BOSNIA - HIGH REP PRESSES FOR "REAL ASSESSMENT" ON

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SARAJEVO 003203

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR DICARLO, EUR/SCE (HOH, FOOKS); NSC FOR BRAUN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KAWC BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - HIGH REP PRESSES FOR "REAL ASSESSMENT" ON
OHR CLOSURE AT FEBRUARY 2007 PIC

REF: SARAJEVO 2752

Classified By: Ambassador Douglas McElhaney. Reason 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (S) SUMMARY: Prior to the December 6-7 meeting of the
Peace Implementation Council (PIC) in Brussels, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State Rosemary DiCarlo meeting with
High Representative (HighRep) Christian Schwarz-Schilling.
Schwarz-Schilling urged the U.S. to support a "real review"
about OHR's future at the February 2007 PIC and outlined two
contingency plans for keeping OHR open. He told DiCarlo that
ICTY Chief Prosecutor Carla DelPonte had approach him about
using his Bonn Powers to remove the Republika Spska (RS)
Minister of Interior, if PIFWC Stojan Zupljanin were not
arrested in 30 days. On police reform, Schwarz-Schilling
cautioned that it was too early to bring police reform
negotiations to a head. Finally, Schwarz-Schilling proposed
establishing in January a secretariat to manage a second
phase of constitutional reform. END SUMMARY

A "Real Review" Before OHR Closes
--------------


2. (C) Schwarz-Schilling opened the meeting by making a plea
for a "real review" about OHR's future when the PIC meets in
February 2007. Some countries see closure in June 2007 as
already decided and the February review as a formality, he
explained. As HighRep he had a responsibility to ensure the
February 2007 PIC did more than act as "a rubberstamp,"
Schwarz-Schilling said. OHR would distribute its own
assessment 10 days prior to the February 2007 PIC, which he
said would provide the basis for discussion. The assessment
would examine regional factors, particularly Kosovo, security
in Bosnia, and "internal dynamics," such as the functionality
of state institutions and the political situation. OHR's
future should not hinge on the status of one or two reforms,
but a "holistic, systematic view of the stability of Bosnia,"
he added.


3. (C) Though the PIC would not decide OHR's fate at the
December meeting, it would still need to discuss alternative
options for maintaining an OHR presence in Sarajevo,
Schwarz-Schilling said. The HighRep told DiCarlo that OHR
staff had outlined two options for keeping OHR open. The
first was a straight forward 12 month delay with OHR
continuing to operate at whatever staff level existed on
March 1, 2007 while parallel steps were taken for a gradual
build-up of a reinforced Office of the EU Special
Representative (EUSR). The second involved continuing the
transition to a reinforced EUSR, while the EUSR retained his
separate position as HighRep and the Bonn Powers. He would
be supported by a small "Bonn Powers team."


4. (C) DiCarlo agreed that no decision on OHR's future should
be taken prior to February 2007. The U.S. supported a
thorough assessment at that time, but hoped to be in a
position to close OHR on schedule in June. In the United
States' view, OHR needed to focus on creating the conditions
required that would allow OHR to close. With regard to the
two options for keeping OHR open, DiCarlo stressed that the
U.S. could not support maintaining a small Bonn Powers office
in a dual-hatted reinforced EUSR/OHR. If an extension were
required, the U.S. preference would likely be to keep OHR as
it is in March. DiCarlo added that the OHR assessment should
not add new benchmarks for closure. The current benchmarks,
spelled out in OHR's Mission Implementation Plan (MIP) were
clear and what the PIC had decided OHR needed to accomplish
to complete its mandate.

ICTY - The Metric Remains "Full Cooperation"
--------------


5. (C) Turning the ICTY, DiCarlo expressed concern that ICTY
Chief Prosecutor Carla DelPonte was "raising the bar" on SAA
conditionality for the Bosnians. DelPonte had often failed
to make clear to the Bosnians precisely what type of
cooperation she required from them or what kind of support

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she required from the international community.
Schwarz-Schilling agreed, adding that DelPonte often made
claims about the whereabouts and travels of war criminals
without backing them up. This approach had frustrated the
Bosnians and undercut her credibility with them, he said.
Schwarz-Schilling said he had told DelPonte that OHR could
not support her work based on unsubstantiated assertions.


6. (S) DelPonte told him that she believed RS Minister of
Interior Cadjo know the whereabouts of ICTY indictee Stojan
Zupljanin, Schwarz-Schilling continued; and she informed the
HighRep that she had given Cadjo an ultimatum to arrest
Zupljanin and transfer him to The Hague within 30 days. If
Cadjo failed to deliver, DelPonte wanted him to use his Bonn
Powers to remove Cadjo from office, Schwarz-Schilling said.
Aspects of DelPonte's case against Cadjo appeared credible,
but he needed evidence. He was prepared to use his Bonn
Powers, but only if he could verify the information Del Ponte
presented him.

Police Reform
--------------


7. (C) Schwarz-Schilling told DiCarlo that he expected the
Police Directorate to issue its final report on December 20.
Until then, he was not prepared "to force the issue," he
said, adding forcing it too early risked causing RS Prime
Minister Milorad Dodik to walk out of political talks.
Schwarz-Schilling's Principal Deputy Larry Butler noted that
Dodik had not agreed to transfer budgetary competencies for
the police from the entity to the State. This and transfer
of legislative competencies were critical to a police reform
deal. Otherwise, there was "plenty of room" within the three
EC principles on police reform for the RS to maintain its
police force. Butler also warned that if Dodik acted on his
threat to submit the Police Directorate report to the RS
National Assembly (RSNA) and the RSNA voted against it, it
would make it even harder for Dodik to reach a compromise on
police reform. Dodik's threat to hold a referendum on police
reform would have even more dire consequences, Butler
continued, as a police reform referendum could become a
surrogate for a referendum on RS independence.

Constitutional Reform
--------------


8. (C) Turning to constitutional reform, Schwarz-Schilling
stressed his continued support for the U.S.-brokered package
of constitutional amendments, but admitted that he was not
optimistic about its prospects. It was important to maintain
the momentum on constitutional reform and signal to Bosnia
that a second phase would take place. With this he in mind
he proposed establishing a "Constitutional Reform
Secretariat" within the Bosnian parliament in January.

SIPDIS
Taking this step would not require abandoning the
U.S.-brokered package, he quickly added, as OHR could frame
the secretariat as intended to support both phases of
constitutional reform. He asked whether the U.S. would
provide USD 1 million to support the secretariat's work and
said that he requested the same amount of money from the EC.


9. (C) DiCarlo thanked the HighRep for his support for the
U.S.-brokered package, but suggested it was too soon to make
any definitive judgments about its prospects. This would
have to wait until a new government was in place. In the
meantime, the U.S. would not support taking any steps,
including establishing a "Constitutional Reform Secretariat,"
that might provide Bosnian political leaders with an excuse
to walk away from the constitutional compromises they reached
in March. Finally, DiCarlo urged Schwarz-Schilling to
refrain from publi discussion about plans for a second phase
of constitutional reform which would undermine prospects of
passing the existing amendment package.
MCELHANEY