Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06SEOUL3222
2006-09-18 23:46:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Seoul
Cable title:  

OPCON TRANSFER ISSUE DOMINANT DURING OSD NORTHEAST

Tags:  PARM PREL MARR MCAP KN KS 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0867
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #3222/01 2612346
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 182346Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0326
INFO RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1337
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSFK SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CHJUSMAGK SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUHHPDA/USAFK OSAN AB KOR PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 003222 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO JOHN HILL AT OSD NORTHEAST ASIA
DIRECTORATE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2016
TAGS: PARM PREL MARR MCAP KN KS
SUBJECT: OPCON TRANSFER ISSUE DOMINANT DURING OSD NORTHEAST
ASIA DIRECTOR HILL'S VISIT TO SEOUL

Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR JOSEPH Y. YUN. REASONS:
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 003222

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO JOHN HILL AT OSD NORTHEAST ASIA
DIRECTORATE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2016
TAGS: PARM PREL MARR MCAP KN KS
SUBJECT: OPCON TRANSFER ISSUE DOMINANT DURING OSD NORTHEAST
ASIA DIRECTOR HILL'S VISIT TO SEOUL

Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR JOSEPH Y. YUN. REASONS: 1.
4 (b/d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: On September 11-12, DOD/OSD Northeast Asia
Director John Hill visited South Korean government officials
in Seoul to discuss U.S.-ROK Alliance issues. In his
meetings at the Ministries of Defense (MND),Unification
(MOU) and Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT),OSD Hill
stressed the U.S. assessment that ROK assumption of wartime
Operational Control (OPCON) of ROK forces can be achieved by
2009 at low risk, resulting in bilateral command
relationships that reflect actual ROK military capabilities
and that are politically sustainable. During the visit, OSD
Hill also told ROK officials: (1) it is important to provide
training range capabilities in accordance with the early
January 2007 deadline set forth in the Commander USFK's
recent letter; and (2) the ROKG should produce a meaningful
proposal to meet the 50-50 cost-sharing target for the SMA.
ROK interlocutors uniformly expressed opposition to the 2009
OPCON transfer date, strongly favored 2012 as the target
year, and indicated concern that the U.S.-proposed 2009
target may reflect frustration with the Roh Administration
rather than a candid assessment of ROK capability. MND
America Policy Director Chun revealed that construction of
the Jikdo training range may take only four months instead of
six, and hinted the ROKG will offer a more attractive
burdensharing proposal at the next round of SMA negotiations
in October. In summarizing the ROK position on the DPRK
nuclear issue, ROK North Korean Nuclear Affairs DG Lee said
the ROK values maintenance of peace and security on the
Korean Peninsula even over resolution of the DPRK nuclear
issue. MOU Director for International Cooperation J.R. Kim
told Hill the U.S. and ROK approaches to the DPRK differed,
but that good coordination between the "good cop and bad cop"
approaches was needed. He assessed the possibility of a DPRK

nuclear test at 50-50 and urged the USG to offer the DPRK a
face-saving way to return to the Six-Party Talks, such as
unfreezing some BDA accounts. END SUMMARY


RATIONALE FOR OPCON TRANSFER IN 2009 vs 2012
--------------


2. In each of his meetings with ROK officials on September
11-12 in Seoul, OSD Hill stressed that the U.S. is committed
to the ROK for the long-term and is prepared to keep forces
in the ROK as long as they are needed and welcomed. He said
the U.S. proposed target year of 2009 for ROK assumption of
wartime OPCON of ROK forces reflects agreement among U.S.
military commanders and civilian defense leadership that such
assumption can be accomplished by 2009 at low risk. In his
discussions, Hill made the following additional points: (1)
the U.S. has abiding interests in the security of northeast
Asia and the security of the ROK that go include, but also go
well beyond the U.S.-ROK treaty relationship; (2) the U.S. is
prepared to maintain forces in the ROK as long as we are
welcomed and needed; (3) U.S. commanders assess that the
OPCON transfer can be completed by 2009 with low risk and
recommend that year on military capability grounds; (4) the
ROK public and political leadership aspire to have ROK OPCON
over ROK forces and the U.S. considers it important to
reflect those aspirations in our command relationships; (5)
deterrence and the alliance will be strengthened by
establishing command relationships that reflect actual ROK
military capabilities and public aspirations; (6) the same
U.S. commanders who recommend 2009 as the target year would
also be responsible for the U.S. personnel fighting alongside
the ROK military in a contingency, and would not recommend an
OPCON transfer date that they thought would put those U.S.
personnel at undue risk; (7) the U.S. does not envision
significant force reductions in connection with the OPCON
transfer; (8) just as Kim Jong-il quickly recognized how
force reductions and consolidations associated with global
posture realignment produced a stronger U.S.-ROK alliance
posture, he would likely see that the OPCON transfer
reflected both the strength of the ROK military and the
strength of U.S.-ROK political commitment to the alliance,
and thus a strengthened alliance posture; (9) the U.S. and
ROK should work together to address significant public

