BOSNIA: POST-ELECTION MOD SHAKE-UP COULD FURTHER

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 002996

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR (DICARLO),D (SMITH),P (BAME),EUR/SCE (HOH,
SAINZ, FOOKS),AND EUR/RPM (BROTZEN),NSC FOR BRAUN, USNIC
FOR WIGHTMAN, OSD FOR MARK JONES, USNATO FOR SHAFFER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA: POST-ELECTION MOD SHAKE-UP COULD FURTHER
SLOW DEFENSE REFORM

REF: A) SARAJEVO 2259 B) SARAJEVO 2638

Classified By: Amb. Douglas McElhaney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) Many contacts within and outside the Ministry of
Defense tell us that it is unlikely Minister of Defense
Nikola Radovanovic will keep his post in a new government.
The departure of Radovanovic, a Serb, may also lead to a
strong push to replace the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Lt. Gen. Sifet Podzic, a Bosniak, before the
expiration of his term in office. Taken together, these two
moves could present a setback to Bosnian defense reform,
which has already begun to stumble in the face of difficult
decisions over personnel and property. In recent months, we
have engaged in numerous public expressions of support for
the defense reform agenda and the minister. Ultimately,
short of injecting ourselves into the coalition negotiation
process, we believe the most useful means of influencing the
process is to make clear our expectation that defense reform
be fully implemented, and that the process be headed by a
balanced, capable, and apolitical defense team. End summary.

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DEFENSE MINISTER RADOVANOVIC: ONE FOOT OUT THE DOOR?
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2. (C) It appears increasingly unlikely that Defense Minister
Nikola Radovanovic will be part of the next Bosnian
government. As a politically unaffiliated Bosnian-Serb,
Radovanovic's position has always been somewhat tenuous. In
recent weeks, RS Prime Minister and SNSD President Milorad
Dodik has publicly renounced "Serb claim" on the MOD post,
going so far as to say in a recent interview that his party
sought no leadership role in "the phony army." Dodik's
comments have been echoed in private as well, with the RS
Prime Minister telling us and Radovanovic that the Minister
could stay only if he did not "count against" Serb seats in
the Council of Ministers (COM). Defense and Security Advisor
to the Chairman of the Presidency, Dzuro Beronja, confirmed
the SNSD approach, telling us that SNSD did not consider the
MOD portfolio that valuable.


3. (C) Radovanovic has been ambivalent about his future. In
recent discussions with us he has said that he does not want
to retain his position, underscoring that he is tired from
both the exhaustive work and political infighting in the MOD.
Embassy contacts both within and outside the Ministry have
observed that Radovanovic's commitment to seeing through the
reform agenda has waned in recent months. The uniformed
military leadership has been particularly vocal in its
concerns that the Minister has slowed the personnel process,
leaving their futures in limbo. According to a senior member
of the NATO staff in Sarajevo working in the MOD, Radovanovic
has recently "not been decisive."


4. (S) One possible successor is current Deputy Defense
Minister Enes Becirbasic, a Bosniak with strong ties to the
Party for Democratic Action (SDA),who is known to be angling
for the job. NATO had previously investigated Becirbasic
over questions that he had failed to resign his military
commission before accepting the deputy minister slot as
required by law. (Note. The NATO review found no evidence
that Becirbasic had resigned his commission, but NATO was
reluctant to remove him from his post. End note.) Another
rumored replacement is Ramiz Drekovic, a former wartime
commander and current unofficial military advisor to the
Federation Prime Minister. Drekovic, who has ties to both
SDA and newly elected presidency member Haris Silajdzic's
Party for BiH (SBiH),faced wide criticism during the war for
his ineffectual leadership of the Bosnian Army's V Corps and
other units.

