ROKG TO PROVIDE FLOOD-RELATED AID TO NORTH KOREA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 002684

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN REUNIFCATION
TAGS: ECON KN KS PGOV
SUBJECT: ROKG TO PROVIDE FLOOD-RELATED AID TO NORTH KOREA


Classified By: A/DCM Joseph Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

SUMMARY
--------------

1. (C) The ROKG is expected to announce emergency aid to the
DPRK, probably through private NGOs, in the next few days, in
the wake of reports of hundreds of deaths and extensive
agricultural and infrastructure damage from the mid-July
floods in the North. A Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
official told poloff that the emergency aid would not
constitute lifting the ban on regular rice and fertilizer aid
imposed after the July 5 DPRK missile launches. Minister of
Unification Lee Jong-saek was said to be meeting with NGOs on
August 9-10 to discuss the ROKG's role in providing aid.
Several private South Korean NGOs have already begun to
respond by shipping food and other aid to North Korea. An
August 8 report from a semi-official DPRK source says that
North Korea sustained 549 dead, 295 missing and 3,043
injured. One South Korean NGO, Good Friends, estimates that
as many as 10,000 people have died and over one million
people are displaced as a result of the floods, but other
observers see that report as an exaggeration. END SUMMARY.

DEATH AND DAMAGE REPORTS
--------------


2. (U) Heavy rains hit North (as well as South) Korea
repeatedly during the latter half of July. In the North, the
heaviest rains were in the central and southern areas: South
Pyeongan, Hwanghae and Gangwon provinces. Reporting from the
DPRK's media, though incomplete and unverifiable, conveys a
sense of serious damage. The Korean Central News Agency
(KCNA) reported "flood damages in some parts of the country"
on July 16. Korean Central TV (KCTV) reported on July 16
that the Daedong river, which runs through Pyongyang, had
flooded for the first time since 1990. KCTV reported on July
21 that the Pyongyang Railroad Office was participating in
flood recovery efforts, including transporting workers to
repair destroyed railroad infrastructure. KCTV reported on
July 21 on damage to agricultural land in the South Hwanghae
province and that "hundreds of people were reported dead or
missing in the South Pyeongan province area." Pyongyang
Broadcasting reported much damage in Pyongyang, 11 villages
completely flooded, county roads destroyed, and
transportation and communication cut off on July 24.


3. (U) The Choson Sinbo, a pro-North Korean newspaper,
reported on August 8 that July's heavy rainfall caused
"serious damage," with 549 persons dead, 295 missing, and
3,043 injured. The report also said that 4,438 houses
(housing 7,847 families) were completely destroyed, 3,051
houses (housing 5,282 families) were partially destroyed, and
9,178 houses (housing 15,618 families) were inundated, and
that 23,974 hectares ("jeongbo") of farmland were seriously
damaged. The conservative South Korean newspaper Dong-A
Ilbo, reporting on these figures, said that it was
unprecedented for North Korean-oriented media to report
specific data on flood damage in this manner. A World Food
Program representative told us on August 8 that she
considered the Choson Sinbo to be the most authoritative
report on the floods to date.

ROKG CONSIDERING "EMERGENCY" RESPONSE
--------------

4. (C) The ROKG is assessing the extent of the damage in
North Korea this week, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
Director for Inter-Korean Policy Kim Ki-woong told us on
August 8, and is considering providing food aid to North
Korea. If so, he hastened to add, this would be an
"emergency" response and would not constitute resumption of
the food aid program that was put on hold after the July 5
DPRK missile launches. He said the ROKG was trying to get a
more complete picture of the extent of the damage and needs
in North Korea. J.R. Kim (Kim Jong-nu),Director of the
Ministry of Unification's International Cooperation Team,
said that Minister Lee Jong-seok is meeting with various
South Korean NGOs this week to assess needs and determine
ROKG participation. Press reports indicate that the ROKG is
already matching, or more than matching, private aid
donations destined for North Korea.


5. (C) Director of the Red Cross Inter-Korean Cooperation
Team Choi Young-woon told us at an August 9 meeting that the
ROKG may decide later this week to provide rice assistance to
North Korea, but if it does so, the rice will be provided
through the Red Cross as humanitarian aid. This would be
different from the usual economic and social channel of
providing rice through te Ministry of Unification. He said
that the ROKG was working to maintain the ban on normal
economic assistance to the DPRK that was cut off after July
5, but at the same time wanted to find a way to respond to
the humanitarian situation. Asked what the Red Cross thought
the flood victims would need, besides rice, Choi said
"everything," and recounted that in his earlier experience
with providing aid to North Koreans, they even used the
fertilizer bags, once emptied, as window covering to block
the wind.


6. (C) Both the South Korean press and the opposition Grand
National Party (GNP) appear receptive to ROKG aid in this
instance. GNP advisor Walter Peak told us that GNP does not
yet have an official position on the ROKG providing aid, but
that his sense was that GNP members supported aid to
"civilian" flood victims at this time. In the media, GNP has
called for ajoint GNP-Uri fact-finding delegation to go to
North Korea and assess the situation -- a near impossibility
based on the DPRK's reclusiveness.

