BOSNIA ON ELECTION EVE - EVOLUTION, REVOLUTION,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 002307

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR (DICARLO),EUR/SCE, P (BAME); NSC FOR BRAUN;
OSD FOR FLORY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA ON ELECTION EVE - EVOLUTION, REVOLUTION,
AND CONFUSION

REF: A. SARAJEVO 2280

B. SARAJEVO 2279

C. SARAJEVO 2277

D. SARAJEVO 2160

E. SARAJEVO 2060

F. SARAJEVO 1962

G. SARAJEVO 1916

H. SARAJEVO 1891

I. SARAJEVO 1852

J. SARAJEVO 2305

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Classified By: Ambassador Douglas L. McElhaney. Reaons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is the final in a series of planned pre-election
telegrams.


2. (C) SUMMARY: Bosnians go to the polls in two days, October
1, to elect their national and entity governments (Ref E).
International observers and Bosnian officials expect an
orderly and fair election, though lingering concerns about
fraud exist in parts of the country (Ref A and C).
Preliminary results will be available at midnight that
evening, but in the past these have not always been reliable.
At noon on October 2, the Central Election Commission will
release final vote tallies. Going into election weekend, the
race for the Bosniak member of the Tri-Presidency, which has
been marked by a shift in Bosniak politics to the right, is
too close to call. The final days of the campaign may have
seen a shift of momentum in favor of the incumbent, Sulejman
Tihic, however. Among the Serbs, Milorad Dodik's Alliance of
Independent Social Democrats appears poised for a big win
that would sweep his opponents, the Serb Democratic Party,
from power for the first time since 1991. The Croat picture
is confused. Pro- and anti-constitutional reform parties are
duking it out in what amounts to the first truly competitive
contest among Croats since 1991. Victories by more
nationalist candidates among the Bosniaks and Croats will
complicate our efforts to restart constitutional reform talks
after the elections as well as our broader reform agenda over
the longer-term. An extended period of negotiations aimed at
forming coalition governments may also dominate post-election
politics. Our immediate post election challenge may be
keeping issues on an otherwise crowded political agenda in
order to ensure that we are ready to press ahead once the
dust settles. END SUMMARY.

Bosniaks: Moving to the Right
--------------


3. (SBU) Party for BiH (SBiH) leader and candidate for the
Bosniak member of the Tri-Presidential Haris Silajdzic has
staked his candidacy on opposition to the March package of
constitutional amendments. He has also skillfully exploited
Serbian nationalist campaign rhetoric by Alliance of
Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) leader Milorad Dodik to
raise doubts among Bosniak voters about the ability of his
principal opponent, Party for Democratic Action (SDA)
Sulejman Tihic, to protect their interests (Ref E and F).
For much of the campaign, Reis Ceric, the leader of Bosnia's
Islamic Community, and Dnevni Avaz, a leading Sarajevo-based
daily, have tacitly supported Silajdzic and provided
important momentum to his Presidential bid.


4. (SBU) The anti-Tihic rhetoric from the Reis and Dnevi Avaz
has cooled over the past week, however, after Bakir
Izetbegovic, SDA Vice President and son of revered former
President Alija Izetbegovic, broke an inexplicably long
public silence and praised Tihic's work ethic and leadership.
And in recent days, Avaz has featured more favorable stories
on Tihic, and on September 28, the paper published a
full-page color ad for the Tihic campaign. In the meantime,
Tihic has sought to counter Silajdzic with his own
nationalist rhetoric, notably his defense of former Bosnian
Fifth Army Commander Dudakovic, who Serbs accuse of war
crimes (Ref I). Tihic has also campaigned tirelessly among
ordinary Bosniak voters in an effort to exploit his image as
a "man of the people" compared to the urbane and aloof
Silajdzic. The upshot: two days before the elections, most
observers give Silajdzic a slight edge, but consider the race
for the Bosniak member of the Tri-Presidency too close to
call.


5. (SBU) Few people believe Silajdzic has long coattails,

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however. As a consequence, most observers expect the
relative balance of power between the SDA and SBiH in the
State-level House of Representatives (10 seats to 6,
respectively) to remain the same. The Social Democratic
Party (SDP) might pick up a seat in the HoR, but even so, it
would remain the smallest of the three major Bosniak parties
in parliament. Nonetheless, the SDP would be large enough to
be a potential oalition partner for the SDA. The Bosniak
political picture is less clear at the Federation and
cantonal levels, where local issues and personalities may
drive outcomes. Rural voters and those from smaller Bosniak
cities could stay with the SDA or embrace Bosniak nationalist
pitches if the sum of their fears out weighs their
traditional loyalties. If the latter, this would impact the
balance of forces among the Bosniak caucus in the State-level
House of Peoples (Ref I).

