SECURITY POLICY INITIATIVE (SPI) 10: OPCON AND

S E C R E T SEOUL 003286

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2016
TAGS: MARR PARM PREL KS
SUBJECT: SECURITY POLICY INITIATIVE (SPI) 10: OPCON AND
MORE OPCON

REF: A. SEOUL 03104

B. SEOUL 03222

C. SEOUL 03132

D. SEOUL 03249

Classified By: AMB. ALEXANDER VERSHBOW. REASONS 1.4 (b/d)


1. (S) SUMMARY: The OPCON transfer issue continues to
generate widespread opposition throughout the ROK as we head
into SPI-10. Indications are the ROK delegation may refuse
to sign off on the Command Relationships Study (CRS) if we
hold to our position of designating 2009 as the X year for
OPCON transfer. President Roh has been unsuccessful in
countering strong opposition from policy elites and the
public at-large fearful that transfer of OPCON equates to
U.S. "abandonment" of the ROK. MND, MOU and MOFAT officials,
and members of the Defense Committee at the National
Assembly, have also voiced concerns over potential
instability on the Peninsula, distrust of the Roh
Administration, and possible damage to the Alliance. Some
question the ROK capability to take over wartime OPCON.
Others doubt the National Assembly will approve the needed
sizable increases in defense spending. We have stressed our
assessment that the ROK is ready for OPCON and have voiced
the U.S. Government's strong commitment to the ROK for the
long term. Many nonetheless seek clarification of our offer
to provide "bridging capabilities." Timing appears to be the
most problematic aspect of the issue, because of the politics
of the upcoming ROK presidential election in 2007, as well as
worries that now is not the time given DPRK missile launches
and a possible nuclear test. Embassy recommends Washington
to signal some flexibility on the timing of the OPCON
transfer, since it is in our interest to ensure the broadest
possible consensus in Korea on such a key issue for the
future of the Alliance. END SUMMARY.


2. (S) The issue of the transfer of wartime operational
control (OPCON) continues to generate widespread opposition
throughout the Republic of Korea as the U.S. and ROK
delegations head into the tenth session of the Security
Policy Initiative (SPI-10). Indications are that the ROK
delegation headed by Deputy Minister of Defense Policy Kwon
An Do will refuse to sign off on the Agreed Report of the
ROK-U.S. Command Relationships Study (CRS) -- i.e. the
"roadmap -- if the U.S. side insists on designating 2009 as
the X year for OPCON transfer. It was hoped agreement on the
CRS would set the stage for final review and establishment of
the transfer date at the upcoming Security Consultative
Meeting (SCM) on October 20, 2006.


3. (S) In a nationally televised KBS interview on August 31,
South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun attempted to counter
strong opposition to his own call for OPCON transfer by 2009,
arguing that the transfer would not result in either a
reduction of USFK support, nor an increased economic burden
on the ROK. However, his efforts have done little to stem
the rising tide of opposition. Erstwhile supporters and
conservatives alike have complained that he is playing fast
and loose with South Korea's national security. (NOTE:
Political cartoons in the ROK today hinted in very poor taste
that perhaps the ROK needs a military-style coup like the one
that occurred in Thailand). Clearly, however, the voices of
opposition to early OPCON transfer are, for the most part,
coming from serious and thoughtful quarters of Korean
society. In recent weeks that opposition has included:

-- All the former South Korean defense ministers.
-- 70 of 100 retired four-star generals in the ROK.
-- 160 former diplomats, including 3 foreign ministers.
-- The "Hope 21" group of moderate Uri Party lawmakers.
-- The opposition Grand National Party of Korea.
-- The Chair of the National Assembly's Defense Committee.
-- 10 military academy alumni organizations.
-- The Korean Veterans Association.


4. (S) Why are Korean elites and much of the public at large
so strongly opposed to an early transfer? Minister of
National Defense Yoon Kwang-ung cautioned the Ambassador on
August 14 (reftel A) that public concerns over transfer of
OPCON equate to U.S. "abandonment" of the Republic of Korea.
He strongly urged the USG agree to 2012 as the X year, rather
than pressing for 2009 so that, as he put it, the public
could be better prepared and educated on what ROK security
will look like after OPCON transfer. He predicted an
agreement on 2012 would calm Korea and that the many retired
generals and other security experts voicing concern would
come to support implementation fully. The Minister repeated
his appeal for flexibility on timing at a September 25
meeting with the Ambassador (septel),as did National
Security Advisor Song Min-soon the same day.


