AMERICAN ACADEMIC SKEPTICAL ABOUT KIM DAE-JUNG'S

UNCLAS SEOUL 001643

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

NSC FOR CHA

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL MNUC EAID KN KS
SUBJECT: AMERICAN ACADEMIC SKEPTICAL ABOUT KIM DAE-JUNG'S
DPRK VISIT GIVEN NEGATIVE PORTRAYAL IN NORTH KOREAN MEDIA


SUMMARY
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1. (SBU) In a May 12 meeting with poloff, Dr. Brian Myers,
Professor of Korean Studies at Inje University, expressed
skepticism that a June visit to North Korea by former
President Kim Dae-jung would result in any substantial
changes in the North's behavior or its return to the Six
Party Talks. On refugees, Myers asserted that U.S.
acceptance of North Korean refugees would not affect regime
stability in the North due to Pyongyang's view of the
majority of refugees as "undesirables." Based on testimony
by refugees and other sources, Myers said the DPRK-PRC border
appeared to be porous, and many North Koreans were able to
bribe their way around domestic travel restrictions. He
charged that it would be disingenuous for Washington to
criticize the ROK's policies on the Kaesong Industrial
Complex (KIC) and other forms of inter-Korean economic
cooperation after being cognizant of, and supporting the same
policies, since the 1990s, even though the ROK's
justification for them were flawed. Myers thought Seoul's
fears of Chinese dominance over North Korea were unfounded,
given China's own problems, and noted that the DPRK's
"military first" had lasted far beyond what was normal for
most agitative propaganda. END SUMMARY.


2. (U) On May 12, poloff met with Brian Myers, Professor of
Korean Studies, Inje University, to discuss general North
Korean issues. An occasional contributor to the Atlantic
Monthly and the New York Times, Myers teaches courses on
North Korean propaganda, media, and culture. His work on
North Korea focuses on studying Pyongyang's ideology and
worldview through analysis of its internal propaganda. An
American, Myers received his Ph.D. in Korean Studies from the
University of Tuebingen in Germany, and his M.A. in Slavic
Studies and Korean Studies from the Freie Universitaet
Berlin, Ruhr University.

DPRK'S PATHETIC PORTRAYAL OF KDJ, JUNE 2000 SUMMIT
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3. (SBU) Myers stated that a June visit to North Korea by
former President Kim Dae-jung was unlikely to result in any
substantial changes in the North's behavior, given the
negative depiction of both Kim and the June 2000 inter-Korean
summit in North Korean popular culture. Citing as example
the North Korean book "Mannam" (encounter),a fictional work
devoted largely to the June 2000 summit, Myers said North
Koreans portrayed Kim Dae-jung as a frail old man who visited
the DPRK intent on making the North renounce socialism, only
to be outsmarted and outcharmed by Kim Jong-il. Kim Jong-il,
portrayed by the authors as having initiated "true"
inter-Korean dialogue, subsequently duped Kim Dae-jung into
accepting his demands for inter-Korean cooperation, resulting
in an outpouring of South Korean support for the North Korean
leader's vision of North-South relations that effectively
prevented Kim Dae-jung from reneging on the June 15
North-South Joint Declaration. Such a portrayal of the
principals of the June 2000 summit, said Myers, effectively
demonstrated how the DPRK regarded former President Kim
Dae-jung vis-a-vis Kim Jong-il.

KDJ'S VISIT UNLIKELY TO RESULT IN CHANGE OR RETURN TO 6PT
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4. (SBU) Myers asserted that, absent monetary or other
concessions from South Korea, the DPRK would have little to
gain from Kim's visit. The ROK, on the other hand, would
find it difficult to bring anything to the DPRK in light of:
(1) lingering negative sentiment among the South Korean
public and the political right from revelations that Seoul
had paid hard currency to Pyongyang in return for agreeing to
the June 2000 summit; (2) Washington's aversion to outside
money getting in the hands of North Koreans, as demonstrated
by the recent financial actions against Banco Delta Asia
(BDA); and (3) recent criticism by Special Envoy for North
Korean Human Rights (SENK) Jay Lefkowitz that the ROK's and
China's economic policies toward the DPRK helped prop up the
Kim Jong-il regime. This meant that "concessions" from the
ROK would necessarily be less conspicuous than in the past.

The North would likely make a pro forma attempt to portray
itself as a reasonable party, agreeing to vague language in a
joint statement indicating that it remained committed to
denuclearization. More importantly, Myers noted, the DPRK
might announce it would return to the Six Party Talks, but
its decision clearly would not be based on Kim Dae-jung's
visit.

