Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06SEOUL327
2006-01-27 05:59:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Seoul
Cable title:
ROKG PRESS FOR UPGRADE IN STATUS IN FOREIGN
how-toVZCZCXYZ0000 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHUL #0327 0270559 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 270559Z JAN 06 FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5670 INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OSD/ISA/EAP// PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J-5// PRIORITY RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI//FPA// PRIORITY RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J3 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000327
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2014
TAGS: KS PARM PREL
SUBJECT: ROKG PRESS FOR UPGRADE IN STATUS IN FOREIGN
MILITARY SALES
Classified By: A/DCM Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b,d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000327
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2014
TAGS: KS PARM PREL
SUBJECT: ROKG PRESS FOR UPGRADE IN STATUS IN FOREIGN
MILITARY SALES
Classified By: A/DCM Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b,d).
1. (C) On January 25, poloff accompanied the OSD Senior
Country Desk Director LTC Michael Finnegan and EAP/K Andrew
Hyde to a meeting with MOFAT NAD III Director MIN Kyoung-ho
seeking clarification on ROKG's Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
discussions on the sidelines of the Strategic Partnership
Dialogue held last week in Washington, between FM Ban Ki-Moon
and the Secretary. Min emphasized that even though the ROK
is the third largest buyer of U.S. arms, ROK was not
receiving favorable conditions for purchasing U.S. arms
compared to NATO, Japan, Australia, or New Zealand due to
restraints posed by the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and
the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA). Min continued that the
review period by Congress for significant military equipment
purchases by the ROK is usually around 30 to 50 days compared
to 15 days for Japan. He also mentioned that administrative
costs (i.e. non-recurring costs and constant administrative
costs) were significantly higher than those charged to NATO.
Thirdly, Min stated that certain training information was
inaccessible to the ROK on the equipment purchased by the ROK
while Japan and other favorable groups had access.
2. (C) OSD Finnegan informed Min that the ROK is in the
second most favorable price group for military training.
Should the ROK insist on parity with NATO, Australia, New
Zealand, and Japan in the FAA and AECA, Seoul could risk
losing this discount as it would be required to pay prices
more commensurate with higher rates charged to NATO allies.
Finnegan further explained that the process to upgrade the
ROK's standing in the FAA and the AECA will be long and
require coordination with DOD, DOS, and the Congress. With
respect to administrative costs, Finnegan stated that the ROK
always requests a waiver and so does not pay the nonrecurring
costs and receives training on purchased military equipment
at cost without additional markup.
3. (C) Min appreciated the update, promised to consider the
training cost implications but repeated the hope that the USG
will seriously consider ROK's request to be placed in the
same preferential group with Japan regarding FMS. Finnegan
and Hyde undertook to pass the ROK's request to relevant DOD
and DOS offices in Washington.
VERSHBOW
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2014
TAGS: KS PARM PREL
SUBJECT: ROKG PRESS FOR UPGRADE IN STATUS IN FOREIGN
MILITARY SALES
Classified By: A/DCM Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b,d).
1. (C) On January 25, poloff accompanied the OSD Senior
Country Desk Director LTC Michael Finnegan and EAP/K Andrew
Hyde to a meeting with MOFAT NAD III Director MIN Kyoung-ho
seeking clarification on ROKG's Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
discussions on the sidelines of the Strategic Partnership
Dialogue held last week in Washington, between FM Ban Ki-Moon
and the Secretary. Min emphasized that even though the ROK
is the third largest buyer of U.S. arms, ROK was not
receiving favorable conditions for purchasing U.S. arms
compared to NATO, Japan, Australia, or New Zealand due to
restraints posed by the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and
the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA). Min continued that the
review period by Congress for significant military equipment
purchases by the ROK is usually around 30 to 50 days compared
to 15 days for Japan. He also mentioned that administrative
costs (i.e. non-recurring costs and constant administrative
costs) were significantly higher than those charged to NATO.
Thirdly, Min stated that certain training information was
inaccessible to the ROK on the equipment purchased by the ROK
while Japan and other favorable groups had access.
2. (C) OSD Finnegan informed Min that the ROK is in the
second most favorable price group for military training.
Should the ROK insist on parity with NATO, Australia, New
Zealand, and Japan in the FAA and AECA, Seoul could risk
losing this discount as it would be required to pay prices
more commensurate with higher rates charged to NATO allies.
Finnegan further explained that the process to upgrade the
ROK's standing in the FAA and the AECA will be long and
require coordination with DOD, DOS, and the Congress. With
respect to administrative costs, Finnegan stated that the ROK
always requests a waiver and so does not pay the nonrecurring
costs and receives training on purchased military equipment
at cost without additional markup.
3. (C) Min appreciated the update, promised to consider the
training cost implications but repeated the hope that the USG
will seriously consider ROK's request to be placed in the
same preferential group with Japan regarding FMS. Finnegan
and Hyde undertook to pass the ROK's request to relevant DOD
and DOS offices in Washington.
VERSHBOW