A/MOU EXPLAINS ROK ENGAGEMENT WITH DPRK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 002254

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR CHA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2015
TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP KS KN
SUBJECT: A/MOU EXPLAINS ROK ENGAGEMENT WITH DPRK

REF: SECSTATE 111144

Classified By: A/DCM Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b),(d).

SUMMARY
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1. (C) The A/DCM called on Assistant Minister of Unification
Park Chan-bong on July 6 to verify that the ROKG planned to
proceed with a final portion of an earlier pledge of
fertilizer assistance to the DPRK and intended to hold an
inter-Korean ministerial next week as scheduled despite the
North Korean missile launches. Park explained that after
considerable internal discussions, Seoul concluded that
breaking off North-South dialogue was not wise because
restarting talks later would be too costly and difficult.
Instead, the ROKG would use the ministerial to deliver a
stern message to the North, including the point that the DPRK
demand for an additional 500,000 tons of rice and 100,000
tons of fertilizer was threatened. (Subsequently,
Unification Minister Lee Jong-seok told the Ambassador that
the only agenda items in the ministerials would be missiles
and Six Party Talks; septel follows.) The ROK was also
taking quiet steps to increase pressure on the North without
unnecessarily playing into the hand of DPRK hardliners. END
SUMMARY.
.
USG: NEED FOR A TOUGHER MESSAGE TO DPRK
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2. (C) On July 6, the A/DCM requested a meeting with the
Assistant Minister of Unification Park Chan-bong to deliver
reftel points that stressed the importance of international
pressure on North Korea in response to the missile launches.
The A/DCM emphasized that Washington wanted to avoid
escalation, demonstrate international concern about bad DPRK
behavior, and pursue a diplomatic track that included the Six
Party Talks. However, there was a perception that Seoul was
not doing enough to show that it was not business as usual in
its policies towards North Korea. Public statements by the
Unification Minister that Seoul would complete the remaining
shipments of fertilizer aid this week and that inter-Korean
talks set for July 11-14 would be held as planned raised
questions.
.
ROKG: BETTER TO AVOID ESCALATION
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3. (C) Park responded that prior to the launch Seoul had
delivered the message to Pyongyang that missile tests could
not but hinder inter-Korean relations. Park noted that
Unification Minister Lee Jong-seok earlier in the day had
reiterated to the National Assembly that Seoul would withhold
additional assistance to the North. As to the question of
continued fertilizer aid this week, Park insisted that the
South had almost completed delivery on the latest pledge of
200,000 tons, with only 24,000 tons remaining. With the
biggest chunk already sent, Seoul wanted to lead by example
and fulfill its own commitment rather than cancel something
at the last minute like the North sometimes does. At next
week's inter-Korean talks, however, Seoul would explain that
in the wake of the missile launches the ROKG would not be
able to accept an expected North Korean demand for an
additional 500,000 tons of rice and 100,000 tons of
fertilizer. This would provide the North with an immediate
consequence to its action.


4. (C) The ROK would hold the next round of inter-Korean
ministerial talks July 11-14 in Busan, South Korea because it
was better to have a communication channel with North Korea,
Park said. The ROK intended, however, to deliver a different
message than had the North not fired its missiles.
Specifically it would impress on the North that it made a
very bad move. Park added that the North would be made to
feel it not just to hear it. Seoul would also urge Pyongyang
to rejoin Six Party Talks.


5. (C) Moreover, Park said, the North-South talks in of
themselves were not that beneficial to the DPRK and suggested
that canceling talks would hurt the South more than the
North. With Seoul intending to interrupt humanitarian
assistance, the North did not stand to gain much. However,
were Seoul to cancel the talks, the South might have to pay
something to eventually get them restarted. It was cheaper
for the South to use the talks to deliver a message of
dissatisfaction directly to the North Koreans.
.
QUIET INITIAL STEPS
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6. (C) After the missile launches, the South had decided to
postpone military liaison talks planned for the following day
(July 7),Park noted. The North on July 3, prior to the
launch, had proposed liaison talks to focus on scheduling
another round of General Officer meetings. ROKG officials
were also holding back on approving new investor permits for
the Kaesong Industrial Complex. The South was not heavily
publicizing these actions, which, unfortunately, led to the
perception that Seoul had not taken any steps.


7. (C) Speculating on other steps, Park mentioned that the
North was preparing for its annual Arirang Festival that last
year attracted tens of thousand of South Korean visitors that
resulted in perhaps tens of millions of dollars worth of
revenue. If South Korean and other international visitors
chose not to attend the festival, that might have an economic
affect on the North. (COMMENT: Park stopped short of saying
that Seoul would seek to ban such travel to North, but seemed
to imply that a voluntary decision not to visit the North
might have the desired affect of hurting the North without
leaving ROK fingerprints. END COMMENT). Asked what the
Seoul was giving up if it did not deliver additional rice and
fertilizer aid, Park opined that it might be harder for the
South to get more family reunions in the near future.
VERSHBOW