misunderstanding about the meaning of these changes in
command relationships and how the result will be an alliance
structure that strengthens deterrence.


3. ROK officials raised several reasons in arguing their
strong preference for transfer of OPCON in 2012, including:

-- Concern the divisive politics of the issue will further
damage the Alliance.
-- Worry that earlier transfer would have a negative effect
on stability on the Peninsula.
-- Suspicion the United States plans to abandon the ROK.
-- Distrust of Roh Administration handling of ROK national
security affairs.
-- Doubts the ROK military has the needed capabilities.
-- Time required to transform existing ROK command structures
into a ROK war fighting HQ.
-- Dependence upon National Assembly approval of annual nine
percent increases in defense spending (2007-2011) plan.
-- Clarification needed regarding U.S.-supplied "bridging
capabilities."
-- Related "transfer" of Armistice maintenance authority
issues.
-- Need to better educate the public and develop an effective
public relations strategy.

FURTHER INSIGHT ON MND'S PREFERENCE FOR 2012
--------------


4. (C) During a September 12 meeting with Assistant Minister
of Defense for Policy LTG(R) Kwon An-Do, Kwon said the
alliance issues needed to be addressed on a macroscopic level
as allies working toward a common goal. He attributed ROK
public concern over the OPCON issue to the misperception that
transferring OPCON equated to dissolving the CFC without
establishing an equivalent ROK entity that could seamlessly
maintain defense of the ROK. He added that fundamental
misunderstanding had led many Koreans to believe that
transfer of OPCON was the first step in a U.S. plan to
withdraw from the Korean Peninsula. Hill stressed the
importance of keeping deterrence strong and not letting
differences over technical issues lead to false perceptions
that the U.S. and ROK lack commitment to the larger
objectives of the alliance. He said that setting 2009 as the
target date for OPCON transfer and working diligently
together toward that goal would convey the strength of our
commitment and enhance deterrence.


5. (C) In a separate meeting with Colonel Kim Byung Gi, the
director of MND's ROK-US Alliance Transformation Team,
Colonel Kim provided a more detailed explanation of three of
MND's major concerns regarding an early transfer of OPCON.
He said that aside from public perceptions that the U.S. is
"abandoning" its ally, or that the ROKG was not up to the
task of assuming wartime OPCON by 2009, the main reason the
ROK could not accept OPCON before 2012 is that it lacks the
organizational components needed to assume that important
responsibility. Kim argued that the ROK needed to transform
its existing organization into a real war fighting
headquarters. He said the ROK could establish the new
military command by 2008, but that it would need three more
years to adequately train the command through military
exercises. Kim further continued that while subordinate
service commands could be completed by 2010, they would
require at least two years of training and exercises to
become fully functional.


6. (C) Alliance Transformation Team member Colonel Lee Jong
Sup joined in to explain that MND budgetary constraints were
a second major concern contributing to the ROK's preference
for setting the X year at 2012. He said that a 2012 transfer
is dependent upon MND's 2007-2011 procurement plan, which
called for annual nine percent increases in the ROK military
budget to develop the capacity needed to independently
exercise wartime OPCON. Lee noted that the National Assembly
had not yet approved this budget. MND U.S. Policy Division
Director Colonel Chun In-Bum, who was also in the meeting,
expressed doubt that the ROK military could acquire the
necessary capabilities even with the anticipated increase in

the budget. Responding to Hill's question whether adoption
of the 2009 date might give MND greater justification to
argue for larger, accelerated budget increases, Colonel Lee
claimed the ROK had not even considered the far greater
budgetary increases that would be necessary for the ROK to
accept wartime OPCON by 2009.