DPRK AT FIRST REFUSED AID, NOW APPEARS RECEPTIVE
-------------- ---

7. (SBU) The DPRK, through its infrequent official
statements, initially refused to accept South Korean Red
Cross aid, in keeping with the negative tone established
after the July 5 DPRK missile launches, but it has allowed
several private South Korean NGOs, including the Join
Together Society, to deliver shiploads of aid. An August 9
press report says that the North Korean side of the
Inter-Korean Cooperation Committee faxed a request for
assistance with a specific list of relief equipment to the
South Korean side of the committee. On the other hand, the
DPRK appears wary of any additional aid from the World Food
Program. Seoul WFP rep Helen Lee told poloff on August 8
that the DPRK had turned down WFP's offer an extra supply of
rice for flood-afflicted areas.

GOOD FRIENDS NGO ESTIMATES 10,000 DEATHS -- OUTLIER
-------------- --------------


8. (U) Most South Korean sources report deaths and damage in
the range of the Choson Sinbo figures (para. 3),estimating
hundreds dead, up to 21,000 houses destroyed (Red Cross) and
significant damage to roads, railroads and farmland. The
outlier is a report from Good Friends, an NGO that works on
human and economic rights for North Koreans and has been
critical of the North Korean government and which claims to
have an extensive network of other NGO representatives and
businesspeople who regularly travel to North Korea.


9. (U) The Good Friends "North Korea Today" report for August
claims that 10,000 North Koreans have died as a result of the
floods and the 1.3 to 1.5 million are displaced. Going
through the report, however, one does not get a sense that
the numbers are firm. The report includes a map citing
rainfall and damage for two dozen counties in the central
(slightly northeast of Pyongyang) and southeast areas of the
DPRK. The report gives a death estimate of 1,000 for Yangduk
county in the central region and cites 200 deaths in Haeju,
near the DMZ in the west; there are no other regional death
estimates. It says that the "current situation is comparable
to the flood of 1995 that led millions to starvation," and
calls on the international community, "even the conservatives
of the US and the Korean society who have been critical of
the DPRK regime" to respond. The report appears to be more a
of projection of how bad things could be, if the floods are
followed by a wave of malaria and other diseases, and a
heartfelt appeal for assistance, than a purely fact-based
report.


10. (SBU) In an August 7 meeting with Poloff, Good Friends
representative Erica Kang did not provide much additional
detail on where the numbers in the report came from, but said
that the numbers were mostly based on conversations between
various NGO representative and some ethnic Chinese Korean
businessmen with DPRK local officials. She said that Good
Friends had received an early report of 3,400 dead at the end
of July when a South Korean NGO rep delivering coal to an
area near Kaesong had talked to a local official. Since
then, additional reports had come in making the situation
look much worse. She would not provide any detail on the
report's sources.


11. (SBU) A knowledgeable NGO source warned poloff on August
3 to be wary of Good Friends' statistics. She pointed out
that Good Friends often relied on information from anonymous
sources within North Korea which was passed on through
several intermediaries. Further, the information was
sometimes subject to "amateurish calculations." For example,
in estimating that 4 to 5 million died from famine in the
DPRK during the mid-1990s, Good Friends based its calculation
on a relatively small statistical sample from an especially
hard-hit province and then extrapolated the findings to the
whole country. As a result, it was likely that Good Friends
greatly overestimated the number of famine-related
casualties.

IMPLICATIONS FOR DPRK COULD BE SERIOUS
--------------


12. (SBU) Moon Chun-sang, a North Korea specialist with the
Asia Foundation, told us on August 3 that while the flood
damage might not be as extreme as reported by Good Friends,
the situation could become critical, and even destabilizing,
the next time a typhoon or major storm hits the region. If
the current floods have destroyed whatever flood control
infrastructure existed, the next major storm could be a true
disaster. According to Moon, when natural disasters hit
North Korea in the 1990s, most survivors could conceive of no
option other than to rebuild their homes and carry on with
their lives. With increasing numbers of defectors, and the
developing ability of defectors to communicate with remaining
family members through brokers or other networks, the
situation has changed greatly. Natural disaster survivors
may for the first time see defection as a viable option.
This new awareness, he said, could lead to a destabilizing
surge of defector and refugee activity following the next
natural disaster. Another experienced observer of North
Korea, journalist and professor Andrei Lankov, said that the
floods' most serious result may be to threaten the DPRK's
intention to become more self-sufficient in producing its own
food supply, and hence less dependent on outside aid that
could be turned off.

COMMENT: ROKG TRYING TO STRIKE A BALANCE
--------------


13. (C) The ROKG is already matching the donations to private
NGOs that are providing assistance to North Korea, so in that
sense official aid is already flowing north. However, during
this week of heavy press coverage of likely direct ROKG aid,
the ROKG appears to being going to great lengths not to
signal that it has loosened the ban on economic assistance to
the DPRK imposed after the missile launches. END COMMENT.

VERSHBOW