PSI: ROKG NEEDS MORE TIME

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 003558

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2016
TAGS: MNUC PARM PREL PHSA KNNP EWWT KS KN
SUBJECT: PSI: ROKG NEEDS MORE TIME

REF: STATE 172682

Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).


1. (U) This is an action message. Please see para 10.

SUMMARY
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2. (C) In response to reftel request, the Ambassador on
October 15 raised PSI with National Security Advisor Song
Min-soon. Separately, DCM also conveyed reftel points on
October 16 to Park In-kook, Deputy Foreign Minister for
Policy Planning and Public Affairs. While both Song and Park
expressed appreciation for the non-paper that addressed many
of their questions, they noted that significant public
misunderstandings remained as to whether PSI entailed a
virtual blockade of North Korea and would lead to a military
confrontation. These misunderstandings had politicized the
PSI debate in the ROK. For now, both Song and Park believed,
the ROKG needed more time before it could fully endorse PSI,
pending further developments in the nuclear situation in
North Korea. The Ambassador and DCM emphasized that PSI did
not involve sovereignty issues because all participation and
decisions were made based on national laws and interests.
They also stressed the urgent need to send a strong political
message to North Korea at this time. DFM Park even suggested
that it might be helpful if Secretary Rice during her visit
clarified that PSI need not be linked to military action and
that the ROKG would not be forced to do anything it did not
want to do. Unification Minister Lee Jong-seok was also
negative on PSI in an October 16 meeting (septel). END
SUMMARY.
.
NSA SONG MIN-SOON
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3. (C) During a previously scheduled breakfast meeting on
October 15, the Ambassador conveyed to ROK National Security
Advisor the reftel points on the Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI),emphasizing the flexible nature of the
initiative and highlighting the need to send a strong
political message to North Korea. Song said that while
internal ROKG deliberations continued, the debate had become
more heated. The South Korean public, media, and politicians
had the impression that PSI was an aggressive program,
involving stopping North Korea vessels on the high seas by
force. Therefore, the opposition Grand National Party (GNP)
was very much in favor, while the ruling Uri Party was
adamantly opposed. Song said that the ROKG would not
"actively oppose" full participation in PSI, but, for now, it
was caught in the political crossfire. Seoul would need some
more time to come to a decision, which would in turn depend
on further developments in North Korea and the international
community's response.


4. (C) The Ambassador said that, on PSI and other measures
relating to the implementation of UNSCR 1718, South Korea
must avoid the perception that it was only doing the minimum.
The international community had to show a unified reaction;
there was no other way to halt the DPRK's provocative
behavior and get back to diplomatic solutions.
.
DFM PARK IN-KOOK
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5. (C) During an October 16 meeting with Park In-kook,
Deputy Minister for Policy Planning and Public Affairs at the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the DCM delivered
reftel points requesting that the ROKG endorse the PSI
Statement of Interdiction Principles and its full
participation in the PSI during the visit of Secretary Rice
to Seoul on October 19. The DCM informed Park that as the
Ambassador had explained the previous day to National
Security Advisor Song Min-soon, PSI endorsement required no
minimal involvement and that the ROKG would still be able to
determine its participation. In instances where maritime
interdiction was appropriate, the decision on the use of
military or maritime police depended on a country's legal
authorities and the ROKG would make its own determination
based on its national laws and interests. The key was that
the ROKG should send the important political message that it
was actively cooperating with international efforts to combat
proliferation.


6. (C) After a close reading of the non-paper, DFM Park
expressed appreciation for the answers to many of the
questions on PSI that he personally had submitted to the
Department last week through the Korean Embassy. He said he
had briefed ROK media outlets after a four-hour interagency
meeting the previous day that: (1) UN Security Council
Resolution 1718 had no direct relationship with PSI; (2) the
ROKG was actively involved in participating in the global
non-proliferation effort; and (3) in consideration of North
Korea's apparent nuclear test and in the wake of UNSCR 1718,
the ROKG would seriously consider further cooperation.


7. (C) Park added that what he did not tell the press was
his view that the biggest remaining obstacle was public
misunderstanding that PSI entailed a blockade of North Korea.
This had overly politicized the issue in South Korea. The
ruling Uri Party objected to ROKG participation because it
saw PSI as tantamount to a military blockade of North Korea
that could invite military confrontation. The more
conservative opposition GNP, on the other hand, also
misconstrued PSI as a blockade but one that was needed to
respond to North Korean provocations. North Korea, for its
part, said that any blockade was a violation of the Armistice
Agreement. Park did not know if the DPRK understood what PSI
really was or just wanted to stoke the debate, but he noted
that the DPRK probably was unclear as well. The DCM
interjected that many in the ROK seemed not to realize that
inter-Korean maritime agreements already allowed for mutual
inspection of vessels, so PSI could fit current ROKG legal
practices. Park replied that the ROKG leadership understood
the realities of PSI, but in light of ROK political
polarization, needed more time to conduct a public diplomacy
effort to explain PSI.


8. (C) Park said a related problem was to find a way to
address concerns that PSI would trigger military
confrontation. Speaking off the record, he suggested it
would be helpful if during the visit of Secretary Rice that
her delegation find a way to reemphasize that PSI need not be
linked to military action and that the ROKG would not be
forced to do anything it did not want to do.


9. (C) Finally, Park asked the DCM to follow-up on one more
PSI question he had related to ROK sovereignty. PSI involved
a global network to interdict WMD-related materials, but some
countries had more developed assets and capabilities than
others. Park said his lingering question was whether some
countries might provide assistance even if unwanted by the
potential recipient. In other words, would the ROK need to
accept training or regulations that it was not ready to
receive. The DCM said he would report the question, but it
was his understanding that, again, the ROKG would have the
discretion to determine the level and nature of its
involvement in any PSI exercise or operation. The ROK
already had procedures on the books to inspect cargo sent
along inter-Korean roads to the Kaesong and Mt. Kumgang
projects, and this might be a good opportunity for greater
enforcement of ROKG laws.


10. (C) ACTION REQUEST: The Deputy Foreign Minister asked
whether countries would be provided unrequested assistance.
Post requests guidance on how to respond to this ROK inquiry.
END ACTION REQUEST.
VERSHBOW