Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06SEOUL1435
2006-04-28 10:12:00
SECRET
Embassy Seoul
Cable title:  

NATIONAL SECURITY SECRETARY SONG MIN-SOON ON

Tags:  PREL PGOV ECON KS KN 
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OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #1435/01 1181012
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 281012Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7607
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0566
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0644
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 7285
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
S E C R E T SEOUL 001435 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN REUNFICATION
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON KS KN
SUBJECT: NATIONAL SECURITY SECRETARY SONG MIN-SOON ON
JAPAN, NORTH KOREA AND BILATERAL ISSUES


Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b,d)

S E C R E T SEOUL 001435

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN REUNFICATION
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON KS KN
SUBJECT: NATIONAL SECURITY SECRETARY SONG MIN-SOON ON
JAPAN, NORTH KOREA AND BILATERAL ISSUES


Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (S). Summary: In an April 28 luncheon meeting with the
Ambassador, National Security Secretary Song Min-soon said
that the ROK was prepared to compromise with Japan on naming
underwater features located in the East Sea/Sea of Japan, but
that Japan seemed intent on pushing the issue to the limit.
On North Korea, Song, showing frustation, assertedthat
Washington had made denuclearization a lower priority than
defensive measures and human rights. While the North Koreans
had nobody else but themselves to blame, Song urged the USG
to also consider the position of the ROK, which still
considered denuclearization the highest priority in its
dealings with North Korea. The Ambassador differed in his
assessment, noting that the President had reaffirmed the
importance of denuclearization of North Korea and the U.S.
commitment to the Six Party Talks his recent meeting with
Chinese President Hu Jintao. The Ambassador requested Song's
help in resolving a number of bilateral issues, including the
Ministry of Health's proposal to change the policy regarding
reimbursement of prescription drug expenses, Boeing's
proposal to sell AWACS, USFK's proposal for environmental
remediation of returning bases, and MND's plans to remove
protestors around Camp Humphreys that threatened to delay
USFK's move to Pyongtaek. End Summary.

ROK-Japan Relations: Liancourt Rocks
--------------


2. (C) ROK National Security Advisor Song Min-soon opened
his April 28 luncheon meeting with the Ambassador with a
review of the standoff last week caused by Japan's proposal
to survey the disputed waters around the Liancourt Rocks
(Dokdo/Takeshima). Song said that the GOJ seemed intent on
pushing the issue to the brink. Japan had representation on
the IHO (International Hydrographic Organization)
subcommittee on names, which could have stopped any South
Korean attempt to change the existing names. Instead, Japan
chose to send out survey ships, knowing full well that the

ROK would have to confront them. Still, South Korea was
prepared to compromise, Song stated. For example, Japan had
named the large underwater basin "Tsushima Basin," which was
in the South Korean EEZ; the ROK could accept two names, such
as "Ulleung/Tsushima Basin."


3. (C) Song believed that one important reason for Tokyo's
aggressive behavior was its confidence regarding Washington's
support. Song said that he was not asking that Washington
take sides, but that it had to fully grasp the reasons behind
Japan's behavior, which was having very negative consequences
in Korea. Song also mused that the GOJ was blaming the ROK's
tough stance on South Korea's domestic political calendar,
while in reality it was Japan that was using this issue for
domestic politics.


4. (C) The Ambassador said that Washington did not want to
get involved in the territorial dispute. The Ambassador
stressed, however, that Washington was quite concerned by the
deteriorating relations between Japan and Korea and that
Washington had privately conveyed to Tokyo that history
issues, such as the Japanese Prime Minister's visits to the
Yasukuni Shrine, were not helping Japan's relations with its
neighbors. We hoped the upcoming bilateral talks on EEZ
issues surrounding the Liancourt Rocks dispute would help
defuse the situation.

North Korea
--------------


5. (S) Song said that while he still believed the U.S.
wanted North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons, he now
thought that this was no longer an urgent priority for
Washington. Instead, the USG seemed to treat law enforcement
efforts, especially financial actions, and human rights
advocacy as higher priorities. This was unfortunate because
Beijing was becoming sympathetic to Seoul's view that a
comprehensive package showing North Korea a brighter future
in return for denuclearization (with strong pressure on
Pyongyang if they refused) was worth considering. If North
Korea still refused, then we would all have tried our best
and be able to move to an alternative approach together.


