GNP PARLIAMENTARY VICE SPEAKER LEE SANG-DEUK ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 003684

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL ABLD KS KN
SUBJECT: GNP PARLIAMENTARY VICE SPEAKER LEE SANG-DEUK ON
NORTH KOREA AND ALLIANCE ISSUES

Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a lunch meeting on October 25 with the
Ambassador, GNP National Assembly Vice Speaker Lee expressed
concern over the Roh administration's handling of the
U.S.-ROK alliance, OPCON transfer, North Korea and expressed
general dissatisfatction with Roh. Lee's clear message was
that the GNP was the best partner for the U.S., and the point
unstated was that if the GNP came to power in 2008, many of
the current frictions between the U.S. and Korea would
disappear. The discussions were friendly. Accompanying the
Vice Speaker were two pro-U.S. GNP lawmakers Chung Hyung-keun
and Chun Yu-ok. POL Internal Chief accompanied the
Ambassador. END SUMMARY.

SECRETARY RICE'S VISIT TO SEOUL

SIPDIS
--------------


2. (C) During a lunch meeting on October 25, the Ambassador
said we were still working with the ROKG to come to a common
approach on how to respond to the October 9 nuclear test by
the DPRK and said Secretary Rice's visit to Korea went well.
The Secretary did not visit to request specific measures that
the ROKG should take toward North Korea. The Secretary's
message was that we need to send a strong signal of resolve
to North Korea, making clear that its provocative actions
were not acceptable to the international community. During
her October 19-20 visit to Korea she said that the U.S. would
stand by its allies, Korea and Japan, in the wake of the
nuclear test by North Korea on October 9 and meet fully our
security commitments.

UNSCR 1718
--------------


3. (C) The Ambassador said we understood that the ROK needed
to complete a review on ways to implement UNSCR 1718. In
addition, he noted it would be some time before the UN
Sanctions Committee spelled out the specific actions required
to implement UNSCR 1718, including the list of North Korean
companies that will be sanctioned. The U.S. goal remains to
denuclearize the Peninsula through diplomacy and the door
remains open for North Korea to come back to the Six Party
Talks if they are ready to denuclearize.


4. (C) The Ambassador said he appreciated the strong Grand
National Party (GNP) stance and the many National Assembly
members who have spoken out in favor of full implementation
of UNSCR 1718. At the same time, he was surprised by the
mixed signals sent by the ruling Uri party and by the visit
to Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) by the leader and some
members of the ruling party on October 20.


5. (C) However, despite the mixed signals, the Ambassador
said he was confident that the ROKG understood they needed to
make a strong response to the nuclear test. It was too early
and inappropriate to highlight differences between the U.S.
and the ROK, since at the end of the day the U.S. and the ROK
are and will be together. The Ambassador noted that the
perception of the U.S.-ROK relationship was often worse than
the reality.

KIC AND MT. KUMGANG
--------------


6. (C) GNP Supreme Council Member Chung Hyung-keun said that
the GNP thought both KIC and Mt. Kumgang projects should be
suspended until North Korea stopped its nuclear program. It
was a travesty that $2 billion had been given to the DPRK and
this cash had likely been used to develop missile and nuclear
programs. A/S Hill's statements about KIC and Mt. Kumgang
sent a mixed signal and Chung asked if Hill's message meant
that the United States supported KIC.


7. (C) The Ambassador said that the U.S. did not endorse
KIC, but rather acknowledged that there was a positive
rationale for this project relative to the Mt. Kumgang
tourism project. The ROK should review all of its forms of
leverage and ways that indirectly or directly fund the DPRK's
missile and nuclear programs. He reiterated that Hill's
comments were not a stamp of approval of the project but
rather a comparison of the two inter-Korean projects.



8. (C) The Ambassador emphasized that the U.S. supported
whatever changes the ROKG decided to make regarding the
inter-Korean projects, and that the changes were up to the
ROK. We have not asked the ROK to terminate either of its
projects, but even if the money going North does not go
directly into missile development, the ROK should be mindful
of any possibility that the money could go indirectly to
support these programs.

UNSCR 1718: KIC AND MT. KUMGANG INCLUDED?
--------------


9. (C) Rep. Chung said that the ROKG's interpretation of
UNSCR 1718 was that KIC and Mt. Kumgang were not specifically
mentioned and therefore the ROK could continue with both
inter-Korean economic projects. He said this was regrettable
since both projects provided cash to the North Korean regime.
He added the Roh administration was trying to convince people
that if the two inter-Korean projects were ended, it would
lead to confrontation on the Peninsula. From this, Roh has
said that the GNP wanted war and the Uri Party represented
peace.


10. (C) The Ambassador asserted that it might be true that
UNSCR 1718 did not specifically address KIC or Mt. Kumgang
and that it did not technically require any action by the
ROK. That said, he hoped the ROK would decide, at a minimum,
to make adjustments in their policy toward the projects that
were consistent with the spirit of UNSCR 1718.

NORTH KOREA-SIX PARTY TALKS
--------------


11. (C) The Ambassador said there was still a chance that
North Korea will return to the Six Party Talks. There should
be a step-by-step character to our approach to North Korea
and diplomacy was still the best way to solve the North Korea
problem. The Ambassador remarked that according to polls and
pundits, most GNP members were not against engagement, but
had different ideas on how to pursue it. Lee agreed that
this was an accurate perception and that engagement, in some
form, was the way forward with North Korea.


