KOREA'S NEW INTEL CHIEF NAMED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 003760

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL KS
SUBJECT: KOREA'S NEW INTEL CHIEF NAMED

REF: SEOUL 03719

Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b,d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (U) President Roh Moo-hyun named Kim Man-bok as the new
chief of the National Intelligence Service (NIS) on November

1. Kim is a career NIS officer and has been serving as the
Deputy at NIS since April of this year. The nomination came
in the wake of the abrupt resignation of the former NIS chief
Kim Seung-kyu on October 26. Kim was investigating a
high-profile espionage scandal (reftel) that some say is
partly to blame for his departure. Kim would likely assume
the Chief position in late November assuming that he receives
a favorable report from the National Assembly Intelligence
Committee. END SUMMARY.

BIOGRAPHIC DATA
--------------


2. (U) Kim was born in Busan in 1946. He received his
bachelor's degree in law from Seoul National University. He
joined NIS in 1974 where he has worked since that time. The
following are some of his career details:

- Worked overseas at foreign bureaus for 10 years.
- Member of advance team for Kim Dae-jung's trip to Pyongyang
in 2000.
- Trained at Sejong Institute where he became an acquaintance
of Lee Jong-seok in 2002.
- Appointed NSC Information Management Chief in 2003, under
the supervision of Lee Jong-seok.
- Chief of Planning and Coordination (Vice Minister level)
since 2004, led NIS reform.
- NIS Deputy Chief since April 2006.

WHERE IS NIS HEADED?
--------------


3. (SBU) By naming someone from within the organization, the
Blue House appears to be trying to maintain the
organizational stability and keep a firm grip on NIS (by
appointing a loyalist) at the end of this administration's
term. Skeptics point to Kim's promotion as evidence that the
Blue House is trying to cover-up the spy scandal that is in
the early stages of investigation within the NIS. Current
media coverage casts doubt on the notion of a cover-up by
citing President Roh's approval and support of the espionage
investigation that began in May when he was first approached
about the possibility of an investigation.

QUESTIONS SURROUNDING KIM'S DEPARTURE
--------------


4. (U) Although President Roh has been quoted as saying that
"I do not change horses on the battlefield," some critics say
that Roh requested Kim's resignation in an internal meeting
on October 25. The opposition Grand National Party (GNP)
offered its opinion on the matter by saying, "The resignation
on the 26th was definitely submitted under the Blue House's
influence" and went on to say Kim should remain in office at
least until the espionage case was fully investigated.
Various Uri Party officials as well as DLP Representative
Kwan Young-ghil's Chief of Staff told poloff that the NIS
switch was expected and not related to the latest espionage
scandal or dissatisfaction within the Blue House.

CONFIRMATION PROCESS
--------------


5. (C) Regardless of the reasons behind Kim's departure,
incoming Kim will experience loud opposition during the
confirmation process. As the only member of the cabinet who
is subject to a formal recommendation by a National Assembly
committee, some officials are concerned that the opposition
GNP Party may use the process as an opportunity to delay
Kim's approval thereby expressing their objection to other
cabinet appointments for which their input is not required
for ratification. Intelligence committee member Gong
Song-jin told poloff that even though there would be
resistance from the GNP, there was no way to block Kim's
nomination. He said the committee has tried to block
previous appointments to NIS, but had failed due to lack of
votes in the Uri dominated Intelligence Committee. He said
that as long as the Uri Party voted together, Kim would pass
through the committee. NOTE: The Intelligence Committee
that will review Kim's nomination is comprised of 7 Uri Party
members and 5 GNP members. END NOTE. Representative Choi
Jae-cheon (also a member of the Intelligence Committee),in
an internal Uri Party meeting, spoke out strongly against
Kim's appointment. He said that Kim was not qualified for
the position and would have retired had he not met Lee
Jong-seok while at the Sejong Institute. He saw this as
"code" personnel and internally expressed strong views
against Kim's nomination but, that said, allowed that Kim
would pass through the committee without major problems.
VERSHBOW