INR A/S FORT,S MEETING WITH MOFAT DEPUTY MINISTER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 003437

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/04/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV KN KS
SUBJECT: INR A/S FORT,S MEETING WITH MOFAT DEPUTY MINISTER
PARK IN-KOOK

Classified By: DCM Bill Stanton. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)

SUMMARY
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1. (C) Over dinner on September 26, Amb. Park In-kook, Deputy
Minister of Policy Planning and International Organizations
at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT),agreed
with visiting INR Assistant Secretary (A/S) Randall Fort that
Japan remained preoccupied with the DPRK abduction issue.
Amb. Park thought this issue made it unlikely Japan would
make diplomatic headway on other concerns with North Korea.
Amb. Park observed that North Korea must feel "betrayed" by
China's strong reaction to the July missile launch and said
the U.S. needed to "learn lessons" from North Korea's 1998
missile launch, after which the U.S. had initiated talks with
North Korea. When dealing with North Korea, he said,
countries should use sanctions and engagement in parallel, as
the ROK had done after the latest missile launch. He
cautioned the five other Six-Party Talks (6PT) countries not
to forget the goal of denuclearizing the Korean peninsula,
specifically advising the U.S. to "clean up the Banco Delta
Asia case" in order to revive the 6PT. In closing, Amb. Park
expressed his appreciation to the U.S. for accepting North
Korean refugees, which he called "symbolic." END SUMMARY

WARTIME OPERATIONAL CONTROL (OPCON)
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2. (C) A/S Fort said that the fact that the U.S. and ROK were
even discussing the possibility of transferring wartime
operational control (OPCON) to the ROK was a sign of a mature
relationship. He noted that OPCON was not nearly the
emotional issue in the U.S. that it was in the ROK. Amb.
Park remarked that "strategic flexibility" had been
misinterpreted as a possible USFK withdrawal from the
peninsula, igniting the issue, but he understood the concept
was not related to troop reduction.

JAPAN-NORTH KOREA RELATIONS
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3. (C) Having come directly from a visit to Japan, A/S Fort
described the vehemence that Japanese contacts had expressed
toward North Korea over its abduction of Japanese citizens.
He noted that it was rare for the Japanese to be so
emotionally charged to the point that it drove policy. John
Merrill, INR Northeast Asia Division Chief, who accompanied
A/S Fort on the visit, noted that the abduction issue had
been among the biggest news stories for more than a year in
Japan, adding that, while Japanese outrage was
understandable, the intensity of the public's feeling was
somewhat puzzling. Amb. Park agreed, observing that as long
as Japan remained preoccupied with the abduction issue, it
could not make diplomatic progress with North Korea. He
noted that Japan insisted on abduction language in every
diplomatic document it produced. A/S Fort remarked that
Japanese diplomats would like more flexibility to pursue
other diplomatic options. Kim Jong-il believed that his
admission that North Korea had abducted Japanese was a
breakthrough, so he considered the issue closed. He hadn't
expected the Japanese reaction would be to impose new
"shackles," and this had caused him to withdraw from
engagement with Japan. Japan would not rest until it
received every last trace of remains. Nam Gwan-pyo, MOFAT
Director General of Policy Planning, who also participated in
the meeting, agreed that Kim Jong-il had made it clear he
won't do anymore on this issue. He noted that in terms of
North Korean policy, Japan put the same weight on the
abduction issue as the nuclear issue, so it was hard to take
Japan seriously. He mentioned the announcement that Japan's
Prime Minister Abe would appoint Kyoko Nakayama as special
advisor on the abduction issue.

NORTH KOREAN MISSILE LAUNCH
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4. (C) Turning to the July 5 North Korean missile test
launch, Amb. Park said the DPRK had learned lessons following
the 1998 missile launch. One week after those tests, the USG
proposed reopening dialogue with North Korea and sent an
envoy a few months later. North Korea clearly saw this as a
model when it tested its missiles in July, he suggested, and
we could "learn lessons" from North Korea's actions.


