ROKG READOUT ON MARITIME RESOLUTION WITH JAPAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001349

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR CHA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2015
TAGS: PBTS PHSA PREL EFIS MOPS KSAC JA
SUBJECT: ROKG READOUT ON MARITIME RESOLUTION WITH JAPAN

REF: A. SEOUL 1323


B. SEOUL 1314

C. SEOUL 1271

D. SEOUL 1246

Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b),(d).

SUMMARY


1. (C) MOFAT DG for the Asian and Pacific Affairs Bureau Lee
Hyuk on April 24 told POL M/C that Seoul was relieved that it
managed the maritime survey dispute and prevented a worsening
of the already strained relationship with Tokyo. Both sides
agreed that (1) Japan would recall its ships and drop its
current survey plan; (2) the ROKG would maintain the right to
name undersea features in its exclusive economic zone at an
appropriate time (meaning after the International
Hydrographic Organization meeting in June); and (3) Seoul and
Tokyo would resume discussions on resolving EEZ disputes as
soon as possible, perhaps in May. Lee emphasized that the
ROKG had stuck to its initial position and was relatively
satisfied, despite domestic criticism for not being tough
enough with Japan. Seoul planned to conduct its own surveys,
perhaps in July, in waters that Tokyo might consider to be
overlapping EEZs. South Korea also intended to submit new
names of underwater features to the IHO next year. Lee
appealed for USG efforts to persuade Japan not to repeat its
most recent provocation. END SUMMARY.
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ROKG STRATEGY: CONSTRUCTIVE AMBIGUITY
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2. (C) In an April 24 meeting with POL M/C, Lee Hyuk, Asian
and Pacific Affairs Bureau DG Lee Hyuk, expressed relief that
Seoul negotiated an understanding with Tokyo that essentially
maintained the ROKG's initial position, despite some domestic
criticism that it had not been tough enough. South Korean
and Japanese diplomats on April 22 agreed to a three-point
understanding: (1) Japan would recall its survey ships; (2)
Korea maintained the right to name undersea features within
its EEZ at an appropriate time; and (3) the two sides would
hold discussions on delineating their EEZs perhaps as soon as
May.


3. (C) Lee emphasized that Seoul successfully rebuffed
Japanese efforts that could have weakened South Korean
sovereignty to the islet of Dokdo (Takeshima) and the
surrounding waters. It maintained the precondition that
Tokyo first had to drop its plan to dispatch survey ships to
the region before anything could be agreed. Thereafter Seoul
emphasized that it still had the right to name undersea
features within its EEZ, but that it would proceed with such
efforts after necessary preparations were completed. Lee
said that Japan was allowed to explain that it understood the
term "appropriate time" to mean that Seoul would not submit
names to the International Hydrographic Organization in June,
even though Seoul did not explicitly say this. The ROKG
position was to neither deny nor endorse that Japanese
interpretation.


4. (C) Lee said the discussions over the weekend nearly
ruptured a couple of times. The talks began at 5:30pm Friday
night and went until midnight before resuming at 5:30am on
Saturday. Around 3:30pm Saturday, the South Korean side was
ready to say the talks had failed. Still, talks continued.
Later, around 7:00pm South Korean negotiators were again
ready to quit and were on their way back to MOFAT before
receiving a call from the Japanese side to return. Lee
reported that the Japanese side then yielded. Earlier
Japanese proposals included joint maritime surveys in waters
that Tokyo claimed were in overlapping EEZs; Seoul, however,
responded that there were no areas of overlapping EEZs.


5. (C) Lee opined that Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Yachi
came to Seoul looking for an amicable solution and proved to
be reasonable and forthcoming. Yachi reportedly faced
criticism from conservatives in Japan for his initiative to
visit Seoul, and therefore was open to the risk that the
talks could have proven unsuccessful.
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TOUGH SEAS AHEAD
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6. (C) The agreement bought both side time, Lee asserted,
but what was needed was to convince Tokyo not to create
another provocation because the ROKG could not tolerate any
challenges to South Korean sovereignty over Dokdo. The ROKG
could not and would not change its plan to conduct scientific
surveys in July of South Korean EEZ waters, some of which
Japan might consider as an area of overlapping EEZs. Perhaps
next year, Seoul would submit names for undersea features
within its EEZs. It was unclear how Tokyo would protest
either of these actions. Should Japan respond with a similar
provocation, South Korea would have to take defensive action.


7. (C) Lee said that President Roh was also quite firm on
the issue of Dokdo, noting that Roh would make a statement on
April 25 about the agreement and Korea's relations with
Japan. Lee did not preview the message but indicated that,
since the negotiations over the weekend were conducted under
Roh's instructions, his statement would probably be
consistent with the resolution.


8. (C) Lee concluded the meeting by appealing for USG
efforts to persuade Japan not to repeat this type of
provocation. Seoul hoped that Washington would seek to
restrain Tokyo.
VERSHBOW