AID SUSPENSION MAY FULFILL UNSCR 1695, SAYS NSC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 002852

SIPDIS

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2014
TAGS: PREL PREF PGOV KS KN
SUBJECT: AID SUSPENSION MAY FULFILL UNSCR 1695, SAYS NSC


Classified By: CDA Bill Stanton. Reasons 1.4(b/d).

SUMMARY
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1. (C) In an August 21 courtesy call by the CDA, Senior
Secretary to the President for National Security Suh Choo-suk

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said that the ROKG's suspension of rice and fertilizer
shipments would likely fulfill the ROKG's obligation under
UNSCR 1695. Suh also explained the ROKG's one-time shipment
of humanitarian relief to the DPRK; said that a nuclear test
was probably not imminent but that additional monitoring
would be prudent; and expressed hope that the September
Summit would reaffirm the regional importance of the U.S.-ROK
alliance, and facilitate the final resolution of remaining
alliance issues, including OPCON. END SUMMARY.

SUSPENDING AID SHIPMENTS MAY FULFILL UNSCR 1695
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2. (C) Responding to the CDA's question about the ROKG's
response to UNSCR 1695, Suh said that the ROKG took very
strong action following the July 5 missile launches by
suspending shipments of rice and fertilizer to the DPRK. He
said that this action had had more impact on the DPRK than
any measure taken by any other country. Suh did not believe
that that UNSCR 1695 required additional measures. Although
the rice and fertilizer curtailment was not initiated in
direct response to the Resolution, it should be interpreted
as part of the ROK's response. Asked about the August 20
announcement that the ROKG was about to send 100,000 tons of
rice and other aid to North Korea, Suh explained that this
was a one-time emergency shipment in response to severe
monsoon flooding and was entirely separate from the
suspension of rice and fertilizer shipments. Further, Suh
expressed concern that the value of this shipment was being
overstated. He explained that rice accounted for USD 200
million of the shipment's total value, but rice in the ROK
traded for five times the global market price. Thus, in
terms of the international price, the ROKG would only ship
about USD 40 million worth of rice. He also said that the
Red Cross had come to an agreement that distribution of this
aid would "to some extent" be monitored.

MORE NUCLEAR MONITORING NECESSARY
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3. (C) The CDA asked how the ROKG would respond should the
DPRK test a nuclear device. Suh replied that a test was
improbable because the DPRK would have to take a number of
preliminary steps and, as far as the ROKG knew, the DPRK "had
not completed the checklist." Suh did not discount the
possibility, however, that the DPRK had secretly made
preparations. As a result, the ROKG had strengthened its
monitoring activities. A nuclear test would result in a
significant change in North-South relations and would be much
more serious than the missile tests, he added.

SUMMIT SHOULD REAFFIRM ALLIANCE'S LEADING REGIONAL ROLE
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4. (C) Asked about ROKG priorities for the September
Presidential Summit, Suh said that the Summit should include
security, bilateral, and regional issues. It would be an
opportunity to reaffirm the strength of the U.S.-ROK alliance
and demonstrate that our leaders were of like mind on the
transfer of operational control. He also said that the
leaders should underscore their commitment to resolving DPRK
issues peacefully and diplomatically. Observing that the Six
Party Talks have not progressed since the September 19 Joint
Statement, and that the general situation has ground to a
stalemate since the July 5 missile launches, Suh said that it
was now time to tackle these challenges. At a minimum, Suh
hoped that Presidents Bush and Roh would agree on general
principles, encourage continuing military consultations and
identify a cooperative framework to resolve any remaining
alliance issues. Discussion of military issues could
continue at the Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) in
October and be concluded in early 2007.

ALLIANCE ISSUES
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5. (C) Suh noted that the U.S. and ROK were currently facing
a number of difficult issues, including USFK troop
realignment, base consolidation, strategic flexibility and
transfer of operational control. These issues were all being
worked out through "smooth and close" consultations between
the two governments.


6. (C) The CDA agreed that there has been significant
progress on specific military issues and that changes in the
alliance represented a natural evolution of the U.S.-ROK
relationship. Remaining differences appeared to be tactical
rather than strategic. Most important, he said, was that the
two allies shared many of the same goals. With regard to the
transfer of operational control, one of the challenges would
be for the USG and ROKG to present the transfer as a positive
development and counter those who wanted to cast it in a
negative light.

STANTON