DFM YUN PROVIDES UPDATE ON LIANCOURT ROCKS ISSUE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001433

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2015
TAGS: PBTS PHSA PREL EFIS MOPS KS JA
SUBJECT: DFM YUN PROVIDES UPDATE ON LIANCOURT ROCKS ISSUE

REF: A. SEOUL 1349

B. SEOUL 1379

Classified By: DCM Mark Minton. Reasons 1.4 (b),(d).

SUMMARY
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1. (C) In an April 28 meeting with the DCM, DFM Yun Byung-se
offered an update on the ROKG approach to its maritime
dispute with Japan. Seoul was (1) preparing for the next
round of EEZ talks with Tokyo that would be held by the end
of June; (2) providing foreign diplomats with Seoul's
justification for its claim of sovereignty over the Liancourt
Rocks (Dokdo/Takeshima); and (3) hosting visits from Japanese
politicians next week to encourage dialogue. He emphasized
the importance of President Roh's April 25 statement on
ROK-Japan relations that gave the context behind recent
provocative actions by Japan. Yun also expressed
appreciation for USG cooperation and called for a continued
USG role in the issue. END SUMMARY.
.
NOT JUST TERRITORIAL PROBLEM BUT "ISSUE OF HISTORY"
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2. (C) Deputy FM Yun Byung-se requested a meeting with the
DCM on April 28 to discuss Seoul's sovereignty claim to the
Liancourt Rocks. Based on the ROK-Japan vice ministerial
talks over the previous weekend (ref a),the ROKG was
preparing for the next round of consultations with Japan over
the delineation of the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) between
them. The talks would be held before the end of June.
(NOTE: According to press reports, FM Ban on April 26
announced that MOFAT would create a special task force to
coordinate Seoul's position for the EEZ talks. END NOTE.)


3. (C) Yun said that President Roh Moo-hyun's special
message on April 25 (ref b) on ROK-Japan relations had
highlighted a pattern of insensitive Japanese behavior. The
key point of the message, which was addressed to domestic and
international audiences, was that the Dokdo issue was not
just a territorial problem but an "issue of history." The
presidential message received overwhelming political and
public support, codified Seoul's position, and would guide
talks with Japan. If Japan took offensive actions,
especially after the presidential message, Seoul would have
no choice but to respond, Yun stated.


4. (C) Yun briefly recounted Korean arguments for its claim
to Dokdo and provided a 15-page primer on Korea's claim to
the islets, an English translation of Roh's April 25 message,
and a five-page paper documenting Japanese aggression towards
the Liancourt Rocks. (NOTE: The Embassy faxed these
documents to EAP/K. END NOTE.)
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JAPANESE POLITICIANS TO VISIT NEXT WEEK
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5. (C) Reiterating that the next EEZ talks would probably be
held in June, Yun said that for the time being it looked like
a catastrophe had been averted. Hopefully, EEZ talks could
be one element in dissuading Japan from engaging in
unnecessary activities. Meanwhile, Seoul welcomed increased
dialogue with Japan.


6. (C) Seoul would host two visitors from Tokyo, Japanese
Vice FM and four-term ruling Liberal Democratic Party
representative Yasuhisa Shiozaki on May 1 and former LDP
Secretary General Taku Yamazaki on May 2. These politicians,

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who reportedly had ties to PM Koizumi, were not in positions
to negotiate but their visits might prove helpful if they
could help explain the ROKG position to Tokyo, Yun opined.
The visitors were expected to see Foreign Minister Ban and
meet with Korean politicians, probably from the ruling Uri
Party.


7. (C) Yun said that the ROK Minister for Culture and
Tourism, Kim Myong-gon, would probably still complete a
planned visit to Tokyo scheduled for May because it was not
related to the Dokdo issue. At this time, however, a
ROK-Japanese summit would be impossible and visits of
security-related ministers were improbable. Seoul's future
flexibility would depend on the Japanese attitude.
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ROKG REQUESTS CONTINUED USG ROLE
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8. (C) Yun expressed appreciation for the constructive USG
role in the maritime dispute with Japan and promised to keep
the Embassy and Washington informed of any developments. He
also requested that Washington consider the materials he
provided to gain a better appreciation for Seoul's position
and continue to exercise whatever leadership the USG deemed
appropriate.


9. (C) The DCM thanked Yun for the materials and for keeping
the USG closely informed. It was important for our capitals
to keep open channels for communication. The USG would
welcome further updates.
VERSHBOW