ROH-ABE SUMMIT DOMINATED BY HISTORY AND NORTH KOREA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 003465

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/11/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC KS KN JN
SUBJECT: ROH-ABE SUMMIT DOMINATED BY HISTORY AND NORTH KOREA

Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b),(d).

SUMMARY
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1. (C) MOFAT Asia Bureau DG Lee Hyuk told POL M/C on October
11 that Japanese Prime Minister Abe's summit with President
Roh in Seoul on October 9 provided momentum for an
improvement in the strained bilateral relationship. The
summit meeting, conducted in a frank and sincere manner, was
dominated by history issues, which took up 80 minutes in the
two-hour encounter. The North Korean nuclear test, which
occurred earlier on October 9, was the other major issue
discussed. The two leaders tentatively agreed to meet on the
sidelines of APEC next month in Hanoi, but Roh was
noncommittal on an invitation to visit Japan in 2007. Lee
commented that Abe, and especially his wife, who speaks good
Korean and is a fan of Korean TV dramas, made good
impressions in Seoul and encouraged hope that an Abe
administration would contribute to improved ties. A Japanese
Embassy official separately confirmed that the GOJ viewed the
summit favorably, and said that the surprise DPRK nuclear
test had highlighted the ROK-Japan common regional security
interests. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) On October 11, Lee Hyuk, Director General of the Asia
and Pacific Affairs Bureau at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and Trade (MOFAT) provided POL M/C with a detailed readout of
President Roh Moo-hyun's October 9 summit with Japanese Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe. Lee characterized the Abe visit as a
good trip that was conducted in a frank and respectful
manner. The summit, originally planned for 90 minutes, ran
for two hours with about 80 minutes devoted to history issues
and the remaining time spent on other bilateral topics and
the North Korean nuclear test. A 30-minute small group
meeting was followed by a larger plenary session.
.
OPENING POSITIONS
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3. (C) In the opening small group session, Prime Minister
Abe commented that the ROK-Japanese relationship was
important but irritants needed to be overcome to develop a
future-orientated partnership that benefited not only Korea
and Japan but the rest of Asia. Korea and Japan shared a
common view on democracy, freedom, and human rights and both
countries had contributed to international peace and
stability. Over the past sixty years, Japan was deeply
remorseful over the suffering and damage caused by its
actions in WWII. Since then, Japan had championed freedom,
democracy, and human rights and this policy would remain.
Japan also took seriously the views of Korea, and Abe would
do his best to build a more future-oriented partnership based
on trust and understanding.


4. (C) President Roh agreed that the bilateral relationship
was important, so the two leaders should build a
future-oriented partnership to influence the political and
economic landscape of Asia. It was regrettable that
political difficulties had become an impediment for the
further promotion of the bilateral partnership. Japanese
leaders should understand how Koreans feel and show a correct
perception of history. Korea suffered from Japanese colonial
rule and would remain concerned about Japanese actions for
the foreseeable future until these history issues were
resolved. Roh expected Abe's visit would create a
breakthrough in the relationship and expressed hope that both
sides would reinvigorate cooperation for a sustainable
relationship.
.
YASUKUNI, JOINT HISTORY COMMISSION, COMFORT WOMEN
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5. (C) In the large group session, Roh brought up the
Yasukuni Shrine emphasizing that in 2001 President Kim
Dae-jung and Prime Minister Koizumi, on the margins of the
APEC meeting in Shanghai, explored the option of Japan
building a memorial separate from the Yasukuni Shrine.
Koizumi at the time reportedly undertook to look into it.
However, five years later there was little movement. Roh
urged Abe to pay more attention to the matter.


6. (C) Abe replied that his own visits in the past to
Yasukuni were meant to pay respect to those who sacrificed
their lives for Japan and pray for eternal peace. His intent
was not to glorify militarism. Abe said that he was mindful
that visits by Japanese leaders could be viewed differently,
and they had become political and diplomatic issues. Now
that he was a leader he preferred not to mention possible
visits to Yasukuni. He undertook to properly deal with this
issue to overcome policy problems. He would look carefully
at the issue of separate memorial sites, noting that such a
move was not easy because there were diverse opinions in
Japan, especially among the families of Japanese whose
ancestors suffered during WWII.


7. (C) Roh and Abe agreed to launch a second Joint History
Commission by the end of the year. According to DG Lee, the
first scholarly meeting of the Joint History Commission ran
from 2002-2005. When then Prime Minister Koizumi visited
Korea in 2005 both sides agreed to launch a second commission
but it got delayed by Japan's inability to appoint members to
its panel; Lee said the ROK had already decided on its own
contingent.


