Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06SEOUL2850
2006-08-21 09:16:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Seoul
Cable title:  

ROKG CAUTIOUS ON USG VIEW OF UNSCR 1695

Tags:  MNUC PARM PREL PTER KNNP KPAO WMD CT KS KN 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHUL #2850 2330916
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 210916Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9812
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1104
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 7470
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1187
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0288
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 002850 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PLEASE PASS TO EAP/K AND ISN/CPI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2015
TAGS: MNUC PARM PREL PTER KNNP KPAO WMD CT KS KN
SUBJECT: ROKG CAUTIOUS ON USG VIEW OF UNSCR 1695

REF: STATE 136495

Classified By: A/DCM Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b),(d).

SUMMARY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 002850

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PLEASE PASS TO EAP/K AND ISN/CPI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2015
TAGS: MNUC PARM PREL PTER KNNP KPAO WMD CT KS KN
SUBJECT: ROKG CAUTIOUS ON USG VIEW OF UNSCR 1695

REF: STATE 136495

Classified By: A/DCM Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b),(d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) On August 21, political and economic officers
delivered reftel points on USG thinking concerning UNSCR 1695
implementation to officials at the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Trade (MOFAT). The officials gave initial
responses claiming that ROKG policy was already largely in
line with the USG recommendations but expressing concern
about next steps, especially the relationship between the
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and interdiction
options. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) MOFAT Director of North America Division I Hahn
Choong-hee on August 21 thanked A/POL for the non-paper and
said that his office would be the coordination point for the
ROKG response. After a quick review of the paper, he said
that he thought the ROKG policy was already largely in line
with the recommendations since the ROK has no banking
relationships with the DPRK, and because the ROKG had already
taken steps to enforce export controls. He understood that
the USG would be interested in further ROKG steps on PSI.
Hahn promised to coordinate a ROKG response soon, asked if
that responses along with response from the other addressee
countries could affect the USG approach to enforcing UNSC
1695, and asked for any available information about USG
implementation of UNSC 1695, including timing.


3. (C) Separately, A/POL delivered reftel points to Cho
Koo-rae, MOFAT's Director of North Korean Nuclear Affairs
Division II. Cho undertook to obtain guidance from higher
authorities but informally raised questions about the
proposed approach. He wondered whether the non-paper went
beyond the scope of UNSCR 1695 by suggesting measures to
interdict proliferation-related goods and suggested there
might be other options than endorsement of the PSI Statement
of Interdiction Principles. Looking at Section C of the
USG-provided non-paper titled "Land, Air and Other
International Transit of Proliferation-Related Goods," Cho
wondered under what legal authority the USG and others would
interdict planes and ships bound to or from North Korea. Who
would decide whether the information was solid enough to
block the suspected transit? Cho was concerned that
countries would be enlisted to block third-party exports or
imports.


4. (C) In addition, econoff delivered relevant financial
portions of reftel to Oh Young-ju, Director of MOFAT's United
Nations Division. Econoff received no substantive reply.
STANTON