Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06SEOUL2227
2006-07-06 06:01:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Seoul
Cable title:  

ROKG OFFICIALS DISCUSS DPRK MISSILES, KIC,

Tags:  PREL MNUC ETRD KS KN 
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RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0972
RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR 1283
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR
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RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 002227 

SIPDIS

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NSC FOR CHA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2015
TAGS: PREL MNUC ETRD KS KN
SUBJECT: ROKG OFFICIALS DISCUSS DPRK MISSILES, KIC,
ALLIANCE WITH SENATE STAFFER JANNUZI

Classified By: A/DCM Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b),(d).

SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 002227

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR CHA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2015
TAGS: PREL MNUC ETRD KS KN
SUBJECT: ROKG OFFICIALS DISCUSS DPRK MISSILES, KIC,
ALLIANCE WITH SENATE STAFFER JANNUZI

Classified By: A/DCM Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b),(d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) In a series of meetings on June 28, SFRC Professional
Staff Member Frank Jannuzi told officials from the Ministry
of Unification (MOU),Ministry of National Defense (MND),and
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) that the
ROK should seek to dissuade a DPRK missile launch. Seoul
could announce that a DPRK missile launch would compel the
ROK to review its engagement policies, implement security
measures, expand multilateral coordination, and support UNSC
discussions. Providing his impressions from his June 26
visit to the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC),he encouraged
Seoul not to seek KIC inclusion in a U.S.-ROK Free Trade
Agreement. He also emphasized that differences of the threat
perception of North Korea should not become the focus of the
bilateral alliance. The ROKG officials emphasized that Seoul
opposed a possible DPRK missile launch, expressed concerns
over the controversy surrounding KIC in the context of the
FTA, and agreed that the alliance transcended the DPRK
threat. Jannuzi also met with progressive NGO
representatives to discuss the alliance. END SUMMARY.


2. (U) On June 28, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Professional Staff Member Frank Jannuzi met with ROK
officials in three separate meetings to discuss North Korea,
the Kaesong Industrial Complex, and the U.S.-ROK alliance.
The ROKG officials included:

- Park Chan-bong, Assistant Minister for Unification (MOU);

- Kim Kyou-hyun, Director General, International Policy
Bureau, Ministry of National Defense (MND); and

- Cho Byung-jae, Deputy Director General, North American
Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT).
.
EFFORTS TO STOP DPRK MISSILE LAUNCH
--------------


3. (C) Jannuzi suggested Seoul take the occasion to create a
strategy to influence Pyongyang to cease launch preparations
and demonstrate a strong allied response. Prior to a launch,
President Roh Moo-hyun should announce that Seoul took the

matter seriously and would review all aspects of the
North-South relationship after a launch. Some force
adjustments should be implemented. Multilateral efforts
should be strengthened, perhaps Six Party Talks even without
North Korea. Finally, Seoul should support UNSC discussions.
Together, these steps would signal that Seoul would not
conduct business as usual, that security was the priority,
and that Seoul supported multilateral cooperation. After a
DPRK launch, Seoul should issue the statement that the ROK
was working with its friends and allies on next steps. Seoul
and Washington should fully share intelligence to avoid any
differences in assessments and reassure markets. Jannuzi
said that on June 27 he had shared these ideas with Moon
Chung-in, a close adviser to President Roh, and had received
a positive response.


4. (C) MOU Assistant Minister Park noted that Seoul was
growing increasingly frustrated with North Korean antics and
the May 31 local election results indicated that the South
Korean public was as well. The North had failed to follow
through on commitments to allow the trail runs of trains on
the inter-Korean railroad, provide flexibility on a proposed
visit to North Korea by former President Kim Dae-jung, nor
extend cooperation for flood control measures for the Imjin
River. Excuses citing DPRK military objections raised doubts
whether DPRK negotiators could deliver on their agreements.


5. (C) MND DG Kim responded that Seoul had been sending the
message in inter-Korean talks that it would not be business
as usual following a launch. President Roh would find it
hard to stay on the same course after a launch, especially
after the May local elections that were a setback for the
ruling party. Raising the DEFCON status would probably be
too extreme, but limited force posture adjustments would be
appropriate. Asked about missile defense, he said that the

ROKG considered DPRK artillery more of an immediate threat,
however the strategic implication of a stronger DPRK missile
force, for example on the allied ability to respond to any
DPRK provocation, was not lost on more forward-looking
planners.


