Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06SEOUL2706
2006-08-10 23:15:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Seoul
Cable title:  

CODEL HYDE MEETS PRESIDENT ROH: DIFFERING

Tags:  PREL KS KN 
pdf how-to read a cable
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FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9598
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1057
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 7449
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1137
RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR 1315
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 002706 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN REUNIFICATION
TAGS: PREL KS KN
SUBJECT: CODEL HYDE MEETS PRESIDENT ROH: DIFFERING
APPROACHES TO DPRK

Classified By: Amb. A. Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

SUMMARY
--------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 002706

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN REUNIFICATION
TAGS: PREL KS KN
SUBJECT: CODEL HYDE MEETS PRESIDENT ROH: DIFFERING
APPROACHES TO DPRK

Classified By: Amb. A. Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

SUMMARY
--------------

1. (C) House International Relations Committee Chairman Henry
Hyde and delegation discussed what President Roh Moo-hyun
called differing ROK and U.S. approaches to the DPRK, as well
as general alliance issues at a one-hour Blue House meeting
on August 10. President Roh emphasized that the DPRK's
mistrust of the United States, which the DPRK suspected
backed regime change, had to be overcome before there could
be progress on ending the DPRK nuclear weapons program.
Pressed to speak out more on North Korean human rights, Roh
described the ROK approach as working to gradually improve
the life of North Koreans so that the DPRK would open up and
reform, saying that a potential regime collapse would be a
burden too large for South Koreans to bear. In a general
discussion of alliance issues, Roh said that he agreed with
Chairman Hyde that the U.S.-ROK relationship is strong,
grounded on the sacrifices the Americans made in the Korean
war and on our shared values of freedom and belief in a
market economy. Though some people in pluralist South Korea
have different views, they were not representative of the
mainstream. Asked by Congressman Flake about making a
training range available to the U.S. air forces stationed in
the ROK, Roh said he was doing his best to resolve the issue.
END SUMMARY.


2. (C) At the August 10 meeting at Blue House, President Roh
Moo-hyun began by greeting each member of the Congressional
delegation and Chairman Hyde then introduced the members of
the delegation by name (para 10). Hyde and President Roh
both made brief opening statements while media were in the
room. Hyde said that alliance issues under negotiation
between the United States and the ROK could be resolved with
goodwill and patience on both sides, and that Congress
supports the ROK entering the Visa Waiver Program. President
Roh, speaking through an interpreter, thanked Hyde for
mentioning the Visa Waiver Program, said that he agreed that
important issues under negotiation could be resolved, and
then, raising a subject he emphasized throughout the rest of
the meeting, said that the "core difficulty" facing the ROK

and the United States was North Korea and its missiles.
Media representatives then left the room.

DIFFERENCES ON NORTH KOREA
--------------


3. (C) President Roh, after noting that a serious underlying
problem affecting the U.S.-ROK alliance was the rift within
Korean society on the U.S. presence, turned to North Korea.
He said that the ROK and United States had differences on the
DPRK but that he believed we could work together, and he
asked for Codel Hyde delegation's views. Hyde noted the
United States' respect for the Korean people's place in the
world, both politically and geostrategically. He said that
North Korea issues were serious but could be solved through
U.S.-ROK cooperation and a united front. Roh said he agreed,
but, he said with a smile, the United States and the ROK
might have a different approach to the DPRK. These
differences stemmed from the countries' inherently different
position in the world, the U.S. with its global standing and
the ROK with its position in Northeast Asia and its country
divided. Roh said the ROKG was fully committed to working
out the differences by talking, and committed to not making
the differences public.


4. (C) Representative Rohrabacher joined the discussion
noting that his father had fought for Koreans' freedom in the
Korean War and that Americans were sometimes dismayed by the
lack of appreciation by some people in Korea for U.S.
sacrifices. Rohrabacher asked whether the ROKG could put
increased attention on freedom by putting more emphasis on
human rights in its discussions with North Korea, and whether
the ROK could make greater efforts to accept DPRK refugees
who are in China.


5. (C) Roh replied that the cornerstone of the U.S.-ROK
relationship was the huge sacrifice that the United States
made in the Korean War. It was on that basis that the ROK
had been able to achieve economic success as well as freedom.
Roh said the vast majority of South Koreans had a sense of
gratitude for American sacrifices, and that the two countries
were linked by common values of belief in freedom and a

market economy. Pluralism in the ROK meant that some people
had different views about U.S.-Korea relations, but they were
not part of the mainstream.


