REACTION TO DPRK TEST: ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVES

UNCLAS SEOUL 003492

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: MNUC PREL PGOV KS KN
SUBJECT: REACTION TO DPRK TEST: ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVES

SUMMARY
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1. (SBU) Local academic observers in South Korea provided
the Embassy on October 10 and 11 with their takes on the DPRK
nuclear test. Professor of Korean Studies and DPRK cultural
analyst Brian Myers argued that the DPRK conducted the test
primarily for internal reasons to recover from failed missile
launches in July. University of North Korean Studies
Professor Ryoo Kihl-jae thought that the North's desire for
bilateral talks with the USG was the key factor. Historian
Andrei Lankov had expected the North to wait longer before
testing in order to ratchet up tensions, but assessed that
UNSC sanctions would be relatively short lived because China,
South Korea, and Russia would look for reasons to return to
non-confrontational policies. END SUMMARY.

PROFESSOR MYERS: NUKE TEST TO RECOUP FROM MISSILE FAILURE
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2. (SBU) Dr. Brian Myers, Professor of Korean Studies at
Busan's Dongseo University, on October 10 opined that the
DPRK probably conducted a nuclear test to remedy a loss of
face suffered from a less-than-impressive missile launch
display in July. For the DPRK, a failure often provided the
impetus for an even bigger provocation. The 1968 DPRK
seizure of the U.S.S. Pueblo, for example, shortly followed a
failed DPRK commando raid on the Blue House. The nuclear
test, Myers argued, was not a DPRK negotiating ploy because
North Korean leader Kim Jong-il (KJI) did not seek talks with
the USG as much as he sought to bolster his own cult by being
seen as intimidating the USG. The North's quick test shortly
after its announcement of its intention to test underscored
that the DPRK was not seriously interested in trading a test
for negotiations. (NOTE: An occasional contributor to the
Atlantic Monthly and the New York Times, Myers teaches
courses on North Korea propaganda, media, and culture. An
American, Myers received his Ph.D. in Korean Studies from the
University of Tuebingen in Germany. END NOTE.)


3. (SBU) Myers speculated that KJI would be discouraged that
the USG made statements after the test indicating it was more
worried about DPRK proliferation than the danger posed by
North Korea to United States. This would signal that the USG
did not take the North Korean threat seriously. The North,
Myers postulated, would not sell nuclear technology to others
and lose the credit to someone else for attacking the United
States.


4. (SBU) Myers was not surprised China was unable to prevent
a DPRK nuclear test because North Korean propaganda
consistently argued that Koreans were the superior race and
therefore had little reason to listen to the Chinese. China,
he said, always had limited influence, even during the Korean
War when a beleaguered DPRK refused PRC efforts to control
train station operations in North Korea to reinforce troops
fighting UN forces. USG officials should pay more attention
to DPRK propaganda because it reflected official DPRK culture
and was not just a cynical tool used by the DPRK leadership,
Myers said.


5. (SBU) Asked about ROK perceptions, Myers thought the
nuclear test would be a "turning point" for South Koreans who
were becoming tired of North Korean provocations. His
students indicated to him over the past few days that South
Korean patience would end as soon as the North acted in a way
that negatively affected the ROK economy. (See Myers' NYT
piece.)

PROFESSOR RYOO: DPRK FOCUSED ON USG
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6. (SBU) University of North Korean Studies professor Ryoo
Kihl-jae told poloff on October 10 what he thought of the
possible nuclear test by the North. (NOTE: Ryoo is an expert
on North Korea and particularly specializes in the study of
the regime. END NOTE.) He said that while there were
internal factors that contributed to the North,s decision to
test a nuclear device, the relationship with the U.S. was the
most important factor.


7. (SBU) According to a recent defector Ryoo had talked to,
the test was an extreme measure intended to improve relations
with USG by ending the Six Party Talks and moving to direct
talks with the United States. According to the defector,
unless the USG accepted the DPRK as a nuclear state, the
North could move further toward a policy of extreme
brinksmanship that could lead all the way to war. The recent
defector said that if the USG accepted the North as a nuclear
state, the DPRK could give the USG all it wanted in strategic
terms.


8. (SBU) Professor Ryoo thought there was room for
negotiation but not through the Six Party Talks format. He
said during multilateral talks the DPRK felt it could not be
open and frank. He said he hoped that the USG and DPRK would
find a way to move beyond the current stalemate and that he
thought the North wanted better relations with the USG.

HISTORIAN LANKOV: UNSC SANCTIONS UNLIKELY TO ENDURE
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9. (SBU) Russian historian and author Andrei Lankov, who has
focused on Korea for over two decades and writes a column for
the Korea Times, on October 11 said he was not surprised that
the DPRK announced its intention to test on October 3, but he
was surprised that the test came so soon, expecting the DPRK
to wait one or two years, all the while ratcheting up the
tension. As for the changes brought by the test, Lankov said
the fundamental situation had not changed, given the DPRK's
clear prior determination to possess nuclear weapons. Lankov
dismissed the chances that UNSC sanctions would have much
effect. The sanctions will be in place for one or two years,
he estimated, and then China, Russia and the ROK will find a
reason to return to non-confrontational and aid policies.
VERSHBOW