Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06SEOUL2535
2006-07-27 06:21:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Seoul
Cable title:  

ROK MINISTER OF UNIFICATION'S "U.S. FAILED"

Tags:  PREL KS KN 
pdf how-to read a cable
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FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9359
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1006
RUEHKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR 2424
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 7434
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1082
RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR 1301
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 002535 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

KUALA LUMPUR FOR A/S HILL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2015
TAGS: PREL KS KN
SUBJECT: ROK MINISTER OF UNIFICATION'S "U.S. FAILED"
REMARKS SPARK CONTROVERSY; MINISTRY'S DPRK PLANS ON HOLD


Classified By: CDA Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

SUMMARY
--------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 002535

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

KUALA LUMPUR FOR A/S HILL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2015
TAGS: PREL KS KN
SUBJECT: ROK MINISTER OF UNIFICATION'S "U.S. FAILED"
REMARKS SPARK CONTROVERSY; MINISTRY'S DPRK PLANS ON HOLD


Classified By: CDA Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) South Korean Minister of Unification Lee Jong-seok's
July 23 televised remark that the United States "failed the
most" in not preventing North Korea from launching missiles
on July 5 sparked a strong negative reaction from both sides
of the aisle in the National Assembly and among
editorialists. Senior officials in the Ministry of
Unification (MOU) and in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
Trade (MOFAT) defended his remarks to us as logical, saying
that he meant the missiles were intended mainly as a
provocation against the United States, but readily admit that
it would have been better for him to focus his remarks on
North Korea's ill-advised action and its failure to
intimidate the international community. Meanwhile, MOU and
MOFAT officials tell us that the post-missile-test impasse
with North Korea marks a serious low point in MOU's effort to
build linkages with the North. On the other hand, the
impasse with the North is unlikely to change the long-term
MOU strategy for eventual unification stretching over the
next generation. END SUMMARY.

"U.S. FAILED THE MOST"
--------------


2. (U) Unification Minister Lee Jong-seok's July 23 televised
remarks (recorded on July 19) were as follows (unofficial
Embassy translation):

Q: One of the Roh Moo-hyun administration's three main
principles in its North Korea policy is to assume an
initiative role in its relationship with North Korea. When
we look at the recent missile crisis, however, it makes one
fundamentally question the role of the ROK government toward
the DPRK. In fact, it makes one think that the ROK has a
limited role on North Korea.

A: Yes. All of the North's neighbors including the ROK,
China, the United States, and Japan expressed their positions
that the DPRK should not launch its missiles. And all
parties strongly warned the North Koreans on this. But none
were able to prevent the DPRK from launching its missiles.
If we look at this from a logical perspective and consider
the fact that the U.S. was the most active in warning the

North Koreans, (we could say that) the United States failed
the most because it couldn't prevent the North from launching
its missiles.

The ROK and China also failed in dissuading the North. From
this point of view, I acknowledge that the ROK failed, but
this was also the case with other states in the international
community. This just shows how difficult it is (for all of
us) in persuading the North.

Later in the program came this exchange with Lee:

Q: There is concern about the U.S.-ROK alliance...

A: It is true that there are a few differences in opinion
regarding issues on dealing with the North.


3. (U) The Korean and international press seized on the "U.S.
failed the most" sound bite as a sign of friction with the
USG. National Assembly members from both sides of the aisle
criticized Lee: Uri Party member Chung Eui-yong said, "To
officially confirm that there are differences is not a
diplomatic practice. Senior officials of ministerial rank
should refrain from such words." Another Uri Party member
said Lee should give up his post as Chairman of the National
Security Council Standing Committee, a position he holds
concurrently with being Minister of Unification, while
members of the conservative GNP opposition party blasted Lee
as being soft on North Korea. Editorials in the conservative
and centrist press were harsh too, saying that the government
should wake up to the threat from the North. A JoongAng
Daily editorial pointed that a North Korean official, Ahn
Gyeong-ho, Director of North Korea's Secretariat of the
Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland,
threatened the South one month ago by saying the foremost
victim of any war with the United States would be South
Korea.


4. (U) President Roh Moo-hyun gave the controversy new life,
and emphasized the sense of friction with the USG, by
defending Lee's remarks on July 25:

"I do not understand why a South Korean minister had to be
reproached at the National Assembly for saying U.S. policies
were a failure. Cabinet ministers are supposed to speak
straight from their own conviction and belief and sometimes
have to refute questions from lawmakers. The ministers should
always be ready to answer such questions with responses such
as, 'Then are you insisting on suffocating North Korea?, 'Do
you lawmakers think the U.S. is a faultless country?,' and
'Do you lawmakers believe South Korea should keep mum about
policy mistakes by the U.S.?,'" Roh said.


