DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER ALEKSEYEV'S READOUT OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 003591

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL KS
SUBJECT: DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER ALEKSEYEV'S READOUT OF
TRIP TO PYONGYANG

Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b,d).

SUMMARY
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1. (C) Assistant Secretary Hill, Vice Foreign Minister Chun
Yung-woo and Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Alekseyev of
Russia met in a trilateral meeting to hear Alekseyev's
readout of his meetings in Pyongyang on October 13. In his
high-level meeting with DPRK officials, Alekseyev made it
clear that Russia was very displeased with the DPRK's
decision to conduct a nuclear test following hours of
consultations in which Moscow had argued against such an
action. Although Russia has little it can do now in the form
of sanctions, Alekseyev was clear that if a second test
occurred, Russia would support full and comprehensive
sanctions against North Korea. Despite the DPRK's rhetoric
in recent statements, Alekseyev said he thought that the DPRK
was ready to come back to the negotiating table, without
preconditions. According to Alekseyev, the key was to
provide a way for the North to come back to the table while
allowing them to save face. Alekseyev said he planned to
talk with the DPRK Ambassador in Moscow again in 10 days to
see what the mood in Pyongyang was at that time; allowing
them some time to absorb some of the pressure as a result of
UNSCR 1718. Hill said he would like to see a proposal for a
"roadmap" from the North Koreans or some substance to back up
their alleged desire to return to the talks before Washington
would take their comments seriously. Hill also outlined the
Secretary's agenda for the balance of her Asian trip after

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leaving Seoul. Hill focused on three areas that the
Secretary will cover: UNSCR 1718 and how it will be

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implemented, PSI as it relates to Iran and the DPRK, and a
path back to negotiations with North Korea. END SUMMARY.

ALEKSEYEV'S TRIP TO PYONGYANG
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2. (C) As the Six-Party Talks negotiators from the U.S.,
Korea, and Russia got together for a meeting, the focus was
on Alekseyev, who had just returned from meetings in
Pyongyang on October 13. Alekseyev gave a readout of
Moscow's contact with the DPRK in the time leading up to the
October 9 test as well as the most recent meeting on the
13th. Alekseyev said that he was briefed by the DPRK on the
logic behind its nuclear test and what they hoped to achieve.
The DPRK claimed that they were hoping to secure a more
respected position at the negotiating table and a more secure
environment for their people. "We need to show the world
that we are not bluffing. No one takes us seriously,
especially the U.S." were two statements that Alekseyev
quoted from DPRK officials showing their reasoning for going
forward with the test. Alekseyev told them to "think twice"
before doing the test because it was sure to bring the
opposite effect. He also assured the DPRK that a test would
bring about a tough UNSC resolution that Russia would likely
support. Alekseyev also described the North Koreans'
sentiment that they had been betrayed twice by Russia
throughout the recent events: once when Russia supported
UNSCR 1695 and again when Russia gave a "tense" reaction to
the nuclear test.


3. (C) Alekseyev said that Deputy FM Kim Gye-Gwan had said
the North was very interested in coming back to the Six-Party
Talks, without preconditions, and a test was a means to that
end. Yet, the DPRK was afraid of appearing weak if they
unilaterally announced their return to the talks. Alekseyev
expressed confidence that once the DPRK started to feel the
pinch of the new sanctions in the next month or two, it would
have even more incentive to come back to the talks. Since it
was still not clear how China would send a clear message of
its anger and frustration with the North, the timetable for
the DPRK to return the talks remains unclear. Alekseyev was
confident throughout the meeting that the DPRK regime could
not survive under the current situation of international
isolation and with the forthcoming implementation of UNSCR

1718.

PYONGYANG PRESS COVERAGE OF TEST
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4. (C) According to Alekseyev, the press in Pyongyang has

published very little about the test. What was published
portrayed the test as a scientific experiment and not a great
national accomplishment. Alekseyev noted that his
observation was based on the publicly available media under
the control of the central government and expected that the
internal state communications (for members of the elite)
carried a much different story.

A WAY BACK TO THE TABLE
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5. (C) Shifting the conversation to the future, Alekseyev
suggested that "two-way traffic" between the U.S. and the
DPRK was necessary in order for the DPRK to save face while
coming back to the table. One idea was for the USG to
release its grip on DPRK funds at Banco Delta Asia.
Alekseyev was quick to point out that the DPRK was not
looking to set preconditions, but simply to save face. When
A/S Hill suggested that Secretary Rice wanted to see Yongbyon
frozen and IAEA inspectors returned at the outset of resumed
Six-Party Talks, Alekseyev said that would be too drastic in
the short term. Hill said he would like to see a proposal
for a "roadmap" from the North Koreans or some substance to
back up their alleged desire to return to the talks before
Washington would take their comments seriously. Hill added
that nobody in Washington was interested or had any
confidence that the North would negotiate in good faith.

EFFECTS OF A SECOND TEST
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6. (C) When asked how Russia would respond in the event of a
second nuclear test by the DPRK, Alekseyev quickly responded
that they would support "all-around sanctions, a full
blockade." He went on to explain that he had invested a
significant amount of time to explain the ramifications of a
nuclear test to DPRK officials. Despite their understanding
of his points, they proceeded with the test; much to
Alekseyev's surprise. After they went forward with the test,
Alekseyev said he was concerned because the DPRK obviously
did not care what other people thought or was too far out of
touch to understand the consequences of its actions.
Therefore, Alekseyev said, a second test would show that the
DPRK is completely unreliable and they needed to be reined in
more tightly.

SECRETARY RICE IN RUSSIA

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7. (C) A/S Hill outlined the Secretary's agenda for the
balance of her Asian trip after leaving Seoul. Hill focused
on three areas that the Secretary will cover: UNSCR 1718 and
how it will be implemented, PSI as it relates to Iran and the
DPRK, and a path back to negotiations with North Korea.
VERSHBOW