7. (C) Colonel Lee said the ROK was unclear about the U.S.
pledge to provide necessary "bridging capabilities," and the
exact nature and duration of those bridging capabilities.
"We don't know what specific capabilities you will offer,"
Director Chun explained, "so we must ask the USG to provide
clarification on the type and anticipated duration of those
capabilities." Hill assured Colonels Kim, Lee and Chun that
those discussions would be held between appropriate military
experts. He also explained, when asked, that the bridging
capabilities would be intended to fill a temporary gap in ROK
capabilities, clarifying that other "life of the alliance"
capabilities would endure as long as the ROK welcomed and
needed US military support.

ARMISTICE MAINTENANCE
--------------


8. (C) On the related issue of responsibility for Armistice
maintenance, MND ROK-US Alliance Transformation Director Kim
voiced his concern with the fact that the DPRK does not
recognize South Korea as a legitimate military counterpart,
and is therefore unlikely to engage with ROK generals in the
context of the United Nations Command. Dismantlement of the
Combined Forces Command (CFC) structure would destroy the UNC
channel for communication with North Korea, unless agreement
is first reached on an adequate replacement mechanism, Kim
warned. He suggested the United States and ROK work to reach
an agreement regarding the future UNC role before the next
round of the Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) in October.

MOFAT, MOU LIKEWISE PREFER 2012
--------------


9. (C) The OPCON transfer issue similarly dominated OSD
Hill's discussions with MOFAT and MOU officials on September

11. According to Kim Hong-kyun, MOFAT Senior Coordinator for
ROK - US Security Cooperation, the pubic is largely
uninformed or misinformed about OPCON transfer. Kim
commented that while the wartime OPCON transfer signifies a
natural evolution of a "matured alliance," many in Korea
oppose OPCON transfer because they lack sound information.
Kim shared his concerns about negative reports in the
"conservative media" on the upcoming Presidential summit.
While a successful summit "will put OPCON to rest," Kim saw
the need for both countries to think about "how we can better
sell" the eventual OPCON decision to the Korean public. Kim
proposed the United States and ROK work together to develop
common talking points or even a press release.


10. (C) Senior Coordinator Kim opined that there are two
groups opposing OPCON transfer. The first group is against
it in principle and will be unhappy no matter what timeline
is decided. This group spoke out against the OPCON transfer
earlier than any other opposition groups. The second group,
however, favors the transfer of OPCON in principle, but
disagrees on the timeline. According to this group, OPCON
transfer would "eventually" become feasible, Kim explained.
However, given the current political and security atmosphere,
they firmly believe transfer should be postponed. Lee
Jeong-kyu, Director of MOFAT North America Division III, who
joined in the meeting, stated that the groups opposing OPCON
transfer are gaining more influence with the public, but
remain poorly informed about the issue. Lee accused these
uninformed groups of "negatively affecting stability of the
peninsula and contributing to the weakening of the alliance."
Sighting a concurrent shift of opinion in the National
Assembly, Lee predicted that the second group, which argues
the timing of the OPCON transfer, would strengthen.


11. (C) Senior Coordinator Kim argued to Mr. Hill that a
greater emphasis should be placed on setting a "target year,"
rather than a "fixed year." Kim stated that the

implementation of the target year should also be incremental
and conditional, which he said would build more confidence
among the public and win the support of the former generals
who have openly opposed an early transfer of wartime
operational control. Otherwise, he warned, the opposition
groups will "hang around the issue forever," possibly
elevating OPCON transfer as the main focus of next year's ROK
presidential election. Echoing MND views, Kim concluded that
2009 is simply "too early." He noted that diplomats and
politicians should not have a final say in the OPCON transfer
date, and emphasized the need for the military-to-military
only discussions. "It is dangerous to politicize this
issue," Kim warned.


12. (C) MOU Director for International Cooperation J.R. Kim
accepted OSD Hill's message that the transfer of OPCON was
prudent and appropriate based on ROK military capabilities
and acknowledged that the crafting of an effective message to
the public would be key to the successful transfer of OPCON.
However, he expressed deep concern with the future of the
alliance and feared that the United States was pushing an
early transfer of wartime OPCON out of a deep negative
emotional reaction to ROK President Roh Moo-Hyun.