5. (C) Our contacts in the Ministry of Unification, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and the National Security
Council defend the strict logic of Lee's remarks -- since the
United States, they say, was the primary "target" of the July
5 missile tests and therefore the primary "victim" -- but
they also acknowledge that the sense of division with the
United States is the wrong message. MOU Director for the
International Cooperation Team J.R. Kim (Kim Chong-no) said
that even though his Minister's remarks were logical, he
would have recommended a different, more pro-U.S. approach.


6. (C) In a July 26 conversation with National Security
Advisor Song Min-Soon, the Ambassador said that Minister
Lee's and President Roh's comments were harmful and could
embolden the DPRK to remain defiant. In reply, Song Min-soon
urged the Ambassador to look past what he called
media-generated controversy. He said that journalists
intentionally baited Lee to make the statements and that
President Roh defended the comments in an attempt to put the
matter to rest. Like others in MOFAT and NSC, Song asked us
to focus on the real work going on to get North Korea back to
the table. He said the ROKG wants to work with the USG over
the coming weeks to craft a North Korea plan for President
Bush and President Roh to endorse at their mid-September
meeting in Washington.

MEANWHILE, WHAT IS THE PLAN FOR NORTH KOREA?
--------------


7. (C) The running front-page controversy over Lee's remarks
is striking, but perhaps more significant is what is not in
the South Korean newspapers lately: any detailed suggestion
from government officials or from opinion-makers about what
to do about North Korea in the wake of the missile tests and
the acrimonious and aborted July session of the Inter-Korean
dialogue. Instead, there are signs of getting back to
business-as-usual: the MOU's head of the Office for
Inter-Korean Economic Projects was quoted in the July 27
press saying that expansion of the Kaesong Industrial
Complex, ostensibly on hold after the missile launches, may
resume as early as August or September since it is a project
that "runs strictly according to market mechanisms."


8. (C) Privately, our MOU, NSC, and MOFAT contacts all agree
on two things: contacts with the North are on hold for now,
but it is important to "keep the dialogue open," as NSC
Assistant Secretary to the President Noh Kyu-duk put it in a
July 26 meeting. MOU's Kim said that MOU plans are on hold
now and that the Ministry is waiting to see if the DPRK will
take any more "soft steps" (steps that express displeasure
but don't cost the DPRK significant money). He pointed out
that the DPRK, like the ROKG, is being careful not to close
the door completely. For example, on July 22 the DPRK
withdrew several officials at the Kaesong liaison office that
opened last October, but left in place several officials who
deal most directly with economic issues in Kaesong.


9. (C) MOFAT Director for North America Division I Hahn
Chong-hee gave us a more subtle description of the DPRK's
recent actions, saying that the DPRK was taking steps, but
would be careful not to anger the ROK because the DPRK sees
the ROK as a friend, relatively speaking, in a hostile world
community.


10. (C) Asked whether the current impasse endangers MOU's
vision of reunifying the Koreas, Kim gave a surprising
answer, in light of the ROK Constitution's statement that
"The Republic of Korea shall pursue unification, and draw up
and implement a peaceful unification policy based on the
liberal democratic system." He said that the MOU policy is to
build mutual prosperity and peace as a foundation for
unification, but that actual unification was at least a
generation away. The ROKG had come to this "second-best"
approach after learning two lessons: in the early 1990s,
that the DPRK was much more resilient than the "regime
collapse" analysts thought; and in the late 1990s, after the
financial crisis that shook Korea's economy, that the ROK
could not possibly afford to absorb the North. Kim's
explanation appears to be a franker version of what Minister
Lee said in an April 2006 speech: "Considering the huge
economic and social gap between the two Koreas, it is
inappropriate to pursue immediate unification."

COMMENT
--------------


11. (C) The Roh Moo-Hyun administration's responses to the
North Korean missile launches have been confused at best.
From the beginning, the ROKG did not want to believe that Kim
Jong-il would actually order the launches. From President
Roh on down the prevailing attitude was that this was just
another threat. It is, therefore, not surprising that the
ROKG was caught off-guard not knowing how to respond. Within
the ROKG, MOFAT and MND pressed heavily that South Korea must
join the international community in strongly condemning the
launch; they asked for the North-South Ministerials to be
canceled or at least postponed and to support a tough UN
Security Council resolution. MOU, personified by Unification
Minister Lee Jong-seok, argued vehemently that such actions
would end the North-South dialogue, which was the same as an
open admission that President Roh's North Korea policy had
failed. We understand that there were bitter arguments in
the cabinet with the usually cool and suave Foreign Minister
Ban Ki-moon losing him temper and walking out on occasions.


12. (C) Roh was, of course, not ready to admit that he had no
North Korea policy, hence the deafening silence from the Blue
House on virtually anything to do with North Korea since the
missile launches. This too won't last. Roh, facing a bleak
domestic political outlook, is eager to salvage something
from his North Korea policy. We expect the ROKG will propose
a renewed diplomatic initiative soon to key partners,
especially the U.S. If this is not forthcoming, our best
guess is that bilateral engagement will be renewed and even
deepened.
YUN