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AS GOES RADOVANOVIC, SO GOES PODZIC?
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5. (S) If a Bosniak, as is rumored, replaces Radovanovic,
there will be strong pressure within political and military
circles to replace Lt. Gen. Podzic to preserve ethnic balance
at the senior level of the defense leadership. Though

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Podzic, a strong supporter of defense reform and Bosnian
overseas deployments, has two years remaining on his term, a
new defense minister could recommend his retirement to the
Presidency. (Note. The choice of the CHOD is supposed to be
divorced from the political process. End note.) In this
scenario, a senior Bosnian-Serb military commander would
likely replace Podzic as chairman of the joint chiefs.
Podzic has stated that he expects to be a victim of a MOD
shake-up, and has asked for support from the senior NATO
staff. A NATO official told us that the NATO commander would
support Podzic finishing his term, but does not have the
power to block Podzic's legal replacement.


6. (C) Ideally, Podzic should finish his full term as
prescribed by law. It would establish a clear precedent of a
professional, apolitical senior uniformed leadership that is
immune from changes resulting from the electoral cycle.
Working through the NATO command in Sarajevo, we have a
decent chance of keeping Podzic as chairman for the legal
duration of his term. Doing so, however, also contains
certain political drawbacks. Keeping Podzic, our strong
partner and committed proponent of defense reform, could
serve to isolate Bosnian-Serbs from the reform process by
turning the top two defense positions in Sarajevo over to
Bosniaks. Consequently, the locus of power for Bosnian-Serbs
in the defense structures could return to Banja Luka, where
senior Bosnian-Serbs military leaders will be commanding the
VI Infantry Brigade and Support Command.

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SEEKING A CROAT ALTERNATIVE
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7. (C) A direct effort to force governing coalition partners
to agree on a specific defense minister candidate could
undermine our own preference to keep the portfolio
apolitical, and directly draw us into further discussions
about other ministries and government composition.
Considering Dodik's position and the general political
situation, the best outcome we could hope for is to have an
apolitical Croat take over the minister's slot. One
possibility is current Assistant Defense Minister for
International Cooperation Zoran Sajinovic, a Croat, who also
heads the inter-agency Partnership for Peace working group.
Though his name has yet to surface as a possible candidate,
we can attempt to steer the debate to a candidate like
Sajinovic by continuing to stress the need for competent,
committed, and "balanced" leadership at the helm of the MOD.

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DEFENSE REFORM IMPLEMENTATION ALREADY SLOWING
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8. (C) Even outside the political wrangling over MOD
leadership, some crucial elements of defense reform have been
put on hold (see reftels). The MOD missed its initial
October 1 deadline to finish its personnel decisions for both
the ministry and armed forces. While the selection
committees are currently meeting, it is an open question as
to whether the new deadline of December 21 will be realized.
A senior NATO advisor told us that the deadline could be met,
but it would require the selection boards to work late and on
weekends, possibly sacrificing quality decision-making for
the sake of finishing work by the end of the year. The key
property issues of the new state-level ministry and army are
even further from resolution. Both the Federation and RS
have balked at transferring both immovable (land, buildings)
and movable (weapons) property to the state-level
institutions without guarantees that the proceeds of any
future sales of the property would be transferred back to the
entities. Apparently in an effort to avoid a drawn-out
political fight with the entity governments, Radovanovic
failed to sign the order transferring the property until last
week. The order now needs approval from the state-level COM
and entity governments, which is not expected in the
near-term, without concessions from the MOD. In another
unwelcome development, newly elected RS President Milan Jelic
recently appointed a military advisor to his own staff,
directly contradicting the spirit, if not the letter, of the
defense reform law.

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COMMENT: DEFENSE REFORM LEADERSHIP KEY TO ITS SUCCESS
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9. (C) The creation of a single, unified armed forces is
critical to Bosnia's long-term peace and security. Defense
reform accomplishments of the past two years have been
substantial and have gone a long way in establishing a NATO
compatible force capable of deploying in overseas missions.
We have been very active in trumpeting the successes of
defense reform and reminding Bosnians that the USG is
watching its development closely (reftel A). The Ambassador
has appeared at a series of public events throughout the fall
with Radovanovic and Podzic and publicly praised their
leadership. We believe it is crucial that the defense
process continues to be headed by an apolitical, balanced and
committed leadership team, and will continue to deliver that
message to the Bosnian political leadership. This is more
important to the long-term health of defense reform than
freezing the current leadership in place.
MCELHANEY