Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06SEOUL2255
2006-07-07 14:13:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Seoul
Cable title:  

ROKG TO RESTRIC INTER-KOREAN MINISTERIALS NEX WEEK

Tags:  PREL PGOV KS KN 
pdf how-to read a cable
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FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8896
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0917
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 7401
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0988
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 002255 

SIPDIS

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E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN UNIFICATION
TAGS: PREL PGOV KS KN
SUBJECT: ROKG TO RESTRIC INTER-KOREAN MINISTERIALS NEX WEEK
TO NUCLEAR AND MISSILES


Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 002255

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN UNIFICATION
TAGS: PREL PGOV KS KN
SUBJECT: ROKG TO RESTRIC INTER-KOREAN MINISTERIALS NEX WEEK
TO NUCLEAR AND MISSILES


Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)


1. (C) Summary and Comment: In separate meetings with the
Ambassador on July 6, Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon and
Unification Minister Lee Jong-seok said that after a bitter
internal fight over whether or not to cancel next week's
inter-Korean ministerial, President Roh had tried to square
the circle: to announce that the meeting would go ahead as
scheduled, but declare that the agenda would be restricted to
the missile issue and the resumption of the Six Party Talks.
In this way, Seoul would signal to the North Koreans that
there could be no "business as usual" in the wake of the
launch (i.e. no discussion of inter-Korean economic
cooperation or humanitarian aid),without closing off
channels of communication with the North. FM Ban, who had
recommended canceling the meeting, told the Ambassador that
his expectation was that the announcement of a reduced agenda
would prompt the North Koreans to pull out of the meeting.
Unification Minister Lee, however, in a subsequent meeting,
said he believed that there was a chance the North Koreans
would still attend, in which case the South Koreans would
give them a firm message about the missile launches and the
need to return to the 6PT without preconditions. Lee
appealed repeatedly for U.S. support.


2. (C) The Ambassador said he appreciated the effort to
avoid the impression of "business as usual," which was
reinforced by the earlier decision to suspend further
humanitarian aid. In his own view, the best outcome would be
for the meeting NOT to take place. In commenting publicly on
the Korean proposal, Embassy recommends accentuating the
positive -- the signal Seoul is sending that routine
inter-Korean business cannot proceed in the aftermath of the
missile launches. This will increase our chances of
persuading Seoul to consider other measures to counter the
North Koreans' actions. End Summary and Comment.

FM Ban: Had Favored Canceling Ministerials
--------------


3. (C) During a July 7 meeting with the Ambassador, FM Ban
received a phone call from NSA Song Min-soon that President

Roh had decided in favor of holding the inter-Korean
ministerials next week with the agenda restricted to missiles
and the Six Party Talks. Ban acknowledged that this had been
a very difficult decision. He had favored canceling the
meeting, or at least postponing it for a while.


4. (C) However, Ban continued, others (read Unification
Minister Lee Jong-seok) had argued that suspending
consideration of the new humanitarian assistance request from
North Korea of 500,000 tons of rice and 100,000 tons of
fertilizer was a very powerful signal, truly hurting
Pyongyang. Moreover, Ban continued, these advocates had a
valid point in that the ROK needed to maintain a channel of
communications with the North. South Korea had never
rejected dialogue with North Korea. It was always the North
refusing to come to various meetings and events for one
reason or another. President Roh certainly believed the
channel should be preserved and used to convey tough messages.


5. (C) The Ambassador said that the international community
in general and the 6PT partners in particular should be
sending clear united signals of disapproval to Pyongyang in
the wake of the missile launches. The Ambassador said that
he was not suggesting breaking off all contacts, but that
Pyongyang must not get the impression that it was "business
as usual." The Ambassador expressed appreciation for the
ROK's firm stance that new humanitarian assistance of rice
and fertilizer was suspended.


6. (C) Ban said that the decision to restrict the agenda of
the ministerials took into account the phone conversation
between the two Presidents the previous day and NSA Song
Min-soon's consultations in Washington this week. It was
quite likely that Pyongyang would refuse to attend the
ministerials next week given the restricted agenda. Already,
Pyongyang was sending mixed signals, because it had not yet
sent the delegation list.


