Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06SEOUL2094
2006-06-25 22:42:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Seoul
Cable title:  

AMBASSADOR AND MINDEF DISCUSS BASE RETURNS, EX

Tags:  PARM PREL PGOV KS 
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PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #2094/01 1762242
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 252242Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8619
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0848
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0914
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OSD/ISA/EAP// PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J3 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 002094 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2014
TAGS: PARM PREL PGOV KS
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR AND MINDEF DISCUSS BASE RETURNS, EX
PROCUREMENT, TRAINING, OPCON AND NK MISSILE


Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b,d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 002094

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2014
TAGS: PARM PREL PGOV KS
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR AND MINDEF DISCUSS BASE RETURNS, EX
PROCUREMENT, TRAINING, OPCON AND NK MISSILE


Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary: During an hour-long June 23 discussion with
Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-ung, the Ambassador urged the
ROKG to resolve environmental remediation and training range
issues, advocated Boeing's bid in the EX procurement, and
reaffirmed our commitment to work toward a transfer of
wartime OPCON to the ROK, based on enhancements to ROK C2
capabilities. Minister Yoon assured the Ambassador that the
ROKG was working on base returns and access to the Chikdo
training range, understood U.S. concerns regarding the EX
procurement, and would work toward establishing a reasonable
timeline of the transfer of OPCON. The Ambassador and the
Minister also reviewed the situation regarding North Korean
missile launch preparations. End Summary.

Base Returns
--------------


2. (C) Complimenting MND's efforts to deal with protestors
impeding base expansion in Pyongtaek, the Ambassador urged
the ROKG to resolve the environmental remediation issue so
that base returns could be carried out without further delay.
He noted that the U.S. had no choice but to proceed with the
approach outlined in DUSD Lawless's recent letter. The U.S.
hoped that the return of the "clean" facilities as well as
the bases undergoing the LaPorte plan could be carried out in
a coordinated manner. Recalling the Minister's recent public
statement, the Ambassador said the issue should be viewed in
the context of the 53-year old alliance and the contributions
of U.S. Forces Korea in maintaining peace and stability on
the Peninsula. Moreover, the U.S. approach went beyond SOFA
requirements and should therefore be viewed positively by the
public.


3. (C) Yoon said that the issue was being pursued in the
ROKG interagency and that he would do his best to resolve it
quickly. While the Ministry of Environment and the NGO
community may have different views, MND was fully committed
to working together with the U.S. to come up with a
constructive solution. Saying the USG should not worry too
much, Yoon suggested that the ROKG's eventual decision could

lead to demonstrations against both MND and the U.S. Embassy.
Noting his recent discussion with Secretary Rumsfeld, Yoon
asked the Ambassador whether the LaPorte plan had been
briefed to U.S. Congress.

Range Access
--------------


4. (C) Highlighting the importance of adequate access to
training ranges to maintain our pilots' combat readiness, the
Ambassador urged MND to resolve the range problem. Minister
Yoon said the ROKG understood the need to facilitate access
for U.S. pilots. It was equally important for ROK pilots to
have adequate training time. Assistant Minister of Defense
Kwon will soon meet with the Mayor of Kunsan to try to
resolve the issue. While pursuing a solution in Chikdo, MND
would also explore other possible locations. Noting ROK
public sensitivities, Yoon said MND's public explanation on
this issue would focus on ROK pilots' needs, rather than U.S.
requirements. He expressed hope that the U.S. would
understand this and avoid unnecessary public comment on the
issue.

EX Procurement
--------------


5. (C) The Ambassador expressed disappointment and concern
that the timeline and rules for the EX procurement continued
to change in favor of Boeing's competitor. The ROK needed to
get the best possible system, especially as it moved to
assume wartime OPCON. Recalling his and ROK Ambassador Lee's
visit to Boeing, the Ambassador said they saw firsthand that
Boeing offered the most capable and interoperable system. He
urged the ROKG to make the right decision in a timely manner.



6. (C) Yoon said he fully understood the importance of
interoperability and had always been positively inclined
toward U.S. systems. However, the procurement process in
Korea was now more open and transparent, and MND did not have
much leeway in procurement decisions. The EX situation had
been complicated by some civilian experts who argued that it

was not necessary for the ROK to purchase such a
sophisticated system because the North did not have a
comparable system. The Minister said he understood the
Ambassador's points, but the defense procurement committee he
chairs included skeptical civilian experts.

OPCON
--------------


7. (C) The Ambassador noted that working-level discussions
on the transfer of OPCON were proceeding constructively. The
U.S. remained committed to moving forward. However, it was
important to manage public expectations regarding the
timeline and preparation; it would be a mistake to establish
artificial deadlines. Transfer could only take place after
providing the necessary C2 capabilities, plans and training.



8. (C) Yoon said he and Secretary Rumsfeld agreed in
Singapore that it was appropriate for the ROK to get back
OPCON and that the transfer should take place when the ROK
had the necessary capability. A complete evaluation of ROK
capabilities needed to precede the transfer. The ROK JCS and
CFC were working to develop a roadmap and a timeline.
Although discussions were continuing, he personally believed
it would take at least five years for the ROK to be ready to
assume OPCON. Defense experts also had indicated last year
that the transfer should happen around 2012. Minister Yoon
suggested that President Roh's remarks on this topic have a
political angle and should be seen in that context.

NK Missiles
--------------


9. (C) Noting that the DPRK appeared to be pausing
preparations for a possible missile launch to see the
international community's reaction, the Ambassador said it
was important not to reward Pyongyang for not launching. Our
main goal remained to bring North Korea back to the Six Party
Talks; rewarding them for not doing what they should not have
been doing in the first place would not help bring them back
to dialogue. If the DPRK does proceed with a launch, strong
countermeasures will need to be taken.


10. (C) Yoon said that he was involved in ROK interagency
discussions on this matter and that he would continue to
support the ROKG's approach. He understood that
Embassy-MOFAT and DoD-MND coordination were proceeding
smoothly. This was a complicated matter but he believed
things were moving in the right direction.
VERSHBOW