Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06SEOUL3433
2006-10-10 07:44:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Seoul
Cable title:  

INR A/S FORT'S MEETING WITH MOU VICE MINISTER SHIN

Tags:  PGOV PREL PHUM SOCI KN KS 
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RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
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RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 003433 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/02/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM SOCI KN KS
SUBJECT: INR A/S FORT'S MEETING WITH MOU VICE MINISTER SHIN
EON-SANG


Classified By: DCM Bill Stanton. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 003433

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/02/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM SOCI KN KS
SUBJECT: INR A/S FORT'S MEETING WITH MOU VICE MINISTER SHIN
EON-SANG


Classified By: DCM Bill Stanton. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a September 27 meeting, Ministry of
Unification (MOU) Vice Minister Shin Eon-sang told visiting
INR Assistant Secretary (A/S) Randall Fort that the
international community needed to create an environment where
North Korea's weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) would be
useless. VM Shin said the ROK viewed North-South Korean
economic exchanges and subtle social changes in the DPRK as
"signs of dawn; soon we'll see the sun rising." Evidence of
a market economy was emerging throughout North Korea, he
claimed, and if history were a guide, social/cultural change
and political/military change would follow. The
international community, especially the U.S., had helped
accelerate social change by introducing the concept of human
rights to North Korea. He cited continued economic exchange
and patience with North Korea as ways to further accelerate
the North's transformation. The DCM Bill Stanton, who also
participated in the meeting, questioned this upbeat
assessment, pointing out that North Korea had not been
responsive to the ROK's flexibility and that while the world
waited, North Korea could produce more WMDs. VM Shin
admitted that North Korea sometimes acted irrationally, but
that North Korea was "destined" to change. END SUMMARY.

DPRK'S WMDS
--------------


2. (C) VM Shin opened the meeting by comparing North Korea to
a small animal hiding in a cave, waiting for larger animals
outside to leave. It feared, in particular, the large U.S.
animal lying in wait outside the cave and prepared to pounce.
North Korea was suffering from difficulties, so it was
focused on developing WMDs rather than expanding its arsenal
of traditional weapons.


3. (C) VM Shin cited economic problems and isolation from the
international community as North Korea's principal
challenges. "If I were Kim Jong-il," he said, "I would feel
that I had no options," adding that Kim Jong-il would wait
for the international community--especially the U.S.--to show

some flexibility. WMDs posed threats to Northeast Asia and
the international community. He said, "If the U.S. convinces
North Korea to return to the Six-Party Talks (6PT),it can
convince it that WMDs are useless." At the recent summit,
our two presidents had agreed to a common, comprehensive
approach, and this was very meaningful to the ROK. "We need
to create an environment where North Korea's WMDs are
useless," he urged. Meanwhile, it was important to have
accurate information and to evaluate North Korea's WMD
capabilities. A/S Fort agreed that obtaining reliable
information about North Korea was challenging since it was so
isolated.


4. (C) VM Shin remarked that the scope of decision-making in
North Korea was very narrow; the military made most
decisions. He said he believed that the military's hand was
evident in the decision to launch the missiles in July.

NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS
--------------


5. (C) In the six years since the Sunshine Policy was begun,
there had not been much progress, according to VM Shin,
except for an up-tick in economic exchanges. Although these
might not seem like much to the U.S., the ROK viewed them as
great achievements. He said he believed a paradigm shift had
occurred from that of Cold War to reconciliation. He
characterized the North-South relationship as having
improved, but noted that after the missile launch, the ROKG
had suspended aid and dialogue with the North. He cited two
examples of the benefits of North-South economic cooperation
and reconciliation, both in Gyeonggi Province: (1) the Paju
English Village, an immersion village where Koreans could
practice English in real-life situations, just seven
kilometers from the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and (2) an LG
Philips factory manufacturing flat-panel TVs, also very close
to the DMZ. (COMMENT: VM Shin's reference to these projects
was somewhat perplexing, because neither is a North-South
joint economic venture like the Gaesong Industrial Complex in
North Korea. The only relation they have with North Korea is
their close proximity to the border. END COMMENT.)


6. (C) VM Shin said that he thought the U.S.-ROK alliance was
important, and described "good memories" of receiving pencils
and chocolate from U.S. soldiers as a child. But he imparted
that the North-South relationship was important too.
Although Washington thought sanctions against North Korea
were necessary, he wanted Washington to be more open to a
dialogue with North Korea. The previous day, he noted, North
Korean Vice Foreign Minister Choi Soo-heon announced at the
U.N. General Assembly that North Korea would return to the
6PT only after the U.S. lifted its sanctions. VM Shin said
he realized VFM Choi's comment was repetitive, but it was
important that the U.S. show some flexibility toward engaging
North Korea.

NORTH KOREAN SOCIETY EVOLVING
--------------


7. (C) A/S Fort asked VM Shin whether MOU had any metrics or
indicators to study basic social stability in North Korea.
He wondered if society's support for the regime was strong,
weak, or changing, and how that would affect North Korean
decision-making. He cited some past authoritarian regimes in
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union that seemed strong to
outsiders, but were actually fragile and brittle, and when
they had collapsed, the collapses had happened quickly. A/S
Fort asked if North Korea was showing any signs of weakness.
VM Shin replied that A/S Fort's question was a core issue.
North Korean society seemed stabile on the surface, but had
suffered poverty and famine for the past 60 years. MOU had,
with the help of experts, developed models to evaluate the
severity of the situation. VM Shin added that he had visited
North Korea many times and had met a range of people from
ordinary citizens to the prime minister.


