Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06SARAJEVO2717
2006-10-31 14:55:00
SECRET
Embassy Sarajevo
Cable title:  

BOSNIA AND NATO: THE CASE FOR PFP MEMBERSHIP

Tags:  PREL PGOV MARR BK 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO5272
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV
DE RUEHVJ #2717/01 3041455
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 311455Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4735
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CDRUSANATO AFSOUTHBN NAPLES IT IMMEDIATE
RUFOAOA/USNIC SARAJEVO IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 002717 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR (DICARLO),D (SMITH),P (BAME),EUR/SCE (HOH,
SAINZ, FOOKS),S/WCI, AND EUR/RPM (BROTZEN),NSC FOR BRAUN,
USNIC FOR WIGHTMAN, OSD FOR JONES, USNATO FOR SHAFFER,
AFSOUTH FOR CURRAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA AND NATO: THE CASE FOR PFP MEMBERSHIP

REF: A) SARAJEVO 1773 B) SARAJEVO 2259

Classified By: Amb. Douglas McElhaney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 002717

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR (DICARLO),D (SMITH),P (BAME),EUR/SCE (HOH,
SAINZ, FOOKS),S/WCI, AND EUR/RPM (BROTZEN),NSC FOR BRAUN,
USNIC FOR WIGHTMAN, OSD FOR JONES, USNATO FOR SHAFFER,
AFSOUTH FOR CURRAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA AND NATO: THE CASE FOR PFP MEMBERSHIP

REF: A) SARAJEVO 1773 B) SARAJEVO 2259

Classified By: Amb. Douglas McElhaney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (S) Summary. As we approach the NATO Riga Summit, we
think that the time is right to consider admittance of Bosnia
to the Partnership for Peace (PfP). With the implementation
of defense reform legislation, Bosnia has met the technical
requirements for PfP membership. Bosnia has made substantial
strides in reaching full cooperation with the International
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY). It is highly
unlikely that the two remaining major persons indicted for
war crimes (PIFWCS) are on Bosnian soil or have been for
anytime in the past two years and we see little more that can
be done to squeeze the support networks. Most importantly,
Bosnia's PfP membership now would serve U.S. interests by
filling the security vacuum created by the departure of U.S.
and European troops, bolstering the forces for reform that
are critical to the country's long-term stability, and
keeping Bosnia focused "westward" as patience flags with the
slow march toward EU membership. End summary.

--------------
TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS MET
--------------


2. (C) Over the past year and a half, Bosnia has made
tremendous progress in standing up a unified and professional
armed forces. In its initial stages of implementation,
defense reform has created a force that meets the technical
requirements for PfP membership and which is also working
towards increasing inter-operability with NATO forces.
Defense reform was also a major step towards establishing a
lasting and stable security sector in Bosnia allowing the
draw down of the international military presence here.
Though the dissolution of the former entity armies was a
contentious issue for many Bosnian politicians, eventual PfP
and NATO membership was not. In fact, the strong U.S.
leadership and funding of the defense reform agenda and

Bosnia's hopes for increased Euro-Atlantic integration,
particularly PfP membership, have been the motivators that
continue to hold the fragile process together. There are no
doubts about PfP and NATO here -- public opinion is strongly
in favor.

--------------
SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS ON WAR CRIMES SUSPECTS
--------------


3. (S) The primary impediment to Bosnia's PfP accession has
been concern over its cooperation with ICTY. Namely, Bosnia
continues to be held accountable for the fact that Radovan
Karadzic has yet to be apprehended and face justice. Support
networks for Karadzic may still exist in Bosnia, but
aggressive prosecutions of organized crime networks connected
to him have substantially reduced that support. We have
heard that the ICTY Chief Special Prosecutor recently
reported that she had information that Karadzic was in the
Republika Srpska (RS). However, we and our interlocutors have
no credible intelligence information that can substantiate
this assertion. Furthermore, we are aware of no USG or
third-country government information that indicates that
Karadzic, or fellow PIFWC Ratko Mladic, have been present in
Bosnia during the past 24 months. State law enforcement
authorities (i.e., SIPA, State Border Service, State
Intelligence and Security Agency, Foreigners Affairs Service
and the Bonsia and Herzegovina Prosecutors Office) have made
high-level assurances that they have the capacity and the
willingness to act in coordination with their counterpars in
neighboring countries should Karadzic or Mldic enter Bosnian
territory.


4. (S) The vast ajority of Bosnian politicians and the
public strongly support vigorous efforts to bring war
crimials to justice. To that end, Republika Srpska leaders
declared on November 21, in the presence of Secretary Rice,
that remaining ICTY indictees should be brought to justice, a
clear turnaround in their position. Although ICTY Court
President Pocar wrote in the October 2006 Annual Report to
the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) that the
Prosecutor "has been especially disappointed with the failure
by Serbia and the Republika Srpska to trace and arrest
outstanding fugitives," the ICTY Chief Special Prosecutor's
June 2006 statement to the UNSC contradicts this. In that

SARAJEVO 00002717 002 OF 003


statement, the Special Prosecutor, while urging further
efforts, nevertheless acknowledged that RS cooperation with
the ICTY has improved significantly over the past two years.


