Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06SARAJEVO2259
2006-09-27 06:53:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sarajevo
Cable title:  

AMBASSADOR'S TRAVEL HIGHLIGHTS CONTINUED U.S.

Tags:  PREL PGOV MARR BK 
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DE RUEHVJ #2259/01 2700653
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 270653Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4475
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUFOAOA/USNIC SARAJEVO PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SARAJEVO 002259 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR (DICARLO),D (SMITH),P (BAME),EUR/SCE (HOH,
SAINZ, FOOKS),AND EUR/RPM, NSC FOR BRAUN, USNIC FOR WEBER,
GREGORIAN, OSD FOR MARK JONES

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/26/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR BK
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S TRAVEL HIGHLIGHTS CONTINUED U.S.
MILITARY ENGAGEMENT IN BOSNIA AND EXPOSES SOME SHAKY
FOUNDATIONS OF DEFENSE REFORM


Classified By: Ambassador Douglas McElhaney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SARAJEVO 002259

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR (DICARLO),D (SMITH),P (BAME),EUR/SCE (HOH,
SAINZ, FOOKS),AND EUR/RPM, NSC FOR BRAUN, USNIC FOR WEBER,
GREGORIAN, OSD FOR MARK JONES

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/26/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR BK
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S TRAVEL HIGHLIGHTS CONTINUED U.S.
MILITARY ENGAGEMENT IN BOSNIA AND EXPOSES SOME SHAKY
FOUNDATIONS OF DEFENSE REFORM


Classified By: Ambassador Douglas McElhaney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. To focus public attention on continued U.S.
engagement in Bosnia after the announcement of the Eagle Base
drawdown, Ambassador and emboffs traveled September 14-21 to
headquarters of the BiH Armed Forces' (AFBiH) three new
multi-ethnic brigades and the training center for the AFBiH
Explosive Ordinance Disposal Unit (EOD) unit. Accompanied by
BiH Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Podzic and
Senior Military Representative, U.S. BG Weber, the
substantial press attention highlighted the solid progress
BiH has made in standing-up a single military force that is
responsible for stability and security within the country's
borders. The Ambassador's travels also laid bare several
concerns that might undermine the long term success of reform
efforts in the absence of a larger international security
umbrella, such as Bosnian participation in the Partnership
for Peace. END SUMMARY

-------------- --------------
HELO ROADSHOW HIGHLIGHTS CONTINUED U.S. ENGAGEMENT
-------------- --------------


2. (SBU) Traveling by U.S. Army UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter,
Ambassador and emboffs visited the headquarters of the three
new AFBiH multi-ethnic brigades in Banja Luka, Tuzla and
Capljina and the EOD unit in Glamoc on September 14, 18 and

21. Accompanied by BiH Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Gen. Sifet Podzic, the Ambassador's and BG Weber's presence
sent a strong political and public message that the United
States will remain deeply engaged in BiH despite the
withdrawal of U.S. forces from Eagle Base and that the U.S.
strongly supports Bosnia's integration into Euro-Atlantic
institutions. Both print and electronic media widely covered
the visits, and largely focused on our intended message.

--------------

REAL, VISIBLE PROGRESS...
--------------


3. (SBU) The visits also served to highlight the substantial
progress BiH has made in implementing defense reform in the
past year. The Ministry of Defense (MOD) was entirely
supportive of the agenda and used the opportunity to showcase
the advances in creating a single, unified AFBiH. Some of
the lasting images of the trips would have been unthinkable
18 months ago. In Banja Luka, at the former headquarters of
the Army of Republika Srpska, an honor guard, wearing the new
uniforms of the AFBiH and presenting the Bosnian flag, warmly
greeted Gen. Podzic, a Bosniak and former commander in the
Federation Army. At the new joint training facility at
Manjaca, the site of a prison camp during the war as well as
the notorious April 2005 incident in which Bosnian-Serb
recruits refused to take an oath of allegiance to BiH and
whistled during the BiH national anthem, Ambassador and
General Podzic received a briefing on the new AFBiH joint
training program that focused on increasing inter-operability
with NATO forces.