12. (C) The Ambassador mentioned that some people think our
push for change in North Korea equaled a desire for regime
change. The reality was that the U.S. wants internal changes
in North Korea and that if negotiations restarted we would
push for internal reforms in North Korea so that there could
be more durable peace on the Peninsula.

MILITARY DEVELOPMENT
--------------


13. (C) Lee asked if the U.S. could accept the North as a
nuclear power and the Ambassador said that the U.S. could not
accept a nuclear-armed North Korea at any time. Lee
expressed concern that the ROKG had announced a successful
test of a 1000km cruise missile October 25 and questioned the
ROKG's motivation for making the announcement during a time
of tension. Supreme Council Member Chun Yu-ok said that the
ROKG was using the announcement to make people think that the
ROKG was doing something in response to the October 9 nuclear
test.


14. (C) The Ambassador said that the cruise missile program
was part of an impressive set of efforts to modernize the ROK
military. The cruise missile capability highlighted the fact
that the ROK had a stronger technical capability than North
Korea and a commanding technological edge over the DPRK.

FORMER ROK PRESIDENT KIM DAE-JUNG
--------------


15. (C) Chun said she felt that former President Kim
Dae-jung's recent statements blaming the lack of U.S.-DPRK
dialogue on the current impasse were regrettable and asked
the Ambassador what he thought Kim's real views were.


16. (C) The Ambassador said that last time he met with
former President Kim in July he did not ask Kim to cancel his
planned visit to North Korea. They spoke about how to solve

the North Korea problem and he told Kim the U.S. was serious
about diplomacy and was ready to make many positive steps to
help the North Korean people if North Korea denuclearized.
Kim was skeptical of the U.S. approach, but made his own
decision to cancel his trip in the aftermath of the missile
launches.


17. (C) The Ambassador said the cancellation was likely due
to the fact that there were logistical difficulties and North
Korea did not seem interested in Kim's visit. He said that
Kim's private views were more similar to the U.S. views than
his public statements, and he was encouraged that Kim said
that North Korea should be opened, like the former Soviet
Union, through a gradual process that involved internal
change and reform.


18. (C) The Ambassador concluded that Kim's philosophy,
tactics and principles regarding North Korea were similar to
those of the USG but the question of how to implement the
policy was where there were some differences. Diplomacy, to
be effective, had to be backed by force and we had to
convince North Korea that there will be costs if they did not
fulfill their commitments.

PARK GEUN-HYE TO PYONGYANG?
--------------


19. (C) Rep. Chun said that there were reports that North
Korea invited Park Geun-hye to visit Pyongyang. The reports
came from Uri Party Rep. Choi Song and it was not an official
invitation. Chun said that Park had said the invitation was
absurd. Park had a hotline with Kim Jong-il but had not used
it.

ISOLATION
--------------


20. (C) In terms of isolating North Korea, the North's
leaders should understand that if they continued on their
path of provocative behavior, they will become more isolated,
the Ambassador said. China was doing its part by tightening
its controls on the flow of goods and money into North Korea
and imposing tighter restrictions on banking. Firmness was
the best way to achieve peace; President Bush did not want a
war on the Korean Peninsula and wanted to work closely with
our South Korean allies to ensure North Korea was deterred
and the Peninsula remained safe, the Ambassador said.

OPCON
--------------


21. (C) Lee brought up the October 20 agreement at the SCM
between the U.S. and ROK Defense Ministers and said that the
2009-2012 time period for the transfer of wartime OPCON
control was too soon. He said there should have been more
time to discuss the agreement and that the agreement had been
made too quickly.


22. (C) The Ambassador said the October 20 SCM agreement on
command relations was a good compromise on the timing issue
regarding OPCON transfer. There would be more detailed work
on the roadmap to OPCON transfer to be completed by spring

2007. Despite the transfer, the alliance, the U.S.
commitment and U.S. power will remain integral elements in
deterring North Korean threats. The agreement on OPCON
transfer presented a realistic roadmap to a natural
transition and the alliance will be stronger after the
transition. The Ambassador said that the trip by Vice
Speaker Lee to Washington D.C. and the concerns the GNP
leadership voiced to U.S. leaders had made an impact and
helped convince the U.S. to be more flexible regarding the
timing of the transfer.


23. (C) Lee said the Roh government would use the transfer
of OPCON as a political issue during the 2007 campaign and
claim they wrested "sovereignty" from the U.S. He said he
thought the U.S. agreed to the transfer of OPCON to limit
anti-American sentiment in Korea but in fact he said that
almost 80 percent of Korean people believe in a strong
U.S.-ROK alliance, as evidenced by ROK commitment of troops
in Vietnam and Iraq and support for U.S. global initiatives.
Lee looked forward to building on this strong alliance during

the next ROK administration.


24. (C) The Ambassador said that the concern over
anti-American sentiment was not the driving consideration
that led to the transfer of OPCON but rather that we would
have a healthier alliance if the ROK carried more
responsibility. We now had an agreement; the focus should be
on safe implementation of the transfer.

2007 ELECTIONS
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25. (C) As the lunch finished, the Ambassador asked how Lee
felt about the political prospects of his brother, former
Seoul Mayor and GNP Presidential candidate Lee Myung-bak.
Lee said that in Korea, for cultural reasons, he must stay
out of his brother's political race. He noted that the 2002
GNP candidate, Lee Hoi-chang, had a strong lead over all
challengers for a long time and lost, so therefore no one in
the GNP attached any particular meaning to the latest poll
data.
VERSHBOW