-American spying for the North was
a serious issue. He said that some on the left viewed the
arrests as simple violations of the National Security Law
while others claimed the detained former activists were, in
fact, spies working for the North. Sohn said he felt that
the former NIS Director Kim Seung-kyu operated independently
and was forced out of his position due to his pursuit of the
spy case.

PARTY SHAKE-UP
--------------


14. (C) Sohn said that former PM Goh Kun's November 1
announcement of plans to form a new, centrist reform party
would receive zero support from the Grand National Party
(GNP) and the overall prospects for the new party were dim.
He said that while some Uri Party members wanted to switch to
the GNP, it would be difficult. He said he expected lots of
political turmoil and change in early 2007. In January, the
"game" would start in earnest and lots of moves remained
until the December 2007 presidential election.


15. (C) In the GNP, Sohn said, support for former Seoul
Mayor Lee Myung-bak within the party was growing. Sohn was
not optimistic about Park Geun-hye's chances to obtain the
GNP nomination. Park had shown strong leadership as party
leader, but was not seen as a national leader. He said Lee's
strategy was to stay away from delicate issues such as North
Korea and focus on building popular support.

U.S.-ROK RELATIONSHIP
--------------


16. (C) On the U.S.-ROK relationship, Sohn expressed concern
that there were many in the ROKG who were emphasizing
self-determination and that they wanted to take back OPCON
from the U.S. as a sign of independence. Sohn said he was
worried that this trend was eroding support for the ROK in
the U.S. and asked what the ROK should do to change the
perception that it wanted to "go it alone." The Ambassador
said the most basic point was that the ROK should act like a
real ally in the sense that, while we may argue over specific
issues, we agree on fundamental principles and act in concert
at key points, such as after the North Korea nuclear test.
Solidarity in crucial times was the key to building trust.
Now, as the alliance becomes a more balanced partnership with
the transfer of OPCON, the focus should be on the safe
transfer of OPCON rather than on whether the transfer should
occur.

U.S.-PRC RELATIONS
--------------


17. (C) Sohn asked if U.S.-PRC relations had changed as a
result of the October 9 nuclear test. The Ambassador said
that particularly since the July 5 missile launch China has
exercised greater responsibility in seeking to influence
North Korea to reverse course. The U.S.-PRC relationship has
grown stronger as a result of the PRC's expanded role. Also,
the recent agreement facilitated by China to resume the
negotiations has validated the concept of Six Party Talks, in
our view.

SOHN VISIT TO USC, WASHINGTON

--------------


18. (C) Sohn asked the Ambassador for his opinion on whether
he should go to the United States to give a lecture at USC in
December and then go on to Washington. The Ambassador
supported a visit as an opportunity for Sohn to talk about
the state of the U.S.-ROK relationship and learn how Korea is
seen in the U.S. It's also a chance for Americans to get to
know one of the 2007 presidential candidates in advance of
the campaign.
VERSHBOW