Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06SEOUL3104
2006-09-08 14:32:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Seoul
Cable title:  

AMBASSADOR'S SEP 6 MEETING WITH DEFENSE MINISTER

Tags:  PARM PREL MNUC KS KN 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0007
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #3104/01 2511432
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 081432Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0163
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 1195
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1277
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CHJUSMAGK SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUAGNVT/CINCUNC CFC SEOUL KOREA PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSFK SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J3 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUAGAAA/JUSMAG-K SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J-5// PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUHHPDA/USAFK OSAN AB KOR PRIORITY
RUEHUL/USDAO SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 003104 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO EAP A/S HILL ON TRAVEL IN BEIJING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/06/2016
TAGS: PARM PREL MNUC KS KN
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S SEP 6 MEETING WITH DEFENSE MINISTER
YOON

Classified By: AMB. ALEXANDER VERSHBOW. REASONS 1.4 (b/d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 003104

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO EAP A/S HILL ON TRAVEL IN BEIJING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/06/2016
TAGS: PARM PREL MNUC KS KN
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S SEP 6 MEETING WITH DEFENSE MINISTER
YOON

Classified By: AMB. ALEXANDER VERSHBOW. REASONS 1.4 (b/d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: During a September 6 discussion with the
Ambassador, Minister of National Defense Yoon Kwang-ung cited
widespread controversy within Korean society over the
transfer of OPCON issue and strongly urged the USG to agree
to 2012 as the X year, rather than pressing for 2009. He
predicted that an agreement on 2012 would calm Korea and that
retired generals and others voicing concern would come to
fully support its implementation. The Ambassador suggested
that Korean officials strive to shift the focus of the OPCON
transfer debate away from the false notion that Korea is
"regaining its sovereignty" to instead emphasize the strength
and importance of the U.S.-ROK Alliance and the fact that it
was becoming a more balanced partnership.


2. (C) During the hour-long meeting, Minister Yoon also
urged close consultation on the North Korean nuclear threat;
claimed the ROK is in no position to increase spending to
accommodate Boeing's price for procurement of the E-X;
cautioned that SMA negotiations could stretch beyond the end
of this year; pledged that he is doing everything in his
power to secure the Jikdo air-to-surface training range; and
explained that ROKG decisions on troop contributions to
UNIFIL in Lebanon and troop extension in Iraq would await
further assessments of the security situation on the ground
in both countries. Minister Yoon shared the Ambassador's
hope that the September 14 summit meeting in Washington will
serve to demonstrate the continuing strength of the U.S.-ROK
Alliance as well as highlighting other positive developments
in U.S.-South Korean relations. END SUMMARY.

OPCON TRANSFER
--------------


3. (C) The Ambassador met on September 6 with ROK Minister
for National Defense Yoon Kwang-ung at the latter's request.
The meeting began and ended with Yoon strongly urging the
U.S. Government to agree to 2012 as the year for the transfer
of operational control, rather than pressing for an earlier

transition. Concerns that transfer of OPCON equates to U.S.
"abandonment" of the Republic of Korea have led to widespread
opposition from both ruling and opposition party members, as
well as numerous conservative groups throughout Korean
society and the media. MND Yoon said he believed that those
advocating early transfer, as well as those calling for a
longer period of transition, were sincerely committed to the
health of the U.S.-ROK Alliance, but stressed his own belief
that "2012 would be much better for the Alliance."


4. (C) The Ambassador acknowledged the concerns expressed
from all sides. He stated that SECDEF Rumsfeld and U.S.
military commanders were convinced the transfer could be
completed in three years, but we obviously needed mutual
agreement on how fast the transition should take. The
Ambassador added that what concerned him most was that what
should be seen as a positive development in the evolution of
the Alliance was generating so much controversy and anxiety
in Korean society. He suggested that Korean officials strive
to shift the focus of the debate away from the false notion
that Korea was "regaining its sovereignty" to instead
emphasize the strength and importance of the U.S.-ROK
Alliance, and the fact it was becoming a more balanced
partnership.


