Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06SEOUL2827
2006-08-19 09:15:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Seoul
Cable title:  

PRESIDENT ROH'S INFORMAL COMMENTS ON OPCON, NORTH

Tags:  PREL PGOV KS 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 002827 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN REUNIFICATION
TAGS: PREL PGOV KS
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT ROH'S INFORMAL COMMENTS ON OPCON, NORTH
KOREA, USG, AND DOMESTIC POLITICS

Classified By: A/DCM Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 002827

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN REUNIFICATION
TAGS: PREL PGOV KS
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT ROH'S INFORMAL COMMENTS ON OPCON, NORTH
KOREA, USG, AND DOMESTIC POLITICS

Classified By: A/DCM Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) Summary and Comment: On August 13, President Roh
Moo-hyun hosted a dinner for several newspapers which are
considered "friendly" to the Roh Administration, including
Hankyoreh, KyungHyang and Seoul Shinmun. Over the course of
the dinner, Roh made frank comments on a number of issues,
including OPCON, the U.S.-ROK alliance, North Korea, FTA and
domestic politics. In Korea, there is no such thing as
off-the-record, especially when journalists are involved.
Some of the discussion is now making the rounds. The
following transcript was given to us by an editor who
participated in the dinner.


2. (C) Roh's penchant for frank talk has gotten him in
trouble many times. This is no exception. Roh's open
admission that he sees ROK forces as aimed at countering the
Japanese and Chinese, rather than the North Korean forces is
astounding. Many Koreans would say they are not surprised
that he has such views, but they are still shocked that he
would verbalize them with the press. Roh's virtual admission
that he is a lame duck is depressing to many in the
Administration, who believe that there's still some work to
do with seventeen months left in Roh's term. The main image
that comes across from these remarks is a president who feels
he has been defeated and under appreciated. End Summary and
Comment.

-OPCON-


3. (SBU) The OPCON transfer is being pursued based on our
discussions with the United States. The conservative press,
however, is assuming the offensive on the issue, although
they called for it ten year ago. (Roh expressed his
hostility towards the conservative media.) It is important
to follow the official statements of the United States
government. It is rare for the U.S. government to express
its position on the U.S.-ROK alliance because its statements
could become the subject of debate. But, the Department of
Defense and Department of State are coming out and expressing
their positions. We should not postpone our consultations
with the U.S. on the issue. Many of the critics question the
issue of the ROK military capabilities. But we are trying to

promote the ROK,s military capabilities to have a prepared
defense posture against Japan and China, not against North
Korea. The Ministry of National Defense (MND) is in great
need of equipping itself with the defense equipment that
Japan has. Talk on the North Korea deterrent misses the main
point of the issue. (Roh talked about the backwardness of
North Korea by mentioning what he saw in Pyongyang.) There
will not be a defense gap after the OPCON transfer. The
fundamental nature of military sovereignty is to exercise
what we have.

-OPLAN 5029-


4. (SBU) We have to rework the details of OPlan 5029. The
current plan fundamentally focuses on U.S. forces going into
the North and taking control of the situation. The situation
would become serious if this happens to be the case. China
does not want U.S. forces coming near its border with the
North. There is also the concern that the U.S. and China
will compete over North Korea (without discussing this with
the ROK) if there is an emergency situation in the country.
The North has not yet mentioned this during inter-Korean
military talks, but it is necessary to be prepared for a
situation where the North brings up the OPCON transfer issue
during military talks.

-NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR ISSUE AND SIX PARTY TALKS-


5. (SBU) There is nothing that we can do at the moment. We
have no choice but to pass the issue to the next
administration. Meanwhile, we have to manage the situation
so that it will not change for the worse. I feel frustrated.
Chief Secretary Song Min-soon says that we should still do
what we can, but that,s how I feel right now.


6. (SBU) The United States is trying to bring about a
collapse of the Kim Jong-il regime, so it is difficult to
communicate our position. On the other hand, North Korea is
stubborn. South Korea is stuck in the middle. We do not
have enough information on North Korea so there were many
times when our judgments had been inaccurate. The National
Intelligence Service (NIS) also does not know much about the
North. The official inter-Korean channel is the most
accurate source of information for us. We had tried in the
past to use unofficial channels to get information, without
any success. We were also unable to verify whether the
unofficial channel was what Kim Jong-il wanted. I still
think that there would be a chance if we meet Kim Jong-il
like last year,s meeting between then-Unification Minister
Chung Dong-young and Kim Jong-il. That is why I would like
to keep Minister Lee Jong-seok; I think he is the most
reliable channel in directly dealing with the North. If a
new person replaces him, it would be difficult to judge what
the North is thinking.