6. (C) On human rights and the general approach to the DPRK,
Roh said, the ROK's view differed from that of the United
States. The ROK believed that to establish peace on the
Korean Peninsula, it was imperative not to give the DPRK the
suspicion that the goal was regime change. It was very
important to build trust on this issue. Should the DPRK
regime collapse, the magnitude of the difficulty for the ROK
would be beyond what the United States could imagine; the
burden would be beyond what the South Korean people could
bear. In addition, the collapse of the DPRK would likely
lead to conflict between the United States and China over the
future course of the Peninsula, which would also be difficult
for the ROK to manage. Roh said that when the ROK says
"human rights," the DPRK hears "regime change."


7. (C) On the ROK's policy on DPRK refugees, Roh said that
the policy was to accommodate asylum seekers, but that a
massive exodus from the DPRK would be a problem for the ROK.
He added that he himself had strong human rights credentials
from his time dealing with dictatorial governments of Korea,
but that special circumstances on the Korean Peninsula made
it difficult to approach North Korean human rights issues in
the same way. Rather than focus on elevating the human
rights of a few defectors, Roh said, the ROK policy was to
gradually improve the life of many in North Korea and to
persuade the DPRK to open and enact reforms. He closed by
saying he sought the delegation's understanding because "we
fear the danger and threat of (DPRK) collapse."


8. (C) Roh deflected a question from Representative
Faleomavaega about North Korean leader Kim Jong-il's
intentions and plans for the DPRK by saying that he was sure
neither of the DPRK's intentions nor where it was headed
post-Kim Jong-il. Instead, he returned to the theme of
overcoming mistrust, which was a wall between South and North
and the obstacle to solving the nuclear issue. He said that
the way to proceed on the relationship was through dialogue,
to reach agreement on a set of promises that will be kept, so
that the DPRK will become a normal nation with an open system.

DPRK NUCLEAR ISSUE DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF IRAN
-------------- -


9. (C) At the end of the meeting, after Hyde had thanked
President Roh and the two had exchanged pleasantries, Roh
asked to return to the issue of North Korea again. He said
that he saw Iran as embarked on a real quest for nuclear
weapons, whereas the DPRK wanted the leverage that nuclear
weapons would provide. He said the United States could, if
it wanted to, give compensation to the DPRK to persuade it to
get rid of its nuclear weapons program. But to do so, the
United States would first have to overcome mistrust, which
made each side suspicious that the other would not carry out
its promises. Hyde replied that the DPRK also had a
responsibility for overcoming mistrust, especially after
breaking its word on the 1994 Agreed Framework. The DPRK's
launching of seven missiles built anxiety rather than trust.
Roh's rejoinder was that the United States should avoid
getting diverted to peripheral issues such as counterfeiting
and drug smuggling. The DPRK remained inherently suspicious
that the USG was pursuing regime change. The United States
needed to remove those worries, and even in the United States
there were disagreements about whether USG policy was aimed
at regime change or solving the nuclear issue. The ROK
doubted the effectiveness of pressure tactics. Hyde replied
that building trust was important, but that it was also
important for the United States and the ROK to work together
on the DPRK issue, using both pressure and dialogue.

TRAINING RANGE FOR U.S. AIR FORCES
--------------


10. (C) Representative Flake asked whether the issue of
providing a training range for the U.S. air forces stationed
in the ROK could be resolved. Roh said that he would do his
best to resolve the problem, which also affected the Korean
military and arose because of the ROK's limited territory.

PARTICIPANTS
--------------

11. (U) ROK:
President Roh Moo-hyun
National Security Advisor Song Min-soon
Presidential Spokesman Jung Tae-ho
Secretary to the President for National Security Cho

SIPDIS
Myoung-gyon
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Director General for
North American Affairs Cho Tae-yong

U.S.:
HIRC Chairman Henry Hyde
Representative Jeff Flake
Representative Dana Rohrabacher
Representative Melvin Watt
Representative Eni Faleomavaega
Ambassador Alexander Vershbow
Dennis Halpin, Congressional Staff
Robert King, Congressional Staff
A/POL McFeeters (notetaker)


12. (U) Codel Hyde cleared this message.
VERSHBOW