BOSNIA - NEXT STEPS ON CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 002876

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR (DICARLO),EUR/SCE, AND P (BAME); OSD
FOR FLORY; NSC FOR BRAUN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - NEXT STEPS ON CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM

REF: A. SARAJEVO 2825

B. SARAJEVO 2782

C. SARAJEVO 2699

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Classified By: Ambassador Douglas L. McElhaney. Reason 1.4(b and d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Six weeks after the October 1 elections,
Bosniak (Muslim) opposition to and anxiety about the
U.S.-brokered package of constitutional amendments remains a
problem. Newly elected Bosniak member of the Tri-Presidency
Haris Silajdzic continues his public and private campaign
against the amendments, convinced that the international
community will bail Bosniaks out of the political morass that
would result from their defeat. Former President Tihic's
Party for Democratic Action's (SDA) support for the package
is uncertain, and greater clarity is unlikely before the
party resolves its ongoing leadership struggle. While the
politics of constitutional reform remain hazy, some process
issues are clearer. There is consensus among the major
political parties that the House of Representatives should
not reconsider the U.S.-brokered package before there is a
new government, for example. A vote is unlikely until at
least the end of February. We plan to use that time to
continue our efforts to shore up support for the package
within the SDA as well as the Bosniak public. Among other
things, we will use the 11th anniversary of Dayton to
underscore the importance of constitutional reform generally
and the U.S.-brokered package in particular. We would
welcome a statement from the Secretary that does the same.
Other measures we plan to take to advance our agenda as well
as proposals for Washington action are contained at the end
of this message. END SUMMARY

Whither the Bosniaks Part I: Silajdzic - Living in the Past
-------------- --------------


2. (C) Among Bosniak political parties, only the Social
Democratic Party (SDP) firmly supports the U.S.-brokered
package of constitutional amendments. After several meetings
with newly inaugurated Bosniak member of the Tri-Presidency
Haris Silajdzic (Refs B and C),we doubt that he or his
party, the Party for BiH (SBiH) could be persuaded to support
it. Silajdzic has a litany of complaints, but his strongest
objection is to the continued existence of entity voting. At
times (but not consistently),he concedes constitutional
change requires agreement among the Bosniaks, Croats, and
Serbs, but when pressed he admits he has no idea how to
persuade the RS-based parties to accept entity voting's
elimination. Though he praises the U.S. role in Bosnia in
meetings with us, with others he claims U.S. support for the
March package is motivated by a desire to wash its hands of
Bosnia and/or a need to placate radical Serbs in order to
secure a deal with Belgrade on Kosovo. More disconcertingly,
he perceives the constitutional reform process as an
extension of the 1992-1995 war. He argues the Serbs are
using it to complete their genocide and ethnic cleansing of
the Bosniaks and to create a "Greater Serbia."


3. (C) Silajdzic's wartime intellectual framework distorts
his assessment of the role the international community
should/will play in Bosnia. Though he bemoans international
community pressure to adopt the March package, arguing
publicly "Bosnia is not a colony," privately Silajdzic told
us the international community should impose a new
constitution (presumably one without entity voting). He
argues the Office of the High Representative (OHR) should
remain in Bosnia beyond summer 2007 "to address inevitable
blockages in the reform process." It is an open question
whether he is prepared to create conditions that would
require the PIC to reconsider its current plans to close OHR,
but we would not rule it out. Silajdzic also justifies his
opposition to the March package by claiming the EU accession
process will require elimination of entity voting, so why
"confirm" it by accepting the U.S.-brokered package. The
assumption that underlies his arguments is that the
international community will bail him out, if he derails
constitutional reform.


4. (C) Silajdzic is working overtime to raise doubts among
Bosniaks about constitutional reform generally and the March
package in particular, by passing around "legal analyses"
critical of the amendments. The "analyses" are partisan
political documents designed to serve Silajdzic's interests,
not objective, scholarly papers. Paranoid political

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assumptions about the motives behind Serb support for the
March package are also woven into their text. Nonetheless,
they are having an impact, not least because Silajdzic uses
his cozy relationship with Dnevni Avaz, (Bosnia's largest
daily),to ensure that the "analyses" receive wide
circulation. The newspaper has now moved to questioning the
motives of the USG, and the Ambassador, in pushing the
package. (Party for Democratic (SDA) MPs regularly raise
with us concerns about the March package drawn from
Silajdzic's "legal analyses.")

Whither the Bosniaks Part II: The SDA, Dazed and Confused
-------------- --------------


5. (C) Prospects for the U.S.-brokered package hinge on the
SDA. Outgoing Bosniak member of the Tri-Presidency and
embattled SDA President Sulejman Tihic tells us SDA support
for the U.S.-brokered package remains solid, but our
conversations with SDA MPs suggest otherwise. SDA MPs
publicly assert that they will support party policy on
constitutional reform, which currently calls for adoption of
the U.S.-brokered package. Privately, they express concern
to us about the politics and substance of constitutional
reform. Most interpret Tihic's loss to Silajdzic as
repudiation by Bosniak voters of the U.S.-brokered package
and worry continued SDA support for it would further weaken
the party. Several propose "technical changes" to the
package as a means of defanging Silajdzic's arguments against
it and mitigating the political dangers to the SDA of
supporting it. The Silajdzic "legal analyses" have prompted
suggestions from SDA MPs, including SDA Deputy Vice President
Bakir Izetbegovic, to change the "dissolution clause," for
example. Some SDA MPs seek substantive, political changes
under the rubric "technical change," such as one proposal to
modify entity voting.