ACCEPTING REFUGEES WON'T DESTABILIZE REGIME
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5. (SBU) On the issue of North Korean refugees, Myers said
the acceptance of large numbers of North Korean refugees by
the United States would not destabilize the Kim Jong-il
regime. Pyongyang would not care if a million refugees
attempted to leave the DPRK, as the vast majority of those
fleeing the DPRK were, from Pyongyang's perspective,
"undesirables" to the regime; i.e., former political
prisoners, criminals, and non-essential laborers from the
outer fringes of North Korea. In fact, added Myers, the
regime might even be grateful to Washington for taking away
"problem children who no longer needed to be fed." He
cautioned against taking information provided by North Korean
refugees at face value, as many of them had realized that
exaggerating or lying about their experiences often provided
them with opportunities for speaking engagements with
"certain interest groups." Recalling a former refugee's
lengthy discussion on the lack of freedom of movement in the
DPRK at a recent academic conference, Myers pointed out that
the same individual had also described his current activities
in North Korea and how easy it was for him to move between
the DPRK-PRC border.

TRAVEL RESTRICTION EASY TO GET AROUND THROUGH BRIBERY
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6. (SBU) The former refugee's credibility notwithstanding,
Myers said many North Koreans appeared to be able to travel
in and out of the DPRK at the Chinese border with relative
ease. Bribery involving hard currency was apparently so
pervasive that North Koreans could get circumvent travel
restrictions within the DPRK. Since state scrutiny of
bribery and corruption was heaviest at the top of the
socio-economic pyramid, the DPRK's ruling elite might,
someday, find itself isolated from the dynamic traffic of
goods and cash across the Chinese border, while lower-ranking
officials and ordinary citizens reaped the benefits, Myers
predicted.

ROK REASONING FOR KAESONG FLAWED
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7. (SBU) Myers argued that the ROKG's justification for the
Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) -- to expose more North
Koreans to South Korean-style market economy in the hopes of
stimulating the North to change its economic policies -- was
unpersuasive. The current arrangement for the KIC left open
too many questions for the outside world, thus making it easy
for critics to regard the project as a money funnel for the
regime. From Myers' perspective, it was clear that Seoul's
primary purpose for inter-Korean economic engagement was to
prevent a sudden, unwanted Korean reunification, which
necessitated propping up the Kim Jong-il regime. He also
argued, however, that while objections from the United States
were not problematic by themselves, it was disingenuous for
Washington to raise them now, after it had known about,
tolerated, and publicly supported the ROK's engagement policy
since the 1990s.

FEARS OF CHINESE ECONOMIC INFLUENCE IN DPRK MISPLACED
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8. (SBU) On the issue of South Korean fears of increasing
Chinese economic influence in the DPRK, Myers dismissed the
notion that China was intentionally, systematically sowing
the seeds of eventual economic -- and perhaps political --
dominance over North Korea. China had neither the frame of
mind nor the wherewithal to form and implement such an
ambitious strategy, as it was going through its own "identify
crisis" of grappling with rapid economic development while

maintaining its party-dominated socialist system. Rather,
Myers assessed, the South Korean concerns stemmed mainly from
decades-old Korea-centric paranoia among South Korean
conspiracy theorists who believed China wanted to take over
the Korean Peninsula, using North Korea as a springboard.
The truth, Myers argued, was that China wanted to deal less
and less with both North Korea and the millions of ethnic
Koreans in the Chinese northeast. This fear among the South
Koreans was, however, a useful tool for North Korea to
exploit as it played the ROK off against the PRC, the same
way that Pyongyang had played Beijing off against Moscow
during the Cold War.

MILITARY-FIRST POLICY'S SURPRISING LONGEVITY
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9. (SBU) Myers said he was surprised that the DPRK had
maintained its "military-first" policy in its official
propaganda for so long, pointing out that agitative
propaganda such as North Korea's, which vilified the United
States as the main enemy, would normally lose its potency
after a protracted period of time. This was dangerous in
terms of regime stability, Myers opined, because Kim Jong-il
obviously could not go back to the propaganda tactic of
presenting himself and his government as providers of
necessities given the DPRK's current inability to provide for
its citizens. Myers argued that the regime was bound to
collapse if the main focus of the "threat" to the DPRK
disappeared. In other words, because the DPRK regime's
derived its legitimacy solely from protecting its citizens
from American imperialism, its raison d'etre would disappear
if USFK pulled out of South Korea.
MINTON