13. (C) In a separate meeting on September 11 with Lee
Yong-joon, MOFAT Director General for North Korean Nuclear
Affairs, Ambassador Lee echoed many of the aforementioned
concerns regarding early transfer of wartime OPCON and urged
the USG to "listen to the Korean public, as well as the
Korean government." When Hill asked which voice is the
single voice of the Korean people, Lee acknowledged that
there are many Korean voices. Lee agreed with Hill that the
best way to approach the numerous difficult issues between
the ROK and the U.S. was as partners focused on a long-term
friendship and alliance, rather than on short-term
difficulties.

ROK VIEW OF THE DPRK
--------------


14. (C) Turning to North Korea, Ambassador Lee gave Hill a
summary of the ROK position on the DPRK nuclear issue. He
said the ROK has two priorities with respect to the DPRK --
maintaining peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and
peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue. "These can
conflict. And when they do the ROK public might choose
number one," Lee cautioned. Ambassador Lee highlighted three
aspects of the DPRK issue: 1) The need for the DPRK to
return to 6PT, where there is no difference between U.S. and
ROK positions; 2) Implementation of UNSCR 1695, where the
ROKG fully supported implementation; 3) Reaction to a
possible DPRK nuclear test, which Lee said was still under
discussion internally, but predicted the ROKG response would
be totally different from its response to the missile tests.
That is because the ROKG considered a possible DPRK nuclear
test as a serious threat to the region as well as an affront
to the Nonproliferation Treaty, Lee explained, adding that he
was still "working on the issue with relevant ministries"
(which could imply that resistance from the Ministry of
Unification remains).


15. (C) Later that morning, MOU's Director for International
Cooperation, J.R. Kim told OSD Hill that the U.S. and ROK
approaches to the DPRK differed because the ROK wanted to
work on improving the DPRK "from the inside" -- to gradually
build up the DPRK's dependency on the ROK -- while the U.S.
worked on the DPRK "from the outside." Hence, good
coordination between the "good cop and bad cop" approaches
was needed. Kim noted, however, that following the 5 July
missile launches the ROK's efforts to engage the DPRK had
stalled as the DPRK refused government-to-government contact,
even to the point that the DPRK refused to grant MOU
officials access to the Kaesong Industrial Complex. Kim
emphasized that despite the lack of official contact, the ROK
hoped that growing inter-Korean trade and ROK humanitarian
aide to the DPRK would encourage the DPRK to restart dialogue
in non-political areas such as family reunions and cultural
exchanges.


16. (C) Regarding the possibility of a DPRK Nuclear Test,
Kim assessed there was a 50-50 chance that the DPRK would
conduct one, but said there was little the ROK could do to
prevent such a test. Kim thought a China-DPRK summit meeting
would likely follow the ROK-U.S. summit meeting and
emphasized that it was important to work with China and the
international community to resolve the issue. Kim urged the
U.S. to offer the DPRK a face-saving way to return to the
6PT, such as unfreezing some BDA accounts.

OTHER ALLIANCE ISSUES
--------------


17. (C) JIKDO: Although Mr. Hill's Korean interlocutors
focused their discussions primarily on the OPCON issue, ROK
views on other Alliance matters -- specifically the Jikdo
training range and the burdensharing negotiation (SMA) were
raised during a candid lunch with MND America Policy Division
Director, Colonel Chun In-bum. Chun explained that while MND
intended to inform the U.S. officially that construction of
the replacement air-to-surface training range at Jikdo would
take six months, the engineers had built-in a one month
cushion for weather delays and another for testing of the
weapons scoring system that could, "if all goes well," result
in a functional range within four months time. OSD Hill said
four months would be better than six, but stressed the ROK
must do everything possible to meet the USFK Commander's
early January deadline for completion of the range.


18. (C) SMA: OSD Hill also strongly urged his ROK
interlocutors to come back to the SMA negotiations with a
meaningful proposal to meet the 50-50 goal we have set. In
their response, MND officials deferred to MOFAT's lead in the
negotiations, while MOFAT officials pointed the finger at the
Blue House. MND Asia Policy Director Chun hinted over lunch
that the ROK side would bring a better offer to the next
round of negotiations (October 10-11) but declined to
elaborate on the details.


19. (U) This message has been cleared by OSD Hill
VERSHBOW