AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW DISCUSSES OPCON WITH GNP FLOOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 003103

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL ABLD KS KN
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW DISCUSSES OPCON WITH GNP FLOOR
LEADER KIM HYOUNG-O

Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Opposition GNP Floor Leader Kim Hyoung-o
told the Ambassador several times in a meeting on September 6
that the Grand National Party (GNP) strongly urged the U.S.
not to discuss a timetable for the handover of wartime
operational control (OPCON) at the September 14 summit or the
October DefMin meetings. He stressed that the current Roh
government should not make any decisions regarding OPCON and
the next government starting in 2008 should handle the OPCON
transfer issue. The Ambassador explained U.S. policy
regarding OPCON and stressed that any agreement on OPCON
transfer would be one on which both countries agreed. He
also emphasized that Koreans should look at the transfer of
OPCON as a natural, positive step that will result in a
stronger alliance, with a more balanced sharing of
responsibility, without any reduction in deterrence or
military capabilities. Rep. Kim asked the Ambassador to
consider the views of the GNP and the Korean people when
deciding on a date for OPCON transfer. The Ambassador
assured him that he would work to understand all perspectives
in Korea with the goal of reaching a mutually beneficial
agreement. END SUMMARY

OPCON, OPCON AND MORE OPCON
--------------


2. (C) In a September 6 meeting requested by Rep. Kim
Hyoung-o, GNP's second ranking official, Ambassador Vershbow
noted that a successful transfer of wartime OPCON to the
ROKG, done responsibly, could keep the alliance strong for
the long term. He explained that a roadmap, to be approved
by both the U.S. and ROK Defense Ministers in October, would
lay out the next steps and he assured Kim that the roadmap
would spell out a path that would keep deterrence and
military capabilities undiminished on the Peninsula. The
Ambassador assured Floor Leader Kim that the U.S. would
continue to provide key capabilities such as air and
intelligence support. He noted that whatever the final
decision on the timing of the transfer, the U.S. remained
committed to ensuring the safety of the Peninsula and to
keeping its defense capabilities after the transfer just as
strong as they are now.


3. (C) The Ambassador said that the U.S. was listening to
Korean views that urged a slower timetable for OPCON
transfer. He would work to explain the U.S. view on OPCON to
Koreans so the transfer could be viewed as a positive,
natural development in our alliance, making it a more
balanced partnership in line with the ROK's growing strength
and global role. The issue was not a question of
sovereignty, as some ROK leaders claimed, since the ROK
already has sovereignty within the CFC structure; General
Bell receives political direction from both Presidents Roh
and Bush.


4. (C) Floor Leader Kim asked if Secretary Rumsfeld's
statement that OPCON transfer could take place in 2009 was
U.S. policy or if it was his personal view. The Ambassador
said that the SecDef's statement reflected his view and that
of U.S. military commanders that the transfer could be done
in three years with minimal risk. But we obviously needed to
reach mutual agreement on how fast the transfer should take
place.

DISCUSSION OF TIMING
--------------


5. (C) Kim vehemently stated that a "lame duck" like
President Roh should not decide important security issues
like the transfer of wartime OPCON. The Ambassador noted
that governments deal with governments and that the transfer
of OPCON was being discussed bearing in mind both countries'
interests. Kim pleaded with the Ambassador to urge
Washington not to discuss the details of a timetable for
OPCON transfer at the September 14 summit or the October
DefMin meetings. Since the vast majority of Koreans did not
trust the Roh government, any discussion of timing for OPCON
transfer could cause internal turmoil, according to Kim. He
said it would divide the Korean people if there were a
timetable set for transfer. Therefore, he emphasized, timing
should not be discussed in October.



6. (C) The Ambassador said he understood Kim's concerns, but
reiterated that, if handled responsibly, an agreement on a
roadmap for the transfer of OPCON did not have to be viewed
so negatively. He added the U.S. would do its part to show
that its commitment to the ROK's defense would be as resolute
under the new command arrangements as it is today.

BURDEN SHARING
--------------


7. (C) The Ambassador asked Kim for the support of the
National Assembly for South Koreans to take a larger share of
the burden for financing U.S. troops stationed in Korea. He
said that Korea should shoulder more of the burden as they
move toward a more equal partnership with the United States.

ROH'S MOTIVATION
--------------


8. (C) Both Kim and Rep. Hwang Jin-ha said Roh wanted to
assume wartime OPCON so he could sign a peace treaty directly
with North Korea that excludes the U.S.; they cited
statements by National Security Advisor Song Min-soon that
elimination of CFC was a DPRK requirement for a peace treaty.
The two lawmakers added that the ultimate goal of the Roh
government was to get U.S. troops off the Peninsula.


9. (C) The Ambassador said he was not comfortable with these
misleading arguments. But even under the most accelerated
timetable, the transfer of OPCON would occur under the next
ROK administration. He concluded by saying that agreement on
the roadmap was only the start of a process that would be
evaluated at each stage, and that agreement to transfer
wartime OPCON was in the best interests of both countries.
VERSHBOW