8. (C) Roh insisted that a perception existed in Korea that
conservative Japanese politicians were now denying Japanese
military involvement in the wartime "comfort women" issue.
In 1993, however, Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Kono
announced that Japanese government authorities indeed had
been involved. Roh urged Japan to clarify its position. Abe
responded that there was no change in the Japanese
Government's position since Kono's 1993 statement.
.
SUMMITS, TRADE
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9. (C) Abe invited Roh to visit Japan in early 2007 and said
the two capitals should revive shuttle diplomacy. Roh
remained noncommittal about visiting Japan in 2007, saying he
would need to consider the wisdom of shuttle diplomacy, but
stated that he would like to go to Japan at an "appropriate
time." Roh and Abe tentatively agreed to meet again on the
sidelines of APEC in Hanoi in November and possibly at the
EAS meeting in the Philippines in December.


10. (C) Abe noted that the Japanese and Korean economies
accounted for about one-eighth of the world economy. The two
leaders should now accelerate discussions for a ROK-Japanese
Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA). Roh supported EPA
negotiations in principle, but said a big difference remained
on rates of concessions for agricultural and fisheries
products. Roh urged Japan to change its position on
concession rates to revive joint negotiations.
.
DPRK NUCLEAR ISSUE
--------------


11. (C) Turning to North Korea, Abe said the DPRK missile
tests in July and the day's nuclear test sharply changed the
security landscape in the region and nuclear proliferation
would become a bigger threat to Northeast Asian and global
security. The international community had to send a strong
message to North Korea that if it failed to abandon its
nuclear programs, the situation for North Korea would only
worsen. The United Nations and concerned nations should
consult more closely, and Korea-Japan-U.S. coordination was
more key than ever. Abe also raised the abduction issue,
indicating ROK-Japanese cooperation could help to resolve the
matter with North Korea.


12. (C) Roh agreed that the DPRK nuclear issue was a serious
threat to both Korea and Japan and to global nonproliferation
efforts. What was needed was a focused response that would
get North Korea to abandon its nuclear ambition. The message
must be firm, cool, and strategic. Roh added that Seoul and
Beijing, which had placed a greater importance on dialogue,
now had no other choice but to get firmer on North Korea.
For a strong response to be effective, the United States and
other Six Party members needed to respond in a
well-coordinated manner. Roh also said that Seoul would help
Tokyo to resolve the abduction issue, and recommended that
Tokyo not separate nuclear, missile, and abduction matters.
.
ATMOSPHERICS
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13. (C) DG Lee Hyuk concluded by saying that Roh was not
totally satisfied on the history issue, but the important
thing was that Abe appeared sincere and gave the impression
that he wanted a positive change in the relationship. Abe,
for example, said a few sentences in Korean during a dinner
speech, and Mrs. Abe visited a Korean primary school where
she read a textbook in Korean and spoke Korean to some of the
children. This kind of approach played well with Korean
audiences, Lee said.
.
EMBASSY JAPAN CONCURS
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14. (C) Japanese Embassy Political Officer Asahaki Sunami
also described the summit as successful from the GOJ point of
view, saying that the surprise nuclear test, which Prime
Minister Abe learned about just before his aircraft landed in
Seoul, had actually improved the atmosphere by throwing into
relief that common regional security interests that Japan and
the ROK share. He said PM Abe, when the subject of him
visiting Yasukuni came up, had been careful not to say yes or
no, but that the GOJ understood that Roh could not visit
Japan if such a visit were to occur. Sunami also said that
the GOJ noted Roh's coolness toward EPA negotiations, and
pressed for increased access to defectors as a means of
learning more about the fate of abducted Japanese citizens.
Summing up, Sunami said the two sides remained well aware of
landmines in their relationship, but had agreed to tiptoe
around them.
.
COMMENT
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15. (C) Not surprising, history again took up so much of the
meeting between the leaders of South Korea and Japan. We
understand that in the pre-meeting negotiations, the ROK side
agreed not to dwell at length on these history issues, but to
no avail. By all accounts, Abe took it well, remaining calm
and respectful during Roh's long monologues. Roh did not get
any commitments, yet he apparently came away satisfied that
he had been heard. The Japanese side could not agree to a
press statement which included references to history issues,
which was why there was no joint press statement.


16. (C) Also helpful to their frank but friendly exchanges
was the sobering announcement by North Korea that it had
tested a nuclear device. We understand that President Bush's
phone calls to Roh and Abe just after their dinner left a
deep impression on the two Asian leaders. DG Lee remarked to
us that he believed U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral consultations
could be resumed soon at the highest level, perhaps in
Vietnam on the margins of APEC meetings.
VERSHBOW