4. (SBU) The Ministry of Defense too has begun to implement
real and important changes that can be seen on the ground.
The deployment areas for the new army have been identified,
and facilities are being readied to house them. A unified
chain of command is in place, and commanders affirmed their
obligation to rely on the single, national MOD for any
orders. The EOD unit, which the U.S. trained and equipped,
is multi-ethnic and will soon deploy its fourth rotation to
support coalition efforts in Iraq.

--------------
... WITH MUCH MORE TO BE DONE
--------------


5. (C) It is also clear, however, that defense reform is a
process that will take substantial time to be fully realized.
The MOD has yet to make its key personnel decisions and
appointments, running dangerously close to not meeting its
October 1 deadline. To meet the requirements of the new
force structure plan, the MOD must cut approximately 2000
soldiers from its ranks, and this has proven to be a
particularly contentious process. This includes personnel
decisions about multi-ethnic commands for the new brigades,
the first step in integrating the units. The down-sizing,
coupled with open questions about recruitment in the new

SARAJEVO 00002259 002 OF 002


all-volunteer force, will effectively limit the ethnic
integration of the new brigades in the short-term (Comment:
Some experts believe the AFBiH may not be fully integrated
for 20 years. End Comment).


6. (C) Along with the remaining administrative and legal
hurdles, such as harmonizing pay scales, questions of
identity and loyalty linger. Some Bosniak commanders also
worry about the commitment of their Bosnian-Serb counterparts
to the reform process. General Podzic told the Ambassador
that the MOD would use the requirement for downsizing to
remove officers with questionable loyalties to the state
structure. Other visuals from the trips are illuminating in
this regard. In Banja Luka, our advance team had to cover a
large "Army of the Republika Srpska" sign above the
headquarters main door and scrubbed the brigade "museum" of
items from the 1992-1995 war. Portraits of famous historical
Serbian military leaders and a large and particularly graphic
mural depicting the 1389 Battle of Kosovo remained for the
visit. At the training facility in Manjaca, the Bosnian
national flag was flying for the Ambassador's visit, with a
second, adjacent flagpole temporarily empty. In Capljina,
army commanders had originally planned for the Ambassador to
visit a monument to a Croatian unit that had fought in the
Second World War as well as the Catholic chapel on the base.
These episodes suggest Bosnian-Serbs and Croats remain
somewhat conflicted about their loyalty to the state's new
defense institutions.

--------------
COMMENT: U.S. DEPARTURE LEAVES A VACUUM
--------------


7. (C) A common theme running throughout the visits was the
crucial role that the United States continues to play in BiH,
especially in the defense reform process. Albeit for
different reasons, all parties in the defense reform process
recognize that the United States' political power, military
capabilities, and credibility in BiH were the glue that held
the reform together. On the Bosniak side in particular, a
general anxiety exists regarding the impending U.S. departure
from Eagle Base in Tuzla. During the trips, we consistently
focused on continued U.S. military cooperation and engagement
with BiH and our retention of "over the horizon"
capabilities. Despite that, it is difficult to overcome the
perception that the U.S. is "abandoning" Bosnia. As a
consequence, the drawdown from Eagle Base will leave a
perceived security vacuum among Bosnians that could shake the
unsettled foundations of the reform process.


8. (C) While the European Union will retain a military force
(EUFOR),it is beginning to draw down to as few as several
thousand by the end of the year. Largely as a result of the
UNPROFOR experience during the war, Bosnians openly speak of
their lack of confidence in the Europeans and do not see
EUFOR as a real stabilizing force in the country. It does
not help that the Greeks, who are slated to backfill the
Austrians in EUFOR's Tuzla deployment, are reportedly telling
people here that they have no intention of taking over the
EUFOR presence there. Ideally, the new AFBiH should take a
lead role in ensuring a secure environment, but it remains
too early in the defense reform process for this to happen.
To provide Bosnians with a more tangible political indication
of our continued interest in their stability and security and
with a mechanism that would act as a continued driver of a
defense reform process, the U.S. should maintain its premier
role in defense reform. We note too in advance of the NATO
Riga Summit that expectations here about Bosnia's PfP
membership are rising.
MCELHANEY