Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06SEOUL1516
2006-05-04 07:50:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Seoul
Cable title:
DPRK REFUGEES IN BANGKOK: AVOIDING PUBLICITY
how-toVZCZCXYZ0005 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHUL #1516 1240750 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 040750Z MAY 06 FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7731 INFO RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 6019 RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0591 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 7297 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0670 RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR 1208 RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001516
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
FOR EAP AND PRM
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2015
TAGS: PREF PREL PHUM KS KN
SUBJECT: DPRK REFUGEES IN BANGKOK: AVOIDING PUBLICITY
REF: A. BANGKOK 2565
B. SEOUL 1308
Classified By: CDA Mark Minton. Reasons 1.4 (b),(d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001516
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
FOR EAP AND PRM
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2015
TAGS: PREF PREL PHUM KS KN
SUBJECT: DPRK REFUGEES IN BANGKOK: AVOIDING PUBLICITY
REF: A. BANGKOK 2565
B. SEOUL 1308
Classified By: CDA Mark Minton. Reasons 1.4 (b),(d).
1. (C) As the case of the six North Korean refugees in
Bangkok appears to be moving toward a successful conclusion,
with very forthcoming cooperation from all concerned,
including the RTG, ROKG, and UNHCR, Embassy Seoul wants to
underscore the need to handle their arrival and resettlement
in the United States quietly.
2. (C) As Embassy Bangkok (Ref A) points out, it is well
established that the DPRK will take retaliatory action
against the relatives of North Koreans who defect.
Pyongyang's punitive measures correspond directly to the
level of embarrassment for the regime. Certainly, a
high-profile arrival in the United States by a group of
refugees would be perceived in Pyongyang as a major
embarrassment. We have no doubt that the DPRK will attempt
to identify the six refugees; if the regime were successful
in that effort, there is a high probability that it would
hunt down and imprison, or even execute, the refugees' family
members.
3. (C) Another important reason for handling the Bangkok Six
discreetly is to protect the existing pipeline of North
Korean refugees, virtually all of whom are expected to be
resettled in South Korea. The ROKG has made it clear
repeatedly, most recently two weeks ago in Ref B, that it
fears publicity would jeopardize its own refugee pipelines,
both in Southeast Asia and in Mongolia. The ROK's
unfortunate experience in 2004, when the highly-publicized
arrival of 468 North Korean refugees from Vietnam led Hanoi
to cease further cooperation on refugees, shows that this
fear is well-founded.
4. (C) We are encouraged by the cooperation extended by the
ROKG, RTG and UNHCR, and, in the process, we have established
an informal framework for implementing the most important
aspect of the North Korea Human Rights Act: resettling North
Korean refugees in the United States. We now need to avoid
publicity, which would undoubtedly make the ROKG and regional
governments hesitant to work with
us in the future. We need to protect our partners--and this
informal framework--to bring in more North Korean refugees to
the United States, as mandated in the NKHRA.
MINTON
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
FOR EAP AND PRM
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2015
TAGS: PREF PREL PHUM KS KN
SUBJECT: DPRK REFUGEES IN BANGKOK: AVOIDING PUBLICITY
REF: A. BANGKOK 2565
B. SEOUL 1308
Classified By: CDA Mark Minton. Reasons 1.4 (b),(d).
1. (C) As the case of the six North Korean refugees in
Bangkok appears to be moving toward a successful conclusion,
with very forthcoming cooperation from all concerned,
including the RTG, ROKG, and UNHCR, Embassy Seoul wants to
underscore the need to handle their arrival and resettlement
in the United States quietly.
2. (C) As Embassy Bangkok (Ref A) points out, it is well
established that the DPRK will take retaliatory action
against the relatives of North Koreans who defect.
Pyongyang's punitive measures correspond directly to the
level of embarrassment for the regime. Certainly, a
high-profile arrival in the United States by a group of
refugees would be perceived in Pyongyang as a major
embarrassment. We have no doubt that the DPRK will attempt
to identify the six refugees; if the regime were successful
in that effort, there is a high probability that it would
hunt down and imprison, or even execute, the refugees' family
members.
3. (C) Another important reason for handling the Bangkok Six
discreetly is to protect the existing pipeline of North
Korean refugees, virtually all of whom are expected to be
resettled in South Korea. The ROKG has made it clear
repeatedly, most recently two weeks ago in Ref B, that it
fears publicity would jeopardize its own refugee pipelines,
both in Southeast Asia and in Mongolia. The ROK's
unfortunate experience in 2004, when the highly-publicized
arrival of 468 North Korean refugees from Vietnam led Hanoi
to cease further cooperation on refugees, shows that this
fear is well-founded.
4. (C) We are encouraged by the cooperation extended by the
ROKG, RTG and UNHCR, and, in the process, we have established
an informal framework for implementing the most important
aspect of the North Korea Human Rights Act: resettling North
Korean refugees in the United States. We now need to avoid
publicity, which would undoubtedly make the ROKG and regional
governments hesitant to work with
us in the future. We need to protect our partners--and this
informal framework--to bring in more North Korean refugees to
the United States, as mandated in the NKHRA.
MINTON