DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER DISCUSSES UNSCR 1718

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 003559

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2016
TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP KS KN
SUBJECT: DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER DISCUSSES UNSCR 1718

REF: STATE 172816

Classified By: DCM Bill Stanton. Reasons 1.4 (b),(d).

SUMMARY
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1. (C) On October 16, the DCM presented reftel points on
UNSCR 1718 to Park In-kook, Deputy Foreign Minister for
Policy Planning and Public Affairs, urging that South Korea,
along with other countries, come up with concrete steps to
implement the resolution. Park said the ROKG welcomed UNSCR
1718 and would adhere to it, but Seoul was eager to hear more
specificity on what the resolution required, noting for
example some of the language was vague on concepts like
"luxury" goods. He added that the ROKG had conducted a
four-hour inter-agency meeting the previous day and decided
that UNSCR 1718 did not directly apply to the ROK's two main
economic projects in North Korea: the Kaesong Industrial
Complex and the Mt. Kumgang tourism project. The DCM
responded "luxury" goods need not be so difficult to define
as evidenced by the ROK's own import regulations that levied
higher tariffs on luxury automobiles. He also questioned the
value of keeping the Mt. Kumgang tourism resort open.
Countries now had the opportunity to find ways to implement
UNSCR 1718 to send a clear message to North Korea that its
actions were unacceptable. END SUMMARY.

ROKG: UNSCR IMPLEMENTATION COMPLICATED BY DETAILS
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2. (C) During an October 16 meeting with Park In-kook,
Deputy Minister for Policy Planning and Public Affairs at the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the DCM delivered
reftel points encouraging Seoul to consider ways to implement
UNSCR 1718. After carefully reviewing the points, Park said
that Seoul welcomed UNSCR 1718. UNSC approval of the
resolution in less than a week was impressive. One merit of
the resolution was the high moral standard of the
resolution's language calling for sanctions. One of the
demerits, he added, was that it lacked the specificity to
allow quick implementation. More efforts were needed to fill
in the details of what the resolution actually required.


3. (C) Park continued that, for example, section 8(d) of the
resolution called on member states to freeze funds or
financial assets controlled by persons or entities designated
by the Sanctions Committee or Security Council. The ROKG
needed to wait to find out who these persons or entities were
designated to be. Similarly, section 8(e) authorized travel
bans on persons likewise designated. Park understood that an
earlier draft of the resolution had language that such
designations would be conducted by "relevant national
authorities" but during UNSC deliberations the language had
been modified. Other examples of unclear language, Park
said, included the definition of "luxury" goods. It would
have been better if UNSCR 1718 included fewer vague terms to
allow for more efficient implementation.


4. (C) The DCM responded that as a sovereign country the ROK
had the opportunity to decide how to implement UNSCR 1718 and
respond to the North Korean nuclear test. It was not that
difficult, however, to give meaning to the spirit of UNSCR

1718. Moreover, trade with the DPRK was so small for most
countries, it should not be hard to identify what goods
should be considered luxury items. It was not right that the
DPRK continued to import luxury goods and continued to
develop nuclear weapons while it also continued to receive
humanitarian aid from donor countries to feed its citizens.
The DCM noted that ROKG officials had already worked out for
their own domestic purposes tariff rates on "luxury" imported
automobiles or imported liquors, so it was not unreasonable
to apply a similar standard to goods destined for North Korea.

ROKG: WHAT DO WE HAVE TO DO?
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5. (C) Park said that the ROKG was aware of an earlier U.S.
Executive Order that had targeted 12 companies and 1 person
for evidence of involvement in WMD-related activities, but
even these entities were not mentioned in the UN resolution.
Park asked if the USG was requesting in this demarche any
specific actions to be taken, for example, against any known
DPRK funds or financial assets in South Korea or specific
persons or entities. He stated that the previous day,
following a four-hour inter-agency meeting, he had given a
background briefing to ROK media and conveyed the ROKG view
that UNSCR 1718 did not apply to the Kaesong Industrial
Complex or the Mt. Kumgang tourism project, as long as the
projects were not clearly linked to DPRK WMD efforts. He
asked if the USG shared this view with the ROKG.


6. (C) The DCM reiterated that the demarche intended to ask
capitals how they planned to implement UNSCR 1718 and to
solicit their suggestions for cooperation. Noting that while
he had no specific guidance about the applicability of UNSCR
1718 to Kaesong and Kumgang, he personally questioned the
Kumgang project, more so than the Kaesong Industrial Complex.
The logic behind the KIC was that through continued
interaction between North Korean workers and South Korean
managers the ROK would be able to expose the North to South
Korea and help to promote economic change and openness. The
Kumgang tourism project, however, accomplished nothing of
that sort. Most of the workers were ethnic Koreans from
China, and the DPRK had taken extreme measures to prevent
contact between North Koreans and ROK or international
tourists at Kumgang. The site was of understandable cultural
importance for ROK visitors, but did the benefit justify the
cost of $20 million in annual fees that the DPRK got to spend
however it wanted? Again, personally speaking, he wondered
why the tourism project had not been touched after the North
Korean missile launches and apparent nuclear test. Park had
no specific response to these points but mentioned that the
ROK Unification Ministry made the case that the per person
fees for visiting Mt. Kumgang were roughly equivalent to visa
fees that most countries charged for tourists.

COMMENT
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7. (C) Deputy Minister Park's deliberate presentation of the
perceived difficulties of implementing UNSCR 1718 underlies
ROKG unwillingness, at this time, to take a tougher approach
to North Korea. Despite initial ROKG statements that the ROK
would need to reexamine its engagement policy following a
nuclear test, the ROKG so far seems to be focusing only on
what it is required to do to meet international obligations
rather than what more it could do in the spirit of UNSCR

1718. END COMMENT.
VERSHBOW