ROK MOFAT AND NSC ON UNSC RESOLUTION: CHAPTER 7

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 002320

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN REUNIFICATION
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC KS KN
SUBJECT: ROK MOFAT AND NSC ON UNSC RESOLUTION: CHAPTER 7
UNACCEPTABLE

REF: A. SEOUL 2296

B. STATE 114019

Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) In a follow-up to the Ambassador's meeting with FM
Ban Ki-Moon and series of telcons with NSA Song Min-soon (Ref
A),A/DCM called on MOFAT Director General for North America
Cho Tae-yong and NSC Director General Lim Sung-nam to urge
the South Koreans to support the Japanese draft of the UNSCR
on North Korean missile launches (Ref B). Cho said, firmly,
that "Chapter 7 is the issue" preventing the ROKG from
supporting the draft resolution. Cho cited July 12 press
statements by Foreign Minister Ban Ki-Moon to the effect that
invocation of Chapter 7 would open new possibilities and
would have negative ramifications for the security situation
on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia. Cho asked
that the USG and other governments consider the merits of the
ROKG argument. Cho also conveyed to us, in a subsequent
telephone call after the meeting, that the ROKG would support
five-party talks in connection with the ASEAN Regional Forum
meetings in Kuala Lumpur, or, if Chinese opposition made that
infeasible, a trilateral meeting between the U.S., ROK, and
Japanese foreign ministers in KL.


2. (C) In a separate meeting, NSC DG Lim said that the Blue
House decided to intervene because the mention of Chapter 7
could lead to military actions in the future, a view
reinforced by the remarks of Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary
Abe. Lim said that the Blue House was disappointed that such
a tough resolution could be drafted without any high-level
consultations with Seoul. (Comment: We understand that IO
brief the ROK Embassy in Washington last week; moreover, A/S
Hill's meetings over the weekend revealed broad support for a
meaningful resolution. Our guess is that President Roh was
out of the loop initially; subsequently, he became
suspicious, especially upon hearing Abe's remarks.) END
SUMMARY.

MOFAT Response
--------------


3. (SBU) In a July 12 meeting with MOFAT DG Cho Tae-yong,
A/DCM conveyed Ref B points emphasizing that Washington was
very concerned that Seoul had taken such a visibly different
position on the draft UNSCR. Given the gravity of the North
Korean action, a Chapter 7 resolution was an entirely
appropriate response for the international community.


4. (SBU) In response, Cho cited "carefully chosen words"
from Foreign Minister Ban Ki-Moon's July 12 press statements
(Cho's translation from Korean text):

-- "The ROK government has to be careful/cautious about
(Chapter 7) because invocation of Chapter 7 has certain
implications and opens certain future possibilities that may
have negative ramifications for the situation on the Korean
peninsula and Northeast Asia."

-- On Japan: "we believe our expression of our legitimate
concerns must not be construed as a diplomatic row between
Japan and Korea over North Korea's missile launches, nor be
construed as my government being less than forthcoming on the
UNSC discussion on North Korea's missile launches. The ROK
government is working to maintain a decisive posture on this
issue and will work with related countries and join the
international community, including discussions in the UNSC."


5. (C) Cho said that the ROKG could agree with all of the
draft UNSC resolution except for the invocation of Chapter 7.
He said that he had learned that only 62 of all UNSC
resolutions to date had invoked Chapter 7, and that of these
only 16 also contained specific measures. He added that the
ROKG believed that the DPRK actions, while very serious, did
not merit the invocation of Chapter 7.


6. (C) On contacts with Japan, Cho said ruefully that
Japanese Embassy officials had told him last Friday (July 7)
that Japan wanted swift UNSC action, whether a resolution or
a Presidential Statement, so that it showed the Japanese
public an immediate result; there was no mention of Chapter 7
at that time. He said further that, "barring another
provocation from across the straits (Japan),we will make an
effort not to heighten the rhetoric level." He asked A/DCM
to understand that when Japan is involved, issues become
emotional. He cited a survey of National Assembly members
that apparently revealed that most were worried about last
week's DPRK missile launches but that all agreed with the
ROKG's stance on Japan.

Blue House Response
--------------


7. (C) NSC Director General Lim requested a meeting with
A/DCM to give the "Blue House perspective," because decisions
had been made at "the highest level." Lim said that under
Blue House instructions, MOFAT had told the Japanese that the
ROKG:

-- Had grave concerns regarding the North Korean missile
launches; appropriate measures had to be taken to discourage
Pyongyang from future missiles launches;

-- Supported strongly the efforts of the UNSC to take such
measures;

-- Had serious reservations, however, that the resolution
contained references to Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, which
could be interpreted to include military actions in the
future;

-- Expressed deep concerns that such a resolution involving
the Korean Peninsula could have been proposed without prior
consultations with Seoul.


7. (C) Lim said that the ROKG was fully aware that the draft
resolution and its reference to Chapter 7 did not mean an
immediate or direct call for military action. But, as
always, a mention of Chapter 7 rang alarm bells, and this was
not different. Perhaps things might have been different had
there been high-level consultations with Washington or Tokyo.
Simply put, Seoul was caught unaware; the ROKG did not know
whether the Chapter 7 reference was "tactical or the
end-goal."


8. (C) A/DCM assured Lim that the Chapter 7 reference was
not tactical and that Washington was committed to the current
draft.

Comment
--------------


9. (C) MOFAT and NSC foreign policy advisors are quite
embarrassed at how things have turned out. In private
conversations they have told us that Seoul had missed an
opportunity to put some heat on China, and that Seoul might
have had the same result without the public display of a gap
with Washington. At the same time, we get the impression that
even seasoned diplomats and senior foreign policy-hands in
Seoul do not quite appreciate the gravity and seriousness of
the North Korean action, especially for Washington and Tokyo.


10. (C) Regarding the South Korean complaint of lack of
consultations, we would note that IO briefed the ROK Embassy
before the resolution was put in blue. Moreover, A/S Hill's
consultations over the weekend with senior ROK officials
revealed broad support for a "tough" resolution, with no one
raising the Chapter 7 issue. In the end, such support could
not overcome President Roh's inherent suspicions and, perhaps
more important, his political instinct to play the "Japan
card."

VERSHBOW