Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06SEOUL2213
2006-07-05 12:29:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Seoul
Cable title:  

ROKG LIKELY TO SUSPEND DPRK HUMANITARIAN AID

Tags:  PREL PREF PGOV KS KN 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #2213/01 1861229
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 051229Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8817
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0900
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 8213
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 7384
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0968
RUALSFJ/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 002213 

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2015
TAGS: PREL PREF PGOV KS KN
SUBJECT: ROKG LIKELY TO SUSPEND DPRK HUMANITARIAN AID

REF: SEOUL 2211

Classified By: Amb. Alexander R. Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 002213

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2015
TAGS: PREL PREF PGOV KS KN
SUBJECT: ROKG LIKELY TO SUSPEND DPRK HUMANITARIAN AID

REF: SEOUL 2211

Classified By: Amb. Alexander R. Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a July 5 meeting with the Ambassador and
A/DCM, Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon shared his "grave
concern" over the DPRK missile launches and said that the
ROKG had "more or less agreed" to suspend humanitarian aid to
the North. FM Ban said that it would be important to respond
firmly, but not to escalate the situation. He said that
Seoul was still debating whether to postpone next week's
inter-Korean ministerial. END SUMMARY.

CABINET CLOSE TO SUSPENDING RICE, FERTILIZER SHIPMENTS
-------------- --------------


2. (C) Expressing grave concern over the DPRK missile
activity, FM Ban said that the launches were a provocative
act that challenged stability on the Korean peninsula and in
Northeast Asia. He said that the launches were a matter of
grave concern and that ROKG was considering strong measures,
including the possible suspension of humanitarian aid.
Reporting on a cabinet meeting called by President Roh on
July 5, FM Ban said the ROKG had "more or less agreed" to
suspend delivery of the 500,000 tons of rice and 100,000 tons
of fertilizer that had been earmarked for the DPRK. FM Ban
indicated that the government was considering other measures
and would cooperate closely with the U.S. in shaping a
response.

MORE LAUNCHES, OTHER ROKG COUNTERMEASURES POSSIBLE
-------------- --------------


3. (C) FM Ban said that the ROKG would continue to speak out
strongly against the launches as provocative acts for which
the DPRK must bear all responsibility. Ban said that there
was continuing concern about the possibility of further
launches, and in particular, another attempt at a
Taepodong-class missile. NIS analysts believed, he said,
that there had been two missiles at the launch site and that
because today's launch appeared to be unsuccessful, the DPRK
could try again in order to recover its prestige. Noting
that a second launch could take some weeks to prepare, FM Ban
said that he hoped the U.S. and ROK intelligence agencies
would continue to work closely to monitor the situation and

share information. Underscoring a point that he made in an
earlier press conference (Reftel),FM Ban said that the DPRK
could not credibly argue that it had the legal right to test
missiles. After announcing that it had nuclear weapons, the
international community could not sit idle and allow North
Korea to develop a delivery system for its weapons of mass
destruction. The missiles, he repeated, were a grave concern
that represented a serious threat to the Korean peninsula and
the international community. They could also undermine the
global regime to limit proliferation, he added.


4. (C) The Ambassador said that he appreciated FM Ban's
statement, since it was important to reject efforts to
justify the launches as "legal." The Ambassador said A/S
Hill would be in Seoul soon to discuss further responses.
The best outcome, said the Ambassador, would be for all
parties to have a unified message and a unified response.

FIVE PARTY TALKS
--------------


5. (C) FM Ban said that the ROKG would be in favor of
holding a session of the Six Party Talks even without North
Korea. Ban noted that, prior to the launch, China had been
reluctant to host a meeting in the absence of the DPRK. The
ROKG, however, believed that the talks would be useful
following the missile launches and would raise the issue with
Beijing on July 6. Commenting on China's concern generally,
FM Ban said that China appeared to believe that it was not
necessary at this time to create too much of a problem.
China appeared more concerned about the U.S. response, he
said.