5. (C) Nam added that after July's launch, many wondered why
North Korea tested several different kinds of missiles. He
noted that scuds could reach USFK installations and that
Nodongs could reach Japan. So this was North Korea's way of
telling the U.S. and Japan, "If you continue sanctions, we
have options." Amb. Park wondered about the level of
technology of the missiles, given the failure of the
Taepodong test. Merrill said that North Korea seemed to be
on a self-imposed missile launch ban while there were talks
with the U.S., but in the absence of U.S. talks, decided to
launch. He noted that North Korea must have been surprised
at the world's reaction, especially that of China. Amb. Park
agreed, saying that North Korea felt betrayed by China,
adding that there were "rumors" that China was also actively
penalizing North Korea. He said the U.S. needs to encourage
China's continuing involvement, since it was the most
feasible intermediary to deal with North Korea. He remarked
that the U.S. had lost a good chance to negotiate with North
Korea 10 years ago. It should have opened its doors then,
when it would not have had to compete with China for
influence.

POSSIBLE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR TEST
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6. (C) A/S Fort asked Amb. Park what the ROK's reaction would
be to a possible nuclear test by North Korea. (NOTE: This
meeting took place one week before North Korea's Oct. 3
announcement that it would test a nuclear weapon. END NOTE.)
Amb. Park noted that after the July missile launch, the ROK
punished North Korea by cutting fertilizer and rice aid to
the tune of $350 million. He said this was the start of
"virtual sanctions," calling it the most critical
implementation of UNSC 1695. He compared this strong action
to the lack of sanctions during President Kim Dae-jung's
administration, when they had to consider the Sunshine
Policy. "Engagement and sanctions should proceed in
parallel," he said, "or else we would have nothing to cut."
A/S Fort related how one of his Japanese interlocutors said
that if North Korea met certain conditions regarding the
abductions and nuclear proliferation, Japan would be bound to
a 1997 reparations agreement by which North Korea would reap
billions of dollars. The official thought that if North
Korea addressed the abduction issue alone, Japan would
probably be willing to meet the reparations agreement. To
boot, this would create huge U.S.-Japan bilateral problems.
But North Korea was too stupid to realize this, the official
added.

RESTARTING SIX-PARTY TALKS
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7. (C) Amb. Park gave his personal outlook on reviving 6PT:
Japan had virtually given up on 6PT because it was so focused
on the abduction issue; the ROK and China were both
preoccupied with other issues; Russia was a question mark;
and the U.S. had another agenda in pursuing Banco Delta Asia
(BDA) sanctions. He pointed out that the five countries
might be forgetting the goal of denuclearizing the Korean
peninsula. He likened North Korea to a "stem cell,"
providing the right conditions for other countries in the
region to develop a multilateral security system, noting that
the U.S. also sat at the table even though it was not in the
region. "I seriously advise you to clean up the BDA case in
order to pursue 6PT," he stated.

NORTH KOREAN REFUGEES
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8. (C) Amb. Park said he "highly appreciated" the U.S. policy
of accepting North Korean refugees. He thought it was very
symbolic and urged the U.S. to think about more fundamental
preparations for North Korean refugees, as it had for
Vietnamese and Cuban refugees. A/S Fort said that in those
cases, the numbers justified the preparations; he encouraged
Amb. Park to raise this issue with high-level policy makers
since INR did not make policy.

FUTURE COLLABORATION
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9. (SBU) Amb. Park said that MOFAT was in the process of
creating a division similar to INR and suggested meeting
annually with INR. A/S Fort responded enthusiastically,
saying that "INR would be only too happy to assist" in
sharing both substantive and technical advice. Amb. Park
noted that A/S Fort's visit would constitute the first
official meeting, and A/S Fort said he hoped it would be the
first of many meetings. He also acknowledged the ROK's
important contributions in Iraq and Afghanistan, calling the
ROK an "intrepid ally." Merrill noted that INR had given
many briefings to the ROK Embassy in Washington before the
Zaytun deployment, and would continue to assist in any way it
could.


10. (U) Participants

United States:
Randall Fort, INR Assistant Secretary
John Merrill, INR Northeast Asia Division Chief
Bill Stanton, DCM
Grace Choi, poloff, notetaker

Korea (all from MOFAT):
Amb. Park In-kook, Deputy Minister, Policy Planning and
International Organizations
Nam Gwan-pyo, Director General, Policy Planning
Hahn Choong-hee, Director, North American Division 1
Choe Jong-hyun, Chief, Intelligence Analysis Team


11. (U) This cable was cleared by A/S Fort.
VERSHBOW