6. (C) MOFAT DDG Cho also emphasized that Seoul had
delivered warnings to North Korea about a missile test.
Seoul had also recently announced that NSA Song Min-soon
would visit Washington in July for discussions on a September
summit. High-level bilateral U.S.-ROK talks, including a
possible July visit by Secretary Rice, would reinforce the
bilateral cooperation and coordination.
.
YOU CAN'T SPELL FTA WITH KIC
--------------


7. (C) Jannuzi told the ROKG officials that Congress would
not bless a U.S.-ROK Free Trade Agreement (FTA) that included
the Kaseong Industrial Complex (KIC). Neither Democrats nor
Republicans were willing to extend trade benefits to goods
manufactured in North Korea, even if existing questions about
workers' pay were resolved. The ROK should not put itself in
a situation where it judged the FTA's success on whether it
included the KIC because that would not be achieved.
Insistence on the KIC could jeopardize the FTA.


8. (C) Jannuzi reassured the ROKG officials that he had a
positive impression of the KIC from his June 26 visit and
from the views of other U.S. visitors to the KIC. The KIC
provided real skills, modern facilities, and a take-home
monthly wage of 6,000 North Korean won, according to
information provided to Jannuzi. Regardless of the exchange
rate, the pay was still double that of a North Korean
professor. The KIC would have a positive influence on North
Korean lives. One could argue that Seoul was liberating
North Korea one industrial complex at a time. Once the North
Korean nuclear situation was resolved the environment would
change, and the September 19 Joint Statement contained the
path for improved relations and a lifting of sanctions. For
now, however, the ROK should keep its eyes on the prize, a
U.S.-ROK FTA.


9. (C) MOFAT DDG Cho responded that this was the strongest
negative message he had heard. If South Korea could not
export KIC items, this would hurt the prospects of the
complex. KIC should be viewed as planting the seed of
capitalism in North Korean soil. He undertook to report
Jannuzi's sobering assessment to his government. (COMMENT:
While inclusion of KIC in a KORUS FTA may never have been
described explicitly as a "poison pill," various USG
officials--in a number of venues--have explained this
impossibility to many senior ROKG officials. END COMMENT)

ALLIANCE IS GREATER THAN DPRK THREAT
--------------


10. (C) Jannuzi and the ROKG officials shared the view that
the U.S.-ROK alliance stems from shared values, interests,
and institutions. Jannuzi said that we should not allow the
perceived differences on the threat perception from North
Korea becoming portrayed as the defining element of the
alliance. Seoul and Washington are cooperating in the war on
terror in Afghanistan and Iraq. They both wanted democracy,
prosperity, and stability in Northeast Asia. These values
would remain the same even after Korean unification. It
would be beneficial if current issues, such as USFK base
realignment could be realized to promote smoother relations.
If would be helpful for the U.S.-ROK alliance to help
solidify the U.S. role in the region and compliment the U.S.
alliance with Japan, and this needed better ROK-Japanese
relations.


11. (C) MND DG Kim remarked that President Roh had passed
out a book, loosely translated as "Korea Again Stands At a
Crossroads of Survival," written by Bae Ki-chan, to his
advisers and urged them to consider the future role of Korea.
Kim said that the book discussed the need for
multilateralism in a world influenced by balances-of-power
relationships, including the United States and a rising
China. Kim opined that Seoul would continue to value the

alliance with the United States in part because Seoul lived
in a dangerous neighborhood. He added his hope that current
USFK-related issues, such as environmental remediation, would
be quickly resolved to facilitate USFK realignment on the
Peninsula and strengthen the alliance.


12. (C) MOFAT DDG Cho emphasized that the alliance was in
good shape, despite the perception otherwise. Earlier
misunderstandings about the "balancer" concept caused some
discomfort. Seoul did not seek to balance between the United
States and China. Based on a strong relationship with
Washington, Seoul would be able to work closely to prevent
tension between China and Japan from upsetting the future of
the region. Seoul understood that current ROK-Japan problems
were adding to U.S. problems, and Seoul hoped a change in
Japanese leadership later this year would prove helpful.
MOFAT also sought a speedy solution to the issue of
environmental remediation of USFK areas to allow base
returns. Cho agreed that South Korean environmental NGOs
were missing the point in creating excessive controversy
because the sooner the land was returned to the ROKG, the
sooner the land could be cleaned up and put to better use.
Cho counseled more flexibility from both sides would prevent
further delays.
.
REACHING OUT TO NGOS
--------------


13. (SBU) Jannuzi discussed a wide range of issues with
representatives from five progressive NGOs. Yoo Young-jae,
from the Solidarity for Peace and Reunification of Korea,
asked about USFK's "strategic flexibility"; Lee Tae-ho, from
the People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy, asked
about Iraq and U.S. draft legislation on North Korea; Jung
Gyung-lan, from Women Making Peace, asked about Iran, North
Korea, and the North Korea policy coordinator draft
legislation; Park Sung-youg, from Nonviolent Peaceforce
Korea, asked about USFK; and, Cho Hee-yeon, from the Korean
Alliance Against Korea-U.S. FTA, asked about FTA negotiations.
VERSHBOW