6. (C) The Ambassador replied that the U.S. would continue
to seek resumption of the Six Party Talks and pointed to the
USG's positive response to China's suggestion of informal
talks. In light of the missile launches, said the
Ambassador, the case for Six Party Talks even without North
Korea may be even more compelling. However, in the short
term, all parties must make the DPRK understand that the
missile launches could not simply result in business as
usual. North Korea has to understand that they made a
mistake. However, while we must be firm in our response, the
Ambassador agreed that we must not escalate the situation.
The U.S. still hoped to persuade the DPRK to end their
boycott of the talks and come back to negotiations.

COMMON THINKING WITH THE SECRETARY
--------------


7. (C) FM Ban said that, based on his conversation with
Secretary Rice, he did not share China's concern about a U.S.

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overreaction. He recounted that the Secretary said that it
would be important not to escalate the situation. FM Ban
said that he and the Secretary shared a "common thinking."
We must manage the situation and avoid psychological
instability on the Korean peninsula.

SUSPENSION OF N-S MINISTERIALS UNDER CONSIDERATION
-------------- --------------


8. (C) FM Ban said that the ROKG had not yet decided
whether to postpone or suspend the North-South ministerial
meetings scheduled to begin July 11. FM Ban said that the
ROKG could hold the meetings as scheduled and use the event
as an opportunity to convey strong protest to the DPRK.
Alternatively, the ROKG could reschedule or put off the
meetings indefinitely, which would send a strong message.
According to FM Ban, the ROK has never before boycotted
bilateral contacts. FM Ban said that the missile tests were
the work of the DPRK military and it was not clear whether
cutting off diplomatic contact would have any impact on
military circles. It was important to think strategically
and determine how best to deal with the DPRK when the
military appeared to be taking a stronger hand. At this
time, the ROKG believed that the launches were a
demonstration of military capabilities. It was possible
that, given the attention the missiles were receiving from
the U.S. and in the international community, the DPRK saw no
alternative other than to launch. It may have been a very
politically-calculated maneuver, he said.


9. (C) The Ambassador pointed out that although the military
agenda may be different than the diplomatic agenda, Kim
Jong-il was Chairman of the Defense Committee and probably
calculated that he would reap both political and military
advantages with the launch. We must make clear, without
overreacting, that this was a miscalculation. The Ambassador
also offered his personal view that if the ROKG continued
with the ministerial talks on July 11, it would give the
appearance of "business as usual." The Ambassador suggested
that even a short delay or postponement would be a way of
signaling displeasure to the DPRK.

SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION
--------------


10. (C) FM Ban said that it was his understanding that the
U.S. was not going to push for a U.N. Security Council
resolution, but that Japan would. The past practice has been
for the Security Council to take time to go over the issue
and the Council may in the end agree to a Presidential
statement rather than a resolution calling for specific
action. The Ambassador said that while the initial UNSC
debate would review the situation, he expected the U.S. would
seek UNSC action and hoped that the process would not take as
long as FM Ban feared. We cannot allow too much time to
pass, he said.


11. (C) FM Ban said that he has had talks with the Foreign
Ministers of Japan, China and Russia. Russia, he said, was
in favor of having discussions in the Security Council, but
was concerned about the U.S. calling for extreme measures.


COMMENT
--------------


12. (C) We would note that the overall ROKG reaction was
quick and forthcoming. After the early morning NSC meeting,
where, we understand, Unification Minister Lee Jong-seok's
initial recommendation of a "soft response" was quickly shot
down by FM Ban and MND Yoon, the language used by FM Ban and
NSC Suh Joo-seok was appropriately serious. Still, we
believe that the ROKG is in a "waiting mode," looking for
concrete signals from Washington. Ultimately, the ROKG could
decide to take more measures beyond postponing rice and
fertilizer assistance. Such measures could include coming on
board in a UNSC action, though not a Chapter 7-type
sanctions, canceling the inter-Korean ministerials next week
and holding the Six Party Talks without North Korea. In
order for all of these actions to materialize, we will have
to do some heavy lifting, particularly in convincing the ROKs
that we are still searching for a solution to denuclearizing
North Korea within the Six Party Talks framework, even as we
seek to mobilize a strong response to the missile launches.
VERSHBOW