5. (S) From 2004-2005, with the cooperation of the RS
Ministry of Interior, Serbia transferred 14 indictees to the
ICTY. Bosnian Serb members of state-level institutions also
played a pivotal role in securing the Russian transfer of
PIFWC Dragan Zelenovic to Bosnia and then onto the Hague. RS
Prime Minister Dodik's government recently ended the
long-time practice of providing stipends from the RS budget
to families of indictees on trial in The Hague. Dodik and
other RS officials have repeatedly assured the USG that the
RS wants to see Karadzic and Mladic held accountable in The
Hague for their crimes (reftel A). Dodik also publicly
criticized both men, underscoring that his government wants
to see them brought before the Hague Tribunal. He delivered
this message to RS voters during the recent election campaign
and to the Serb public during visits to Belgrade.

--------------
DODIK/RS CLEAR ON ICTY RESPONSIBILITIES
--------------


6. (SBU) In an October 27 conversation with Ambassador
McElhaney, RS Premier Dodik reiterated his total commitment
to cooperation with ICTY and outlined his government,s
actions to secure the transfer of fugitive indictees Radovan
Karadzic and Stojan Zupljanin, as well as efforts to uproot
their support networks. In both the Karadzic and Zupljanin
cases, Dodik said the RS police are offering cash for
information on their whereabouts. In addition, on the
Karadzic case, Dodik said his government was working with the
Karadzic family to affect his surrender to ICTY. Dodik said
that the RS police are monitoring family members of fugitive
indictee Stojan Zupljanin as well, hoping to involve them in
a similar effort leading to his surrender and transfer to
ICTY.


7. (SBU) Dodik said that he had pledged to Serbian officials
that, if they had credible information on the whereabouts of
fugitive indictees but lacked the ability to arrest them for
political reasons, he was prepared to dispatch RS police to
Serbia, to render the fugitives to Bosnia and to then
formally arrest and transfer them. Dodik said that in
response to the most recent requests from ICTY, his
government was redoubling its efforts against the support
nets of fugitive indictees. (NOTE: On October 27 Momcilo
Mandic, former head of Privredna Banka Srpsko Sarjevo and
major financier of the fugitive supportnetwork, was
convicted of fraud and financial crmes and sentenced to nine
years in jail. END NOTE)

--------------
PERIOD OF TRANSITION LEAVES A VACUUM
--------------


8. (C) Bosnia is currently facing its greatest period of
transition since the end of the war. The U.S. and its
European partners have announced plans to reduce both our
political and military presence in the country, with a
corresponding amount of authority transferring into local
hands. By the end of 2006, all U.S. forces will be
withdrawn. While these draw down decisions have been driven
by Bosnia's successes in the past decade, such as defense
reform, substantial anxiety remains among the local
population, for whom the period of conflict is far from a
distant memory. The public responded to the announcement
that the U.S. was withdrawing most of its remaining troops
with particular unease, fearing that the resulting security
vacuum will undermine the peace and security they have
enjoyed for the past ten years, and questioning whether
Bosnia has a future inside Euro-Atlantic institutions. At
the same time, public faith in the EU is declining as
Bosnians realize that even after an SAA, an SAA that is
likely to be delayed well into 2007, EU membersQp is
probably a decade away. Recent European announcements from
Commission President Barroso and others about a pause in
further enlargement has left Bosnian politicians wondering
whether their aspirations for integration into Euro-Atlantic
institutions will be realized.


9. (C) Too, Kosovo remains on the radar screen here. We
expect some more difficult sledding over the next months as

SARAJEVO 00002717 003 OF 003


Belgrade prepares itself for Kosovo's independence. We have
seen how, already, Kosovo has played into the hands of those
in Banja Luka and Belgrade who would use the pretext of
Kosovo independence to stir unrest among Serbs here. A step
towards clear association with NATO would go a long way
during this period to discourage talk here of referenda to
disconnect Republika Srpska from BiH. Srpska's military
leaders, integrating into the new Bosnian army, are fully in
favor of PfP, and the advantages it will offer.

--------------
COMMENT: NO TIME TO HOLD BOSNIA BACK
--------------


10. (C) Over the past decade, huge U.S. political, military
and economic investments in Bosnia have brought significant
and positive returns. The U.S. has used all resources at its
disposal to firmly move Bosnia down the path of recovery and
solidify the gains of peace and stability in the Western
Balkans. We can point to the successes in creating
democratic structures, functioning government institutions,
strong national law enforcement agencies and a single Armed
Forces as lasting achievements of our engagement in Bosnia.
But, while we acknowledge that success has driven our
decision to draw down our presence in Bosnia, many more tough
reform decisions await Bosnian leaders in the near term.
Important and lasting constitutional reforms are necessary to
create a viable and coherent state structure. Police and
economic reform must also proceed. We need to protect the
U.S. investment in Bosnia and ensure that the difficult
process of reform continues if Bosnia is to take its place in
a Europe that is free, prosperous and at peace.


11. (C) With the Office of the High Representative due to
close and EU membership a distant and unsure prospect, we
believe that Bosnian membership in PfP can fill the
political/security void created by NATO's departure and
EUFOR's draw down as well as provide a crucial Euro-Atlantic
anchor for Bosnia. Without it, defense reform, an important
achievement of U.S. engagement in Bosnia and key element of
the U.S. policy goal of lasting peace and stability in the
region, will likely see only halting and incomplete progress
in the coming years. Furthermore, Bosnia has objectively met
the technical criteria for PfP membership, and, we think, has
fully cooperated with ICTY within its capabilities. In sum,
an offer of PfP membership at the Riga Summit could go a long
way in solidifying our gains to date, and put new energy
behind our efforts to drive the Bosnian reform agenda
forward. End comment.

MCELHANEY