7. (C) The Ambassador emphasized that Seoul and Washington
must be together in reacting to the North Korean provocation.
Our actions must be equally robust.

Unification Minister Lee: Appeals for U.S. Support
-------------- --------------


8. (C) In a subsequent meeting, also on July 7, Unification
Minister Lee Jong-seok said that the U.S-ROK alliance was of
special significance during this difficult time. Seoul and
Washington, along with Beijing, had tried very hard to
dissuade North Korean from launching missiles. Still, North
Korea persisted. It was an entirely wrong decision; a very
dangerous provocation. In his view, North Korea wanted
attention so that it could deal directly with the United
States. Pyongyang had utterly failed in these objectives;
North Korea now found itself in a much worse situation than
before, Lee said.


9. (C) Lee also speculated that the reason why so many
Nodongs and Scuds were launched was because the Taepodong II
launch had failed. The North Koreans wanted to divert
attention from the failure of Taepodong II.


10. (C) Lee said that Seoul would respond concretely,
supporting the U.S. and international community. Just today,
Seoul had cancelled the previously scheduled working-level
military officers' talks. The decision on the ministerials
next week had been an agonizing one. The "core" agenda would
be restricted to the missile issue and the resumption of the
6PT. Perhaps, the North Koreans might not come after
learning this agenda.


11. (C) Lee continued that in the ministerials next week,
South Korea would urge the North to return to the 6PT. If it
refused to return, there would be no economic assistance from
South Korea. Even without North Korea, Seoul would work
vigorously to hold a meeting of the 6PT with just the five.
Lee said that Seoul's suspension of 500,000 tons of rice aid
was a lot more powerful than Japan's ten-point sanctions.


12. (C) The Ambassador said that it was crucially important
for the international community to tell North Koreans that
its behavior was inexcusable. While Washington did not want
to escalate the situation, we also believed that Pyongyang
must know that it had made a serious miscalculation, and that
there was no business as usual. The Ambassador would have
preferred an outright cancellation of the ministerials, but,
perhaps, if the agenda was strictly restricted to nuclear and
missile issues, the ROK could indeed convey a message to
Pyongyang. Noting Lee's reference to the alliance, the
Ambassador said that the U.S. and ROK should now work
together closely to convince North Korea to return to the 6PT
so that the September 19 Joint Statement could be
implemented. This was the goal and prize, the Ambassador
said.


13. (C) Lee said that the current difficulty was also an
opportunity. Washington should be completely assured that
Seoul was a strong partner in the alliance. He counted on
the Ambassador to explain to Washington the logic behind why
he would meet his North Korean counterpart next week. He
urged the U.S. to support President Roh's decision to hold
the meeting with a restricted agenda.

Comment
--------------


14. (C) While we have not asked for the cancellation of the
ministerials under instruction, we have, nevertheless, told
the South Koreans on several occasions that they must give
clear signals that inter-Korean dialogue and assistance
should not proceed as if nothing has happened. We are
disappointed that the meeting will be held in Pusan next
week, assuming the North Koreans come.


15. (C) Within the Roh Administration, this is once again a
victory of the so-called "engagers" over the diplomats. Lee
Jong-seok got his way because President Roh is a like-minded
engager. Their bottom-line is that dialogue with North Korea
must be preserved, because without it South Korea does not
have a North Korea policy.


16. (C) Perhaps the meeting next week will truly be
restricted to discussions of nuclear and missile issues. We
don't know. At minimum, we are inclined to believe that
these two issues will feature prominently--not necessarily a
bad outcome. For this reason, we recommend that in
commenting publicly on the ministerials, we should accentuate
the positive: that Seoul is approaching the meeting with the
goal of stopping further missile launches and seeking the
resumption of the 6PT, rather than engaging in discussion of
new economic and humanitarian aid. This will encourage the
ROK delegation toward this direction and increase our chances
of persuading Seoul to consider other measures to counter the
North Koreans' actions.

VERSHBOW