BOSNIA: WHY THE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM VOTE FAILED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 000966

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR D (SMITH),P (BAME),EUR (DICARLO),EUR/SCE
(ENGLISH, SAINZ, FOOKS),NSC FOR BRAUN, USNIC FOR WEBER,
GREGORIAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/03/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA: WHY THE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM VOTE FAILED
AND WHAT IT MEANS

Classified By: AMBASSADOR DOUGLAS L. MCELHANEY. REASON: 1.4 (B) AND (
D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a late-night vote April 26, the
constitutional reform package agreed on by the leaders of
Bosnia's major political parties failed to obtain the 2/3
majority it needed in the House of Representatives, falling
short by only two votes. Of the 42 delegates, a majority --
26 -- voted in favor, with 16 voting against (no abstentions
or absences). The package and its backers -- Bosniak SDA,
Serb SDS, SNSD, PDP, Croat HDZ and multi-ethnic SDP -- were
the victims of an alliance of convenience between (Bosniak)
Haris Silajdzic's Party for BiH (SBiH) and the new right-wing
Croat party "HDZ 1990." The rejection of the package means
Bosnia will, for now, retain its inefficient governmental
structure, although we continue to probe for the possibility
of finding the necessary votes -- if not at this moment, then
in a more conducive post-election environment. The
parliament's failure to pass the package leaves the Bosniak
SDA party and its party president, Sulejman Tihic, as the
biggest losers, with the public defection of one of the
party's own parliamentarians driving the nail in the reform
package's coffin and exposing deep rifts in the party's
infrastructure. The political forces unleashed by the
constitutional reform debate will continue to whirl in the
pre-election period, and we will need to contain the
destructive finger-pointing even as we work to lay out plans
for the future of constitutional reform in Bosnia -- a
process that must and will go on. END SUMMARY.

THE ALLIANCE: SBIH, HDZ 1990 -- PLUS TWO


2. (C) After a 16 hour session on April 26 and nine hours
of debate and caucusing the following day, the BiH House of
Representatiaves voted down the U.S. and EU-backed
constitutional reform package close to midnight April 27.
The U.S. brokered package -- negotiated by the leaders of
BiH's eight largest political parties (representing all
ethnicities) over approximately 12 months of discussion --
was ultimately done in by a highly orchestrated and vicious
joint campaign by the breakaway Croat party, "HDZ 1990" and
the (ostensibly multiethnic but largely Bosniak) Party for
BiH (SBiH). Behind the alliance: the electoral ambitions of
their party leaders to de-throne SDA President Tihic and HDZ
President Covic in the October national elections. As
reported in previous cables, HDZ 1990 was founded largely to
oppose the current HDZ leader, Dragan Covic, who participated
in the constitutional reform negotiations; HDZ 1990 defined
opposition to Covic as opposition to the constitutional
reform. Five of six HDZ House of Reps parliamentarians
ultimately aligned themselves with HDZ 1990, and cast their
votes accordingly.


3. (C) SBiH, under the leadership of the mercurial and
power-hungry Haris Silajdzic, proved an even more destructive
force. A participant in the constitutional reform
negotiations for the past year, it ceased to participate in
the end-game ostensibly over a single issue -- retention of
the existing complex voting procedure in the House of
Representatives (the so-called practice of "entity voting").
But that was just their cover. The real reason was the
Presidential ambitions of Silajdzic, who has spent most of
his time in recent years outside the country but now seeks to
seize the political moment by preying on fissures within the
leading Bosniak SDA party. Though Silajdzic was not
physically present in the Parliament, observers quickly
identified his proxy: Zlatko Hadzidedic, an aide to SBiH
Minister of Civil Affairs Halilovic, who orchestrated efforts
by SBiH, HDZ 1990 and various radical independents to sow
dissent. Hadzidedic focused his efforts (and money) on
getting the two additional "no" votes against the package
needed for the HDZ 1990 and SBiH alliance to prevail.


4. (C) He found those votes not among rejectionist Serb
fringe parties but among the Bosniak ranks. Many here
believe that at least one of two crucial Bosniak "no" votes
was literally bought and paid for by SBiH. Over the 48 hours
prior to and during the debate, Mehmed Zilic, the SDA
defector, appeared to be a man who had promised his vote to
someone else for a price. He was alternately intractable,
unreachable and deliberately ambiguous despite a wave of
successive entreaties by long-time friends, political allies
and even religious leaders including the Reis (in response to
a plea from the Ambassador). Zilic's position hardened
perceptibly in the last day before the Parliament session;

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ham-handed intimidation by SDA President Tihic's close ally,
Minister for Human Rights Mirsad Kebo, provided the pretext
for Zilic to break SDA ranks, but it was clear from his
frequent caucusing with SBiH handlers, among other things,
that he had promised his vote elsewhere.