5. (C) Minister Yoon agreed, commenting that he would
remember the Ambassador's words when next called to answer
questions on the issue at the National Assembly. "I feel the
values shared by the United States and the ROK means we are
essentially on the same path," Yoon said. "With that as our
base, I think we should work together to sustain and develop
our Alliance." Yoon went on to express concern over the

"politicization" of a 2009 transfer, stating that he believed
a thorough discussion within the National Assembly was the
most democratic way to resolve the issue. The Ambassador
thanked Yoon for recent comments he had made regarding U.S.
provision of "bridging capabilities," noting that it would be
useful for the ROKG to more broadly disseminate that
reassurance to the public. Yoon stated that "2012" would be
the ROK position going into SPI 10 and the MCM/SCM meetings
in Washington. He confidently predicted that once the United
States and the ROK reach agreement on an appropriate "X
Year," the issue would calm down considerably in Korea, and
that retired generals and others now voicing opposition would
come to fully support implementation of the plan.

DPRK NUCLEAR ISSUE
--------------


6. (C) Turning briefly to the North Korea nuclear issue,
Minister Yoon told the Ambassador that, regardless of the
OPCON issue, it was important for the United States and South
Korea to consult closely as the threat of a North Korean
nuclear test appeared to be a growing concern.

BOEING E-X PROCUREMENT (AWACS)
--------------


7. (C) Minister Yoon raised the current pricing dispute
between the ROKG and Boeing over ROK procurement of the E-X
(AWACS) planes. Calling the ROK defense budget and Boeing's
current price "disparate," Yoon claimed the ROK was not in a
position to further increase spending for the project. The
Ambassador said he was pleased the ROKG selected Boeing
because it provided the highest degree of interoperability
and the best capability, which was especially important as we
transfer OPCON. He encouraged MND to negotiate directly with
Boeing to reach an agreed price, reminding Yoon that the ROK
had been warned the price would go up since Boeing's
subcontractor prices had only been guaranteed until July 1.
Unfortunately, the ROK had taken a very long time to reach
its procurement decision. Keep negotiating, the Ambassador
urged, adding that he very much wanted to see this project go
through soon.

SMA
---


8. (C) The Ambassador raised the SMA negotiation, stating
that the USG was looking for a more equitable share from the
ROK of at least 50%. Minister Yoon replied that Secretary
Rumsfeld had "never failed" to raise the issue with him in
the past and that he fully expected he would do so again at
the SCM. Each time the Secretary of Defense did so he
conveyed those views to MOFAT, Yoon said. He added that he
was confident a satisfactory agreement could be reached, but
warned it may not be accomplished until sometime after the
end of the year, "like last time."

JIKDO
--------------


9. (C) On the status of the Jikdo air-to-surface training
range, Yoon stated that MND had taken "steps of progress" and
that he personally had met twice with the Mayor of Kunsan
City to discuss the issue. The ROKG was expected to announce
its compensation plans very soon, Yoon advised. The people
of Kunsan would then have until September 20th to agree or
not. Yoon promised to do everything in his power, adding his
personal assessment that it was "O.K. to have our hopes up a
little."

UNIFIL and IRAQ
--------------



10. (C) Asked to elaborate on ROK plans to contribute to
UNIFIL in Lebanon, Yoon replied that Foreign Minister Ban
Ki-moon wanted to send combat troops (not merely a medical
team) to Lebanon but that MOFAT first planned on sending an
assessment team to the area. Thereafter, the South Korean
government would have a "comprehensive discussion" that would
include the possibility of dispatching ground forces. He
deferred any further questions to MOFAT, the lead ministry
for the issue.


11. (C) Asked about ROK plans to extend its troop commitment
to Iraq, Minister Yoon replied that he has effectively issued
a "gag order" until mid-November when he said the ROK
government would address the issue. He said he hoped the USG
would also refrain from public remarks until then, "so as not
to further complicate U.S.-ROK relations." In the meantime,
the Defense Committee of the ROK National Assembly would
visit Iraq to assess the current situation and prepare for
that national debate. The Ambassador noted there was also a
serious debate underway in the United States, but stressed it
would be irresponsible to abandon the Iraqi people at this
time. We must persevere, the Ambassador said, adding that
the ROK's continued commitment was very important to the
success of our efforts there.

U.S.-ROK SUMMIT
--------------


12. (C) The Ambassador and Minister Yoon shared the view
that the September 14 summit meeting in Washington was an
opportunity to demonstrate the continued strength of the
U.S.-ROK Alliance, while also highlighting other positive
developments in U.S.-South Korean relations, as well as ROK
contributions elsewhere in the world. Although we may "sway
a little," the Republic of Korea and the United States would
"eventually get to where we both want to go," Yoon commented
to the Ambassador. He also predicted that since the Roh
Administration had chosen to tackle so many difficult issues,
such as FTA, Yongsan relocation and the transfer of OPCON,
future U.S. and South Korean leaders would have a "smoother
ride."
VERSHBOW