6. (S) Looking at North Korea and the United States, it was
clear that North Korea was to blame for the impasse in the
6PT. Still, Song said, South Korea had to deal with the

fallout. While Washington may have downgraded the
denuclearization issue, for Seoul it remained of paramount
importance, comparable only to North-South relations.


7. (S) The Ambassador said that Washington had not made any
decision to downgrade the denuclearization goal for North
Korea. He observed that President Bush had made this clear
in his remarks to Chinese President Hu Jintao earlier in the
month. But with North Korea boycotting the Six Party Talks,
it was inevitable that illicit activities and human rights
would get all the attention.

Good Cop, Bad Cop?
--------------


8. (S) Song said that perhaps there was nothing wrong in
pursuing different approaches. A "good cop, bad cop"
approach could be useful. For example, President Bush
planned to meet with the parents of Megumi Yokota, a Japanese
abductee, and several North Korean refugees. The Blue House
was precluded from taking similar actions, but sould not
oppose such actions by the White House (even though the media
might interpret the U.S. move as a sign of a rift with
Seoul). Similarly, Song said that he hoped the Kaesong
Industrial Comples (KIC) could be supported by Washington.
The Ambassador said that he did not detect signs of a rift
between Washington and Seoul. We were not taking opposite
sides. Even on the KIC, senior USG officials were not
questioning the usefulness of introducing ROK-style
capitalism to North Korea; rather, we had unresolved
questions on labor and wage standards in the complex.


9. (S) Song said that the KIC represented the essence of
South Korea's policy toward North Korea, which he summed as
his own "three cons." CONtiguity: North Korea was right
there touching South Korea in every physical way;
CONsanguinity: North Koreans were blood brothers; and
CONgeniality: they could hurt South Korea, and so peaceful
coexistence was essential. As the existing engagement policy
was embraced by South Koreans, there would be no changes in
policy by successors to President Roh, Song asserted.

Bilateral Issues
--------------


10. (S) The Ambassador requested Song's help on the
following bilateral issues:

--Pharmaceuticals. The Ambassador said that we had serious
concerns regarding the Ministry of Health and Welfare's plans
to announce the switch to a positive list system for the
reimbursement of prescription drugs. This move could
undermine the FTA negotiations, and went against the spirit
of the "standstill" agreement worked out by USTR Portman and
Trade Minister Kim. Song said that he would convey these
points to Health Minister Rhyu Si-min.

--AWACS. The Ambassador pressed Song on the EX procurement
emphasizing USG's strong support for Boeing's AWACS. As the
U.S. and ROK moved forward on adjusting command relations
within the Alliance, it was even more important for the ROK
to have the best command-and-control capabilities. Song
responded that the ROKG had introduced a new process of
defense equipment acquisitions, which provided for efficient
and transparent purchases.

--Environmental Remediation. The Ambassador said that he
hoped the ROKG could accept the LaPorte plan before the next
Security Policy Initiative meeting in May. Song said that he
had expended tremendous amounts of time and energy on this
issue. Only yesterday, he had spent a lot of time with
various ministers; this meeting would resume on Sunday. He
agreed with the Ambassador that the environmentalists would
never be fully satisfied. However, he had to have some
flexibility to win this battle because the environmentalists
were complaining that accepting the LaPorte plan in its
present form would represent an enormous loss in face. It
was also not helpful that USFK's discussion on a possible
"unilateral" action was widely reported, Song complained.
Song asked whether it was possible to reformulate, even
cosmetically, the current USFK offer. The Ambassador said
that USFK was proceeding with the clean-up steps in the
LaPorte plan at five bases; he did not believe that any
significant change to the LaPorte plan would be possible.

--Pyongtaek. The Ambassador said that he understood that the
ROK military planned to take the lead in removing the
protestors in Pyongtaek who were blocking acquisition of the
remaining land for USFK's future headquarters. We were
worried about falling behind schedule. Song said that the
ROKG was determined to remove the protestors in Pyongtaek so
that USFK construction could get underway.

VERSHBOW