AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW DISCUSSES OPCON WITH GNP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 003369

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL ABLD KS KN
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW DISCUSSES OPCON WITH GNP
LAWMAKERS

Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: On September 26 over lunch, Ambassador
Vershbow discussed OPCON transfer with three National
Assembly members from the main opposition Grand National
Party (GNP). The members gave the Ambassador feedback from
their September 19-25 trip to the United States and explained
in detail their many reasons why they were against discussion
of transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) at this
time. They stated they were not against the transfer of
OPCON in principle, but they strongly requested that timing
not be discussed at the October SCM and DefMin meetings given
the high level of tension on the Korean Peninsula and the
unreliability of the Roh Moo-hyun administration. The
lawmakers expressed satisfaction that there were many in
Washington who shared their views on OPCON and said they
appreciated the frank assessment of the situation by State
Department officials. Also, they agreed that there was a
real chance that the GNP would form an alliance with the
opposition Democratic Party (DP). END SUMMARY

OPCON TRANSFER
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2. (C) The three opposition lawmakers, Park Jin, Hwang
Jin-ha and Chung Moon-hun, had accompanied Vice Speaker Lee
Sang-deuk to Washington September 19-25 and are experts on
defense and foreign affairs. Representative Hwang Jin-ha said
that the Combined Forces Command (CFC) should not be
dismantled. Park suggested that instead of working toward
transfer of OPCON and the dismantlement of CFC, wartime OPCON
be transferred transitionally to the UN Command. The
Ambassador said that the place of UNC in the new arrangement
would be a sensitive issue, noting that UNC was key to
implementing the current war plan that relied on support from
U.S. forces based in Japan.


3. (C) Representative Hwang Jin-ha raised the strongest
voice against the transfer and against the Roh government.
He said multiple times that there should not be a fixed date
for the transfer. As a former military officer, he felt that
after DPRK missile launches and with the threat of a nuclear
test, this was not the right time to discuss the transfer of
OPCON. He insisted that the Roh government's intentions were
not to be trusted.

TIMING OF OPCON TRANSFER
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4. (C) The lawmakers said that no one they met in Washington
emphasized 2009 as the date when OPCON transfer had to take
place. They were very much encouraged by this. The
Ambassador said that, timing aside, his perception was that
Koreans wanted a more balanced alliance relationship and the
United States was trying to accommodate this desire by
agreeing to a change in the U.S.-ROK command relationships.
Representative Park Jin said the GNP did not have a problem
with the CFC or wartime OPCON transfer, simply a problem with
President Roh. The Ambassador acknowledged there were
questions to address in order to transfer wartime OPCON, such
as agreeing on common war aims when new OPLANS are written.
But we were confident that by carefully implementing the
steps set forth in the roadmap, we could ensure that
deterrence was maintained and the alliance would be ready to
respond to any contingency after transfer of OPCON.


5. (C) The Ambassador said that based on the results of the
September 14 summit, we were committed to further
consultations at the level of military experts on the timing
of OPCON transfer, with a view toward sending a consensus
recommendation to the Defense Ministers. But the U.S. was
confident the ROK had the capabilities to assume wartime
OPCON. The United States position was that the transfer of
OPCON would make the U.S. presence in Korea less politically
burdensome in the long run, without diminishing our ability
to deter or defeat North Korea. He emphasized that the
transfer was requested by the South Korean government and
that, while the pace could be measured, this was now a
process that would be difficult to stop.

NORTH KOREA
--------------



6. (C) Representative Park said there might be a lot of DPRK
refugees wanting to go to the United States in the future,
especially if North Koreans in South Korea were allowed to
enter the United States. The Ambassador said the U.S.
position was not to grant asylum to North Korean refugees who
had already settled in South Korea. The North Korean Human
Rights Act was not meant to apply to South Korean citizens,
and the two court decisions that had taken place were
anomalies, not precedent-setting cases. Park also said that
during the lawmakers' meeting at the Hudson Institute, former
Bulgarian FM Mikhaylova told them that Bulgaria could serve
as a model for North Korea if it were to open. Park also
said that a staffer from Senator Lugar's office told them
that the U.S. and ROK should work together to find more
creative ways to "expand the scope of freedom" in North Korea
in return for the aid we provided. For example, in return
for aid, we could demand prisoners be released from North
Korean jails. The Ambassador noted that reciprocity for aid
might be more easily obtained if ROK's aid went through the
World Food Program.


7. (C) Park raised the concern that should the North
collapse, it was unclear how we would deal with the situation
in the North. In particular, it should be made clear that
PRC troops should not enter North Korea. His view was that
maintaining UN Command would give legitimacy to any U.S.
troops in North Korea. Hwang worried that if Roh continued
to stress sovereignty as the rationale for OPCON transfer,
the ROK would be left to deal alone with a crisis. They both
stressed that the U.S. and the ROK should work together to
prevent PRC involvement in the North in the event of a
collapse.


8. (C) The lawmakers said they had discussed the North
Korean nuclear issue with U/S Joseph and agreed with Joseph
that the North was undertaking various criminal activities.
Representative Chung Moon-hun asked what the likely reaction
would be to a nuclear test by the North and agreed with the
Ambassador that UN's Chapter 7 would need to be invoked.


9. (C) The lawmakers additionally stressed the difficult
position the ROK and Japanese governments would be in if the
DPRK tested a nuclear device and suggested that it could lead
the GOJ and the ROK to go nuclear as well. The Ambassador
said this would not be necessary since both Japan and Korea
were protected by the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

NEXT STEPS
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10. (C) Heritage Foundation's Balbina Hwang had told the GNP
delegation that she felt Roh wanted to end the alliance and
that she feared the future would be that the U.S.-Korea
alliance would become like the U.S.-Philippines alliance.
Representative Park said that if the GNP won the presidential
election in 2007, they would seek to renegotiate the transfer
of OPCON and the new Korean administration would work to
build a strong U.S.-ROK alliance based on security, common
values and common goals.

VERSHBOW