5. (S) Other MND contacts, as well as ROK officials from the
Ministries of Unification (MOU) and Foreign Affairs and Trade
(MOFAT),have likewise argued their strong preference for
transfer of OPCON in 2012 (reftel B). They are concerned
that an earlier transfer would have a negative effect on
stability on the Peninsula, increase distrust of Roh
Administration handling of ROK national security affairs, and
further damage the Alliance. Some express doubt the ROK
military has the needed capabilities, or the view that more
time is required to transform existing ROK command structures
into a ROK warfighting HQ. (NOTE: Any required increase in
ROK defense spending will be dependent upon National Assembly
approval. The ROKG's current 2007-2011 defense spending plan
ambitiously calls for nine percent increases in defense
spending for each of those years. END NOTE).


6. (S) Alongside the Command, the Embassy has stressed the
USG's assessment that ROK assumption of wartime OPCON can be
achieved in a reasonably short timeframe at low risk. We
have also voiced our strong commitment to the ROK over the
long term, so long as our forces are needed and welcomed
here. The Ambassador has also personally assured ROK
officials that the United States does not envision
significant force reductions in connection with the OPCON
transfer. The Ambassador has emphasized that our more agile
position in the region, coupled with the Koreans' robust
military capabilities, equate to a stronger (not weaker)
alliance posture. However, what typically follows such
assurances are concerned requests from Korean officials for
more clarification regarding what the United States
Government intends to offer the ROK in the way of "bridging
capabilities."


7. (S) What appears to be most problematic for many in South
Korea is that the security situation on the Peninsula has in
some respects deteriorated owing to the July 4 missile
launches by the DPRK and the looming threat of a possible
North Korean nuclear test. Troublesome aspects of the rise
of China have also come to be more keenly felt by the South
Korean populace, as evidenced by their highly emotional
reaction to competing claims over the sacred mountain the
Koreans call Paektusan and the Chinese refer to as
Changbaishan. More sophisticated thinkers in Seoul realize
that U.S.-China relations are far more than a zero-sum game,
but many still worry that if the U.S. role on the Peninsula
is perceived as "diminished" in any way as a result of U.S.
troop reductions and OPCON transfer, PRC influence over the
future of the Peninsula will be enhanced. For these reasons,
it would be very damaging to the U.S.-ROK Alliance if the
Korean public were to come to feel "let down" by the United
States. The opposition Grand National Party of Korea --
whose representatives have been traveling to Washington in
recent weeks to lobby forcefully against OPCON transfer --
announced an official "Position on Transfer of Wartime
Operational Control" that summarizes their view as follows:

--First, the security of the Korean Peninsula is more fragile
than ever.

--Second, early transfer of wartime OPCON can seriously
weaken the Korean people's trust of the United States.

--Third, the majority of the Korean people oppose the policy
of the Roh Administration.


8. (S) COMMENT: Transfer of OPCON is a good-news story that
has been hijacked by politicians in Korea. First, President
Roh misleadingly cast the issue as "regaining of Korean
Sovereignty." Now his opponents are using the issue to
accuse him of damaging ROK national security while elevating
their own campaigns to succeed him in the Blue House. The
reality is that the Republic of Korea has reached the point
where it is strong enough to assume the important
responsibility of wartime Operational Control within a short
timeframe, during which it must enhance several key defense
capabilities. And it got there largely because its national
security, democratization and economic growth were secured by
an effective U.S.-ROK Alliance.


9. (S) COMMENT CONTINUED: To maintain that record of
success, while continuing to effectively deter North Korean
aggression, it is imperative that both our governments
conduct this transformation of the Alliance in as reassuring
a manner as possible. Command leadership and others with
experience negotiating with the ROKG know that a firm date is
needed to prompt the South Koreans to do all they need to do,
and spend all they need to spend, to accomplish this goal.
At the same time,however, there are serious military and
political issues to be worked out. A new warfighting
mechanism needs to be established. New OPLANs need to be
written, agreed to and trained. Meanwhile, our diplomatic
forces will need to address the complicated political and
legal issues of what happens to the UN Command and management
of the Armistice Agreement. For these reasons, Embassy Seoul
recommends that we take our foot off the accelerator for 2009
and show some flexibility to allow some "give" on the
transfer date. Such a position will go a long way to assure
Korean supporters of the Alliance that there's no danger of
U.S. abandonment, and create a calmer atmosphere in which
national consensus in Korea can solidify. Our vital interest
lies in maintaining public confidence in and support for the
Alliance, not completing OPCON transfer by any particular
date. END COMMENT.
VERSHBOW