Serbs: All Hail the Conquering Hero
--------------


6. (SBU) Within the Republika Srpska (RS),pre-election
prognostications are not focused on what party will win the
most seats in the State-level HoR or the RS National Assembly
(RSNA). Everyone agrees that Dodik's SNSD will defeat
current RS President Dragan Cavic's Serb Democratic Party
(SDS). The consuming political question is how big Dodik's
victory will be. According to a USAID-funded poll, the Serb
electorate perceives Dodik as the man best positioned to
secure the RS's future by battling crime and corruption and
implementing economic reforms. The same experts predict,
paradoxically, that Dodik's command of the RS political stage
and his party's growing lead over the SDS could drive SNSD
turn out up (Note: Generally, experts predict an overall
turnout comparable to 2002, approximately 55%. End Note).


7. (SBU) During the final week of the campaign, Dodik's
confidence has been almost palpable. He has increasingly
talked as if he expects to govern the RS, occasionally
hinting that he might do so without coalition partners. He
has also stressed that SNSD expected to play a role in
State-level government commensurate with its electoral
success (i.e., as Chair of the Council of Ministers). OHR
HighRep Schwarz-Schilling's comments in Vienna that he may
sanction Dodik if he plans an RS referendum rallied Serb
voters to his side providing him with additional momentum
going into the last week of the campaign. Two days before
the election, SNSD appears poised to grab the Serb member of
the Tri-Presidency and put Cavic out of a job by winning the
RS Presidency. While winning an outright majority in the
RSNA may be a bridge too far for SNSD, a revolution in RS
politics appears to be in the offing.

Croats: Man Versus Machine
--------------


8. (SBU) If Bosniak politics is evolving and Serb politics
are poised for a revolution, confusion reigns among the
Croats. Since 1991, the Croatian Democratic Union of
Bosnia-Herzegovina (HDZ-BiH) has dominated Croat politics,
but the party split in March over constitutional reform. At
the time, the split did not appear fatal, but in September
the new party, HDZ-1990, was openly endorsed by Croatian PM
Sanader and tacitly endorsed by Cardinal Puljic (Ref B).
Since then, HDZ-1990 and its anti-constitutional reform
message have been picking up support in Herzegovina. With
Croat politics now in uncharted territory and a plethora of
smaller political parties seeking to capitalize on the
confusion and propel themselves into the first rank of Croat
politics, few in Herzegovina are comfortable making
predictions about the election's outcome.


9. (SBU) Nonetheless, two days before the election, Ivo Miro
Jovic and Bozo Ljubic, the HDZ-BiH and HDZ-1990 candidates
for the Croat member of the Tri-Presidency, are publicly
perceived as running neck and neck, and many observers
believe the two parties will split the traditional 5/6 Croat
seats in the HoR among them. If HDZ-1990 is relying on Croat
nationalism and high-profile public endorsements to carry its
cause, HDZ-BiH is hoping its well-established and efficient
political machine will prevail in the end. At the local
level, in the races for the cantonal assemblies, this could
be the case. As with Bosniak politics, the outcome in the
cantons will impact the composition of the Croat caucus in

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the House of Peoples, potentially cementing in place a
nationalist blocking majority.


10. (SBU) Another wild card in Croat politics is Social
Democratic Party (SDP) Zeljko Komsic's candidacy for the
Croat member of the Tri-Presidency (Ref B). Anxiety is
growing among Croat parties and voters that the SDP's
traditionally loyal voters, coupled with multiple candidacies
among the Croat parties themselves will propel Komsic to
victory. The Sarajevo-based Komsic does not need to win all
110,000 to 140,000 projected SDP voters if Jovic and Ljubic
split the approximately 150,000 to 180,000 Croat electorate
among themselves. This week, Zvonko Jurisic, Croat Party of
Rights (HSP) Tri-Presidency candidate, also reportedly began
a late surge, presumably at the expense of Jovic and Ljubic.
His gains, if real, would further split the Croat vote.
Efforts to rally Croat parties around a single candidate have
predictably failed amid clashes of competing egos.

Comment: What Does All This Mean
--------------


11. (C) Our immediate post-election priority remains
constitutional reform agenda. In that context, the most
significant October 1 electoral races are those for the
Bosniak and Croat members of the Tri-Presidency and the
contest between HDZ and HDZ-1990 for the hearts and minds of
Herzegovina. Silajdzic and Ljubic wins as well as a big
nigh for HDZ-1990 would certainly complicate constitutinal
reform. Over the longer term, these resultswould also
likely complicate the usual triangula negotiations required
to reach consensus on othr issues, such as police reform.
In any case, mixed results in the Federation coupled with a
clear Dodik win might herald a longer period of post-election
coalition building, which could consume politicians for weeks
(Ref J). Losses by the traditional "big three" of Bosnian
politics -- the SDA, HDZ, and SDS -- could/could also result
in leadership changes that further preoccupy the parties and
have a significant impact on the tone of Bosnian politics.
Imagine, for example, an SDA led by a more overtly
nationalist figure than the moderate Tihic. Our immediate
post election challenge may be keeping issues on an otherwise
crowded political agenda in order to ensure that we are ready
to press ahead once the dust settles.

MCELHANEY