UNSCR ON DPRK MISSILE LAUNCHES: ROK RESPONSE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 002296

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

BEIJING PASS TO A/S HILL

E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN REUNIFICATION
TAGS: PREL PARM MARR UNSC KN KS
SUBJECT: UNSCR ON DPRK MISSILE LAUNCHES: ROK RESPONSE

REF: STATE 113389

Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: The Ambassador met on July 11 with Foreign
Minister Ban Ki-moon to urge Seoul to reconsider its
opposition to the Japanese draft UNSCR on DPRK missile
launches. This was in follow-up to a series of exchanges on
July 10 with National Security Advisor Song Min-soon. Ban,
like Song the previous day, was insistent that the ROK was
opposed to the Chapter 7 reference in the Japanese draft
UNSCR, since it implied the possibility of military action.
Moreover, Ban reiterated that Japanese Cabinet Secretary
Abe's remarks that Japan could consider conducting preemptive
strikes against the missile launch sites had left Seoul no
choice but to go public in opposing any references to Chapter

7. On July 11, A/DCM also contacted MOFAT DG Cho Tae-yong.
His response was along the same lines as Song and Ban. END
SUMMARY.
.
NSA SONG'S JULY 10 DISCUSSIONS WITH AMBASSADOR
-------------- -


2. (C) On July 10, the Ambassador told NSA Song Min-soon
that it would be unfortunate, especially after Assistant
Secretary Hill's successful visit, to project an image of

SIPDIS
U.S.-ROK disagreement over the UNSCR. The Ambassador noted
that the resolution did not specifically authorize the use of
force, and the operational paragraphs related to blocking
missile technology transfers to and from the DPRK --
something the South Koreans were already committed to
support. The ROKs should wait and see how the resolution
evolves before criticizing it publicly and creating the
appearance of a Seoul-Washington rift. It would be good if
they could express their support for the
counter-proliferation goals of the draft resolution.


3. (C) NSA Song responded that the UNSCR had direct
consequences for South Korea, yet the ROK had not been
consulted prior to the resolution being "put in blue."
Moreover, regarding timing, Song said Seoul was concerned
that the resolution may be voted on before we could all take
stock of the results of the stiff message the ROK will convey
to the North Koreans at the July 11 inter-Korean ministerial
talks in Busan, as well as Wu Dawei's visit to Pyongyang that
was just beginning.


4. (C) Subsequently, the Ambassador contacted Song again to
stress that going public with their objections would go down
badly in Washington. Even if technically the Koreans were
criticizing the Japanese, the U.S. supported the resolution
as it stood and was urging UNSC members to vote for it.
Therefore, this would be seen as a rebuke to the USG.
Substantively, the resolution had to contain references to
Chapter 7 because of the serious threats of North Korean WMD
programs and proliferation risks. The UNSC action must have
teeth, the Ambassador underlined.


5. (C) Going through Seoul's concerns, which he attributed
to President Roh himself, who only learned about the
resolution Monday morning, Song said that the remarks by
Japanese Cabinet Secretary Abe had significantly inflamed the
ROKG views. Abe was essentially saying that Japan could
consider preemptively attacking North Korean missile sites.
Therefore, any reference to Chapter 7 could be interpreted as
a threat to use force.
.
MINISTER BAN POINTS TO JAPAN
--------------


6. (C) On July 11, the Ambassador informed Foreign Minister
Ban Ki-moon that A/S Hill was returning to Beijing to stress
that Washington agreed to delay a vote on the Japanese draft
UNSC resolution but would look to Chinese diplomatic efforts
in considering next steps. Washington wanted Beijing to
persuade North Korea to return to the Six Party Talks,
reaffirm its missile moratorium, and begin implementing the
September 19 Joint Statement. We would review the situation
day by day. If the DPRK did not deliver on all three points,
we would seek a vote on the UNSCR. A Presidential Statement
was not an acceptable alternative. The Ambassador reiterated
the concerns expressed to NSA Song regarding Seoul's
opposition to the UNSCR.


7. (C) Foreign Minister Ban responded by emphasizing ROK
concerns over the DPRK missile launches and said Seoul fully
supported the necessity of UNSC member countries sending a
strong message to North Korea about its provocative steps.
At the North-South ministerial talks in Busan, Unification
Minister Lee would convey ROK, U.S., and international
concerns directly to North Korean officials to give them a
full picture of the international environment. Ban insisted
that South Korean diplomacy related to the Japanese
resolution was not an effort to impede U.S. and international
efforts to find a peaceful and diplomatic resolution, and he
sought to reassure Washington that Seoul did not want any
misunderstandings.


8. (C) Ban said, however, that alarming and surprising
Japanese leaders' statements, including remarks about
preemptive military actions, as well as a lack of prior
consultations from Tokyo, forced Seoul to look again at the
Chapter 7 references. The Japanese draft resolution did not
contain specific military elements, as the Ambassador had
pointed out, but by referring to Chapter 7 it gave the
impression that as the situation developed it might be easier
for the UNSC to invoke another tougher Chapter 7 action.
UNSC decisions should be unanimous or we risked creating gaps
that North Korea could exploit. Japanese statements created
apprehensions and suspicions that might cause others, like
China, to have their own doubts. Those doubts combined with
the Chapter 7 references might make a UNSC resolution
unfeasible by seeming out of proportion to the DPRK actions.
Ban added that he hoped the Chinese diplomatic mission to
Pyongyang would produce positive results.
.
A/DCM SEPARATELY SPEAKS TO MOFAT
--------------


9. (C) On July 11, A/DCM separately conveyed USG concerns to
MOFAT DG Cho Tae-yong that South Koreans were now actively
working to oppose the UNSC resolution on DPRK missiles.
A/DCM stressed that such activity negated the outcome of A/S
Hill's recent meetings in Seoul during which we had agreed on
the critical importance of providing a unified diplomatic
response to the recent North Korean missile launches.


10. (C) Cho also said that Seoul's main concern was over the
Chapter 7 reference in the resolution. Alarm bells went off
in Seoul, Cho said, because of Japanese Chief Cabinet
Secretary Abe's remarks on July 10 that Japan could

SIPDIS
preemptively attack the launch base in North Korea. Such
views were unacceptable to the ROKG. Cho said that Abe's
remarks were entirely inappropriate, recalling that various
communications between Seoul and Washington in the wake of
the recent North Korean missile launches, including those
between the two Presidents and FM Ban and Secretary Rice,
were centered around diplomatic responses. The draft
resolution should not make references to Chapter 7, because
that could justify Abe's views, Cho said.


11. (C) A/DCM said that Washington was committed to Chapter
7 reference because of the dangers posed by the North Korean
WMD program. North Korea was a self-declared nuclear power;
its recent missile launches had threatened peace in the
region; it was a known proliferator. Cho said he would
convey Washington's position to higher authorities.
VERSHBOW