7. (SBU) It does not seem that China is seriously worried
about the North acquiring nuclear weapons. They do not seem
to evaluate the North,s nuclear technology very highly.


8. (SBU) The North Korean threat has more to do with the
North,s relations with other countries rather than its
nuclear technology. The North Korean case is similar to the
Indian case, but I do not understand why India is allowed to
have nuclear weapons (while the North is not). Do the South
Korean people feel insecure because the United States has
nuclear weapons? In addition, India and Iran are interested
in acquiring nuclear weapons, while North Korea is interested
in selling its nuclear technology.


9. (SBU) Q: What would happen if the United States and China
authorize South Korea to negotiate with the North?


A. That will never happen with the United States. If there
was such a possibility, the United States would directly
negotiate with the North. The U.S. perceives North Korea as
barbarous. It is like the U.S. is trying to enforce the
rules of civilization (i.e., democracy, market economy) on
savages. But the more important issue here is the question
of fairness. The United States does not treat the North
fairly.

-U.S. ADMINISTRATION-


10. (SBU) It is difficult to talk with the Bush
administration on security issues. I was more convinced on
this matter after recently seeing the United States,
attitude toward Israel. The situation was OK from the
Chung-Kim meeting to the Sept. 19 Joint Statement, but the
situation changed after the United States took up the BDA
issue.


11. (SBU) Strangely, I think President Bush personally likes
me. I think this is an asset.

-DOMESTIC POLITICS-


12. (SBU) The issue of defense reforms is a very difficult.
I would not have thought of pursuing defense reforms if it
were not for Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-Ung. The
researchers at the defense-related governmental think-tanks
were all hired by their predecessors. We have to change
these people, but that is difficult at the moment.


13. (SBU) When I first went to the Ministry of National
Defense (MND) after I came into office, I got the impression
that MND officials were mocking me. When I heard their
simple comparison of the ROK,s and North Korea,s military
capabilities, I received the impression that these people
were thinking that I was just an ordinary person visiting the
MND. The ROK military,s perception is much behind the times.


14. (SBU) I had not been worried about my popularity until
recently. Because of this it would be difficult to carry out
any reforms during the time that is left, so I am thinking
about just managing affairs. I am even thinking about
publicly declaring this to the South Korean public.


15. (SBU) I do not know what I have done wrong. If it is a
question of style, there is nothing much we can do about it.
I would like someone to specifically point out what I,m
doing wrong. Issues like polarization, irregular employment,
income distribution are all problems where we see progress,
but it is true that these problems remain unresolved. This
would be the same with the next administration. I have
carried out reforms within the administration and have worked
toward changing the Blue House system. The only new issue
that has emerged during my tenure is the issue of the adult
video gambling rooms. But the nature of the issue prevents
the Blue House from getting directly involved in handling the
problem.


16. (SBU) Right now, I feel conflicted between the thought
of giving up and doing my best to improve the situation
before I leave office. It is true that I go back and forth
between these two thoughts. That does not mean, however,
that I am inattentive to state affairs and management.


17. (SBU) Chosun, JoongAng, and Dong-A (three largest
circulating newspapers) all try to drag me down. The press
reflects the power of the people, but these three newspapers
have become synonymous with political power. The press needs
to be broad-minded in order to reflect the power of the
people, but these three do not even follow this principle. I
ask my people to give me a report every morning on what these
papers say. I will make sure that the influence of these
three newspapers fall, even if this means my popularity rate
will fall as well. This will also be better for my successor.


18. (SBU) It is less of a burden for me because the OPCON
transfer issue is becoming more of an issue than the
U.S.-Korea FTA issue.


19. (SBU) It would be more difficult for me if 1,000 people
who had shared my thoughts were to have demonstrations
calling for my resignation than 10,000 conservatives
demonstrating.

-US-ROK FTA-


20. (SBU) This is an option where we can be winners. It is
possible to respond to potential agricultural damages.
One-third of the agricultural industry is competitive, the
other third would become competitive through governmental
assistance, and the last third is not competitive.


21. (SBU) It is also important how we are treated by
stronger countries. The United States picked South Korea as
a FTA partner among 25 countries that had proposed a FTA with
the U.S. (Roh joked afterwards that some people could call
him pro-American if they heard him say this.)
STANTON