5. (C) The second critical "no" vote was cast by Sead
Avdic, an elderly "independent" MP -- independent due largely
to his history of quarrelling with all his previous party
allies. Avdic and Zilic are close; both left the SDP some
years ago for different parties but have maintained ties.
Throughout the debate, Avdic tried to portray himself as the
broker of a grand compromise, only to find his proposal (a
non-starter for all sides) rejected even by those who for
days pretended to encourage him: SBiH and HDZ 1990. Avdic's
petulance and intractability gained as he seemed to realize
that his efforts at dealmaking had no takers, and Zilic's
"no" vote gave him the protection he sought to vote likewise,
having told us only an hour earlier that "he would not be the
man to block the package."

END-GAME NEGOTIATIONS CONSTRUCTIVE BUT UNSUCCESSFUL


6. (C) SDP leader Lagumdzija, joined by other political
party leaders, offered HDZ 1990 a significant compromise at
the start of the afternoon. The offer: a "super veto" in
the upper House of Peoples, whereby any law deemed
destructive to vital national interests by all seven members
of a given ethnic caucus would automatically be rejected,
without recourse to the constitutional court. Substantively,
this should have met the HDZ 1990 concerns that the
constitutional reform package had gone too far in reducing
the role of the ethnic-based House of Peoples (indeed, the
suggested compromise -- agreed among the pro-reform parties
without our input -- violated our principle of avoiding
ethnic-based formulations). But HDZ 1990 leader Martin Raguz
and his group rejected any compromise, nor would they agree
to abstain on the vote (thus permitting the required 2/3 of
the assembly to pass the package through). The fact that
literally NO compromise proved acceptable to the nay-sayers
shocked the EC and EU ambassadors present during these
consultations. Having gathered together a motley collection
of ex-HVO (Bosnian Croat) generals, Croat "third entity"
proponents and homeless hangers-on from the left and
far-right, HDZ 1990 -- a single-issue party -- chose to head
toward the October elections on this rejectionist platform.

WHAT IT MEANS


7. (C) The vote means that the process of constitutional
reform has come to a temporary close, though we continue to
probe for ways to keep up the momentum and find the necessary
votes, if not at this moment then in a more conducive
post-election environment. For now, Bosnia and Herzegovina
will keep its inefficient governmental structure and will
need to consider carefully how it will ultimately achieve the
constitutional changes needed for its eventual Euro-Atlantic
integration. As this experience shows, it will not be easy.
However, the constructive commitment shown by the package's
negotiators during the end-game demonstrates that many in
this country remain capable of seeing beyond narrow party
interests.


8. (C) The constitutional reform process has redefined the
working relationship between this country's major political
parties. That is particularly true of the Bosnian Serb
parties. The rough-edged and somewhat volatile SNSD leader
Dodik (who became RS Prime Minister in February) used the
process to increase his credibility as a leader. Once-pariah
Serb SDS leader and RS President Dragan Cavic (dubbed by
negotiators "the laptop Chetnik" for his attention to detail)
emerged as a constructive force for compromise and a superb
tactician in assisting his fellow-political party leaders to
navigate the shoals of these past weeks of vote-grabbing.
Even the mercurial PDP leader, BiH FM Ivanic, looked good
during the end-game. Among the Bosniaks, SDP leader
Lagumdzija was eloquent both in Parliament and in public,
gaining considerable credibility.


9. (C) Croat HDZ leader Covic was a tough defender of Croat
interests during negotiations, though he ultimately signed on
to the deal and defended it publicly. He proved unable to
prevent the HDZ parliamentarians from changing allegiances
when HDZ 1990 was founded, and it was his party's internal
disintegration that proved a major factor in the defeat of

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the package. Covic's political fortunes remain in doubt,
with his trial for corruption entering its final stages and
this defeat giving him little ground within the party to crow
about his leadership.


10. (C) The largest political loser, however, is SDA leader
(and BiH Presidency member) Tihic. Had Tihic been able to
hold onto Zilic's vote, it is almost certain that Avdic would
have backed the package; this is the universal view here
among commentators and, most damningly, his own party
members. Simmering resentment in the SDA over Tihic's
perceived willingness to bargain away the elimination of the
Republika Srpska -- never a realistic option but one
promulgated incessantly by Haris Silajdzic -- resurfaced
during parliamentary debate, when one SDA member (Izet
Hadzic) blurted out his own objection to the package in
public remarks. Though Hadzic was quickly brought back into
line, it provoked an acerbic Serb reaction and titillated the
ranks of those working to kill the package.


11. (C) The vote, and the package, represent the best
consensus possible at this point. Without a vote, it is
likely that the package would have been subjected to even
more debilitating criticism. The parliamentary rejection has
poisoned the political atmosphere and propelled the country,
early, into the election campaign. Over the next days and
weeks, accusations and recriminations will be flying fast and
furious. The message that responsible politicians will need
to convey: those who favor change and progress toward Europe
need to make that clear in the October balloting. This
Embassy will be working, together with colleagues in the
international community, to reinforce that message, to
encourage the pro-reform parties to stand by what they
achieved, and to maintain the momentum so painstakingly
created. We also need to focus on how to institutionalize
the constitutional reform process so that what was gained
during the arduous months of negotiations -- rare unanimity
of purpose among the entire spectrum of Bosnian leaders --
can be built upon once the sensitive pre-election period is
over. We will follow up with a further cable on strategy.

MCELHANEY