Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06SEOUL1308
2006-04-20 07:31:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Seoul
Cable title:
ROKG PREFERS REQUEST COME FROM UNHCR ON BANGKOK SIX
VZCZCXYZ0002 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHUL #1308 1100731 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 200731Z APR 06 FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7420 INFO RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 5992 RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0504 RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR 1178 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0583 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 7255 RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1773 RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001308
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NSC FOR CHA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2015
TAGS: PHUM PREF PREL KS KN TH
SUBJECT: ROKG PREFERS REQUEST COME FROM UNHCR ON BANGKOK SIX
REF: A. STATE 62410
B. SEOUL 1270
C. SEOUL 1108
Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b),(d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001308
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NSC FOR CHA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2015
TAGS: PHUM PREF PREL KS KN TH
SUBJECT: ROKG PREFERS REQUEST COME FROM UNHCR ON BANGKOK SIX
REF: A. STATE 62410
B. SEOUL 1270
C. SEOUL 1108
Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b),(d).
1. (C) On April 20, POL M/C delivered ref a demarche urging
Seoul to reconsider its position and quickly allow a ROKG
official to assist with the processing of the six North
Koreans in Bangkok to Nam Gwan-pyo, Director General for
Policy Planning in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
Nam respnded that Seoul had instructed its Embassy in
Bangkok to assist with identification checks, but also
specified that (1) the interviews should be done at UNHCR
facilities; (2) the ROKG Embassy official's identity should
remain undisclosed; and (3) the ROKG wanted the assistance
request to come from UNHCR.
2. (C) Nam reiterated his point from Tuesday that the case
of the Bangkok Six was different from what USG-ROKG
discussions had foreseen (ref b). Seoul sought to avoid the
impression that Seoul was working with Washington and NGOs to
send North Koreans to America. It was working to establish
mechanisms to discretely handle the matter and intended to be
helpful. The case, however, raised sensitivities that
persuaded the ROKG to wait for a UNHCR request.
3. (C) Nam said the ROK-seconded individual at UNHCR would
be available to assist however UNHCR decided. There was no
reason for the ROKG to get involved in how UNHCR deployed
detailed personnel. Nam confirmed that Seoul had passed the
USG-provided biographic data to relevant ROKG authorities.
The information was, of course, only a start; certainly not
enough for any background determination, he said.
4. (C) COMMENT: Seoul would be more likely to reconsider its
position about requiring a UNHCR request if we demonstrated
that we had exhausted all efforts to obtain UNHCR
flexibility. It is the Embassy's view that our interlocutors
have twofold concerns. First, they are concerned that any
publicity of the ROKG role would trigger a negative reaction
from Pyongyang with repercussions on a variety of North-South
issues, including the ROK's efforts to account for South
Koreans abducted by the North. Second, Seoul is worried
about regional reactions -- including those from China,
Mongolia, and Southeast Asia -- that could jeopardize the
existing North Korean refugee pipeline. These are
justifiable concerns. Embassy recommends the USG press the
UNHCR further before working another attempt to persuade the
ROKG. END COMMENT.
VERSHBOW
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NSC FOR CHA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2015
TAGS: PHUM PREF PREL KS KN TH
SUBJECT: ROKG PREFERS REQUEST COME FROM UNHCR ON BANGKOK SIX
REF: A. STATE 62410
B. SEOUL 1270
C. SEOUL 1108
Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b),(d).
1. (C) On April 20, POL M/C delivered ref a demarche urging
Seoul to reconsider its position and quickly allow a ROKG
official to assist with the processing of the six North
Koreans in Bangkok to Nam Gwan-pyo, Director General for
Policy Planning in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
Nam respnded that Seoul had instructed its Embassy in
Bangkok to assist with identification checks, but also
specified that (1) the interviews should be done at UNHCR
facilities; (2) the ROKG Embassy official's identity should
remain undisclosed; and (3) the ROKG wanted the assistance
request to come from UNHCR.
2. (C) Nam reiterated his point from Tuesday that the case
of the Bangkok Six was different from what USG-ROKG
discussions had foreseen (ref b). Seoul sought to avoid the
impression that Seoul was working with Washington and NGOs to
send North Koreans to America. It was working to establish
mechanisms to discretely handle the matter and intended to be
helpful. The case, however, raised sensitivities that
persuaded the ROKG to wait for a UNHCR request.
3. (C) Nam said the ROK-seconded individual at UNHCR would
be available to assist however UNHCR decided. There was no
reason for the ROKG to get involved in how UNHCR deployed
detailed personnel. Nam confirmed that Seoul had passed the
USG-provided biographic data to relevant ROKG authorities.
The information was, of course, only a start; certainly not
enough for any background determination, he said.
4. (C) COMMENT: Seoul would be more likely to reconsider its
position about requiring a UNHCR request if we demonstrated
that we had exhausted all efforts to obtain UNHCR
flexibility. It is the Embassy's view that our interlocutors
have twofold concerns. First, they are concerned that any
publicity of the ROKG role would trigger a negative reaction
from Pyongyang with repercussions on a variety of North-South
issues, including the ROK's efforts to account for South
Koreans abducted by the North. Second, Seoul is worried
about regional reactions -- including those from China,
Mongolia, and Southeast Asia -- that could jeopardize the
existing North Korean refugee pipeline. These are
justifiable concerns. Embassy recommends the USG press the
UNHCR further before working another attempt to persuade the
ROKG. END COMMENT.
VERSHBOW