6. (C) SDA's position on constitutional reform has been
subsumed by the party's internecine struggle over Tihic's
future as SDA President. The prevailing wisdom is that if
Tihic loses his leadership battle, the SDA will walk away
from its commitment to support the U.S.-brokered package.
While that is probable, the link between Tihic's and
constitutional reform's fate is not immutable. Many of
Tihic's opponents are motivated by their own ambitions and/or
antipathy towards Tihic rather than opposition to the
U.S.-brokered package. Tihic's opponents had expected a
decisive clash at the November 8 meeting of the SDA
Presidency, but instead Tihic managed to outmaneuver them.
The struggle for SDA leadership could take several more weeks
to play out, perhaps dragging into the New Year. Its final
outcome probably hinges on the position of Bakir Izetbegovic
(son of wartime Bosniak leader Alija Izetbegovic),who is
widely seen as the most likely successor to Tihic. In the
meantime, we continue to argue the U.S.-brokered package's
merits with SDA MPs, remind them of SDA's commitment to the
Secretary on it, and review the consequences of walking away
from the deal.

Non-Bosniak Universe: Continued SNSD, SDS, PDP and HDZ
Support
-------------- --------------


7. (C) Serb and Croat parties that supported constitutional
reform in April - the Alliance of Independent Social
Democrats (SNSD),the Serb Democratic Party (SDS),the Party
for Democratic Progress (PDP),and the Croatian Democratic
Union-BiH (HDZ) - continue to support the U.S.-brokered
package. The Serbs have stressed that their support for the
package is contingent on its adoption without any changes,
however. The Serbs warn that re-opening the package,
presumably even for technical changes, would mean starting
over. The emerging leadership battle within SDS could
complicate Serb support for constitutional reform (Ref A).
If Dragan Cavic is ousted as SDS leader, presumably by a more
right wing personality, his successor could reverse the
party's support for constitutional reform, which would cost
the package three crucial votes it does not currently have to
spare.

Greater Clarity on Process Issues
--------------


8. (C) While the political prospects for the U.S.-brokered
package remain hazy, there is greater clarity on some of the

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process questions associated with its possible
reconsideration by the new Parliamentary Assembly (PA).
Proponents and opponents alike are virtually unanimous that
the new PA should not take up the package until a new
government is formed. The proponent of the package (i.e.,
who reintroduces it) could be either the new government,
depending on the outcome of coalition negotiations, or the
House of Representatives caucuses of the six parties that
agreed to the package in March. Given Silajdzic's views, it
is highly unlikely the Presidency could serve as the
proponent. The PA would be required to ask the Presidency
and Council of Ministers for their opinions on the package.
The opinions are not binding, but they provide an opportunity
to complicate the politics of passage. Finally, the package
would require technical changes related to its implementation
before it is reintroduced. Political and process issues mean
that a vote on the U.S.-brokered package is not likely before
the end of February. It could come even later if the package
passes through full parliamentary procedure (i.e.,
comprehensive public hearings),as some SDS MPs appear likely
to insist.

Constitutional Reform: The Way Ahead
--------------


9. (C) We plan to use the time between now and February to
continue our efforts to shore up support for the
U.S.-brokered package. Our primary focus, as it has been for
the past several weeks, will be on the Bosniak political
leadership, particularly the SDA. On November 21, the 11th
anniversary of Dayton, we are holding a series of events
designed to highlight U.S. commitment to Bosnia and the
importance of constitutional reform to the country's
Euro-Atlantic aspirations. In connection with these events,
we also propose a statement from the Secretary outlining our
hopes for Bosnia and our bilateral relationship as well as
urging reforms and adoption of the constitutional reform
package.


10. (C) In addition to events associated with the Dayton
Anniversary, we plan the following:

-- Embassy officials continue to work behind the scenes to
secure support of political party leaders and MPs -
particularly the Bosniak parties - in advance of government
formation.
-- Embassy media effort to rebut Silajdzic anti-reform
propaganda and shore up support within the SDA.
-- Outreach to BiH civil society groups to build public
support for the amendments. OHR has suggested a panel
discussion on the benefits of the U.S.-brokered package to
ease Bosniak, particularly SDA, anxieties. The panel would
include three members of the HighRep's informal advisory body
on constitutional reform.
-- Coordinated messages by U.S., HighRep, EU and Peace
Implementation Council Steering Board in support of
amendments.


11. (C) As in the past, Washington efforts are crucial to our
constitutional reform agenda, particularly given attempts by
opponents of constitutional reform to argue that the Embassy
is misrepresenting USG policy on the issue. With this in
mind,

-- Continued media efforts, such as DAS DiCarlo's November 9
VOA interview, by senior Washington officials.
-- Visit by A/S Fried to BiH at an appropriate time to lobby
publicly and privately in support of constitutional reform.
-- Messages from senior Dept officials and other influential
former USG officials to key Bosnian political party leaders
and to the public, including the Secretary's Dayton
Anniversary Statement.
-- Visit by the newly elected members of the Presidency to
Washington to hear directly senior USG views about
constitutional reform.
MCELHANEY