8. (C) Continuing, VM Shin said that in countries like China
and Vietnam, there were three kinds of developments that led
to a transformation of society: (1) economic changes; (2)
societal and cultural changes; and (3) political and military
changes. North Korean had gone through the first
transformation (economic change) and the next two would
follow. He was starting to detect some changes in policy
direction and values. For example, he said that North Korea
now recognized and accepted a partial market economy,
adapting some elements of capitalism. In addition, the
economic system was more autonomous, and the DPRK was
beginning to open up to the world. VM Shin said that while
some experts downplayed North Korea's economic changes, its
market economy now accounted for 22 percent of the overall
economy, the same percentage as China in the late 1980s/early
1990s.


9. (C) Commenting on changes in North Koreans' attitudes, VM
Shin said that in the past, citizens had focused on Kim
Il-sung ideology, but now they were pursuing materialism. He
recalled telling a North Korean minister that since North
Korea was so unified, it must have been easy to control the
people, unlike in South Korea where citizens behaved more
individualistically. The minister replied that when they
were educating North Korean citizens about ideology, it went
in one ear and right out the other, because all they cared
about was earning money.


10. (C) Asked when these social changes started to take
place, VM Shin said after Kim Il-sung's death in 1994, when
North Korea suffered economic difficulties and the regime
could not meet its people's basic needs. Although
"hardliners" in Washington might view these social changes as
minimal, the ROK viewed them as "signs of dawn; soon we'll
see the sun rising."

ACCELERATING DPRK CHANGE
--------------


11. (C) A/S Fort asked VM Shin what the international
community could do to help speed up these changes. VM Shin
said that other countries--led by the U.S.--have already
contributed to social change in North Korea by raising the
issue of human rights. North Korea responded to the U.S.'s
charges of human rights abuse by announcing--through its
state-run media--that North Korea did not have a human rights
problem. Until that point, the North Korean general public
had never heard the term "human rights," but from that point
on began to understand the concept. In that way, VM Shin
remarked, American neo-conservatives had contributed to North
Korean human rights.


12. (C) VM Shin cited two ways to accelerate change. First,
we had to expand inter-Korean exchanges so that North Koreans
could understand South Koreans' values toward human
resources. For example, North Koreans could see the
favorable working conditions for their work at Gaesong
Industrial Complex. He said the mostly female workers there
noticed that, after about two months of working at Gaesong,
their skin quality improved thanks to taking warm showers
every day. Gaesong's better pay and work conditions produced
competition among citizens to work there, and the more people
who worked there, he pointed out, the more people would be
exposed to the benefits of a market economy.


13. (C) Second, VM Shin said, the international community
needed to show patience toward North Korea. "We must wait
until North Korea is ready; applying pressure will only drive
North Korea into a corner." The U.S. in particular, he
stated, needed to show flexibility. His view of the USG
position toward North Korea was based on 27 years of
experience at MOU. Drawing on the same analogy he used at
the beginning of the meeting, VM Shin said that if a big lion
wanted to eat a small rabbit, it could. But the lion had
been waiting for years to get concessions from the rabbit.
If the lion showed flexibility, the rabbit would respond.


14. (C) The DCM said that while he might agree in principle
on the need to engage North Korea, North Korea had not
responded to the ROK's efforts to be flexible. He cited as
an example the recent railroad project that the North had
abruptly halted. He also noted Pres. Roh's offers of
concessions to restart the 6PT and North Korea unwillingness
to do so. Time was not unlimited, the DCM observed, given
the North's continuing nuclear program and the concern about
the proliferation of WMDs and missiles. If we waited too
long, he said, a lot of bad things could happen. VM Shin
said the DCM's point was valid, but then (in a rather unclear
allusion) went on to describe two different types of people:
one who walked on roads and was used to comfort, and one who
walked on unpaved roads, to whom rocks and other discomforts
were acceptable. VM Shin said he recognized that North Korea
did not keep its promises and sometimes acted irrationally.
But, he said, if we looked at history, North Korea was
"destined" to change. We needed to use pressure and dialogue
in parallel, he recommended.


15. (SBU) VM Shin closed the meeting by saying he would like
more in-depth discussions. A/S Fort replied that if VM Shin
visited Washington, he would welcome hosting him and his
staff. JR Kim, MOU Director of the International Cooperation
Team, who also participated in the meeting, noted they were
planning to visit in early November, to which A/S Fort
replied he would welcome seeing them then. VM Shin gave the
delegation gifts of MOU watches that were manufactured at
Gaesong Industrial Complex. (COMMENT: The one given to the
DCM did not work. END COMMENT.)


16. (U) Participants

United States:
Randall Fort, INR Assistant Secretary
John Merrill, INR Northeast Asia Division Chief
Bill Stanton, DCM
Glenn Baek, INR Korea Analyst
Grace Choi, poloff, notetaker

Korea (MOU):
Shin Eon-sang, Vice Minister of Unification
Kim Nam-shik, Deputy Minister for Intelligence Analysis
JR Kim, Director, International Cooperation Team


17. (U) This cable was cleared by A/S Fort.
VERSHBOW