Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06SEOUL1033
2006-03-29 08:39:00
SECRET
Embassy Seoul
Cable title:  

DUSD LAWLESS CALLS ON SUH CHOO-SUK AT NSC

Tags:  PREL PARM KS 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #1033/01 0880839
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 290839Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6982
INFO RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OSD/ISA/EAP// PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J3 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
S E C R E T SEOUL 001033 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2014
TAGS: PREL PARM KS
SUBJECT: DUSD LAWLESS CALLS ON SUH CHOO-SUK AT NSC


Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b,d).

S E C R E T SEOUL 001033

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2014
TAGS: PREL PARM KS
SUBJECT: DUSD LAWLESS CALLS ON SUH CHOO-SUK AT NSC


Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (S) SUMMARY: In a March 20 meeting, DUSD Richard Lawless
told NSC Assistant Secretary General for Strategy Suh
Choo-suk that the "LaPorte Plan" proposed to the ROKG in
January represented an equitable, reasonable, and final offer
to the ROK on environmental remediation. Deferring to MOE to
provide a formal response at SPI the following day, Suh
indicated that domestic political dynamics made it difficult
for the ROKG to accept the U.S. proposal. Lawless informed
Suh that both sides had made progress on the Joint Vision
Study and the Command Relation Study. However, on the
Comprehensive Security Assessment (CSA),the ROK and the U.S.
still had many issues to resolve. He proposed drafting a
"CSA-lite" or cancel the CSA altogether if an agreement could
not be reached. When pressed for a quick approval on the
Strategic Guidance Statement (SGS) for OPLAN 5029, Suh asked
for more time. END SUMMARY.


2. (S) DUSD Richard Lawless met March 20 with NSC Assistant
Secretary General for Strategy Suh Choo-suk to discuss

SIPDIS
alliance issues in advance of the SPI talks the following
day.

LaPorte Plan and Environmental Remediation
--------------


3. (S) Lawless stated that the U.S. had been trying to return
closed USFK bases to the ROK for the past year and a half.
Currently, there were 24 camps ready to be returned to the
ROK. Lawless was concerned that if an agreement on a process
to promptly return the closed bases to the ROK did not move
forward, the timeline for the important base realignment
programs would be derailed. He stated he was worried the US
could be criticized for not returning the closed camps and
reiterated that the U.S. was firmly committed to Yongsan and
LPP relocation plans and wanted to return the bases on an
expedited schedule. However, to date no progress had been
made on the return of the closed bases, some of which had
been closed as long as 17 months. Lawless stressed that the
U.S. had been trying to find a solution on the issue of
environmental remediation, worried that this could become a
bilateral political issue. The LaPorte Plan, proposed by
outgoing USFK Commander General LaPorte, included provisions

to take special measures on 5 out of the 24 bases, which were
found to have contaminants floating on ground water. Lawless
emphasized that GEN LaPorte believed he had an agreement with
the Minister of Environment on this proposal, and that this
was the best and final U.S. proposal. Lawless urged the ROKG
to accept the plan.


4. (S) Suh said he had studied the LaPorte proposal and
shared the U.S. concerns on the matter. However, he was
mindful of the overall political situation within the ROK and
the overall policy direction of the ROKG. Downplaying NSC's
role, he deflected responsibility to the Ministry of
Environment (MOE) stating that MOE had the lead on this
issue. Suh noted that, as in the U.S., environmentalists
sought to impose their standards on the government, and there
were those in the National Assembly who agreed with the
environmental NGO's. Taking into consideration these views,
the ROK interagency had prepared a proposal to be presented
at SPI. Although the proposal may fail to meet expectations
from the U.S., Suh stressed the need to keep working on this
issue. The NSC Permanent Council, with the Defense
Minister's lead, would continue to focus on this issue.

CSA, JVS, and CRS
--------------


5. (S) On the three alliance related studies, Lawless noted
that the Comprehensive Security Assessment still had
significant issues to be resolved, most notably the treatment
of Japan. He emphasized that the ROK's language on Japan was
something that the U.S. could not accept in the document.
Discussions in Guam indicated that the two sides were
actually getting further apart. Since CSA sets the necessary
foundation for the other studies, he hoped that the CSA could
be completed as soon as possible. If both sides could not
reach an acceptable solution, he proposed that the CSA be
released as a less comprehensive and complicated "CSA-lite".
If even that approach could not work, the two sides should
consider canceling the CSA altogether. In response, Suh said
that threat assessments were already included in the Joint
Vision Study (JVS) and questioned the practical utility of
the CSA. He thought that a truncated CSA was a good idea.
Suh commented that Assistant Minister of Defense for Policy
Planning Kwon An-do, who would head the ROK delegation for
SPI, would concur with his views. Suh emphasized that
CSA-lite should still reflect the common understanding of the
ROK-U.S. alliance and not focus on the disagreements between
the two partners.


6. (S) Turning to the Joint Vision Study (JVS),Lawless
pointed out that both sides were making good progress and
that the study would significantly impact the alliance. On
Command Relations Study, Lawless said he hoped to finalize a
timeline on command relations by the October Security
Consultative Meeting (SCM) in Washington. He pressed Suh to
make progress on signing a Terms of Reference (TOR) on
command relations. Suh pledged that the NSC would cooperate
fully on such issues of bilateral importance.

SGS and 5029
--------------


7. (S) Lawless commented that the U.S. had met ROK's
requirements in the Strategic Guidance Statement (SGS) and
was waiting for ROK's approval. He inquired if any
outstanding issues remained which prevented the ROK from
approving the draft. Lawless noted that SGS had been in the
works since 2003 and that both sides needed to move forward
on this for the sake of the alliance. While delegating the
primary responsibility over the matter to the Combined Forces
Command (CFC) and the ROK JCS/MND, Suh said that President
Roh was committed to resolving issues regarding the alliance.
However, the internal government deliberations had become
convoluted and the negative reaction by the public had
complicated matters. The President and the policy makers
were committed to a thorough process on these discussions in
the spirit of the alliance, Suh said.
MINTON