Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06SARAJEVO2140
2006-09-14 15:46:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sarajevo
Cable title:  

BOSNIA - KEEPING THE OHR HORSE IN THE BARN ON

Tags:  PGOV PINR PREL BK EU 
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FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4389
INFO RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 002140 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR, EUR/SCE, P (BAME); OSD FOR FLORY; NSC FOR
BRAUN; PRISTINA PLEASE PASS TO EUR/DAS DICARLO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2015
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL BK EU
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - KEEPING THE OHR HORSE IN THE BARN ON
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM

REF: SARAJEVO 1980

Classified By: Ambassador Douglas L. McElhaney. Reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 002140

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR, EUR/SCE, P (BAME); OSD FOR FLORY; NSC FOR
BRAUN; PRISTINA PLEASE PASS TO EUR/DAS DICARLO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2015
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL BK EU
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - KEEPING THE OHR HORSE IN THE BARN ON
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM

REF: SARAJEVO 1980

Classified By: Ambassador Douglas L. McElhaney. Reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
.


1. (C) SUMMARY: The Ambassador met with OHR High
Representative Schwartz-Schilling on September 13 at the
HighRep's request to discuss constitutional reform, police
reform, and the transition from his position as High
Representative to the EU Special Representative. On
constitutional reform, Schwartz-Schilling proposed moving
quickly to phase II talks under EUSR lead, if the U.S. could
not revive the March reform package after Bosnia's October
elections. The Ambassador questioned Schwartz-Schilling's
strategy and timeline, stressing as well that the U.S.
expected to continue to play a leading role on constitutional
reform. On police reform, Schwartz-Schilling urged the U.S.
to convince Dodik to be more flexible, noting U.S. influence
over Dodik was greater than the EU's and OHR's. The
Ambassador responded that progress required the EU to set
clear bottom lines and get tough on the issue. Finally,
Schwartz-Schilling said that if he was to accomplish all that
was required to keep Bosnia on the Euro-Atlantic path and was
to stay on in Bosnia through 2008 as he intended, then he
needed to retain Bonn Powers as EUSR. To the Embassy
Schwartz-Schilling's proposals on constitutional reform loks
like an attempt to secure a personal mandate prior to the
February PIC that helps him secure his future beyond summer
2007 when OHR closes down. Regardless, we worry that
Schwartz-Schilling's "discrete" activity on constitutional
reform is increasingly indiscrete and that it risks
undercutting the prospects for reviving the March package.
It may be time for a frank exchange with Brussels on its
policy to determine if the EU has indeed signed up to
Schwartz Schilling's approach, as he implied, and if so to
make its dangers clear. END SUMMARY

Constitutional Reform: "We Must Move Quickly to Phase II"
-------------- --------------



2. (C) Schwartz-Shilling opened the meeting by underscoring
his interest in coordinating his approach on constitutional
reform closely with the U.S. With that in mind, he outlined
his plans for moving constitutional reform forward. He was,
he said, prepared to support U.S. efforts to push the
U.S.-brokered March package of constitutional amendments
through the next parliament "as far as possible." He
suggested that the parties should not be allowed to open up
what was already agreed, but then added that slight
adjustments and/or technical fixes might be appropriate in
some areas such as human rights. Regardless,
Schwartz-Schilling said, a quick decision after elections
about the prospects for the March package was critical. If
it was impossible, for whatever reason, to secure its
passage, then the international community should move
directly to phase II talks under his lead, as EUSR.
Schwartz-Schilling argued that this approach would ensure
"clarity" on constitutional reform before the February 2007
PIC, which needed to make a decision about OHR's mandate.


3. (C) Schwartz-Schilling explained that he had already
formed an "informal" advisory group, which included Jim
O'Brien and Thomas Maekert (among others),to discuss phase
II, and that the groups had met twice already (outside
Bosnia). He told the Ambassador that the group would meet
again in Vienna on September 25, and he asked whether a State
Legal Office representative could participate.
Schwartz-Schilling said his preliminary thinking, based on
exchanges with the advisory group and OHR staff work, was
that phase II needed to address two key issues: 1) entity
voting within the State-level House of Representatives
(something he said Haris Silajdzic had stressed in an
exchange with him),and 2) clarification of the division of
competencies between the State and entity levels of
government. Language on competencies must not undermine the
"EU clause" in the March package that provides the State the
responsibility to negotiate with the EU and adopt and
implement all measures necessary for implementation of GBiH
commitments to the European Union, he added.


4. (C) The Ambassador responded that the U.S. intended to
continue to exercise a leadership role on constitutional

SARAJEVO 00002140 002 OF 003


reform. This included making a post-election effort to
revive the March package. He stressed that OHR/EUSR signals
that it planned to launch phase II talks early would
undermine the prospects for the March package. The
Ambassador expressed concern that Schwartz-Schilling was
already having conversations with Bosnian political leaders
about phase II, as he recently admitted. The best thing to
do right now was to keep quiet and avoid providing political
leaders with an excuse to jettison the hard fought
compromises contained in the March package. The Ambassador
also questioned Schwartz-Schilling's assertion that the fate
of the March agreement and a decision to move to phase II had
to be decided shortly after the election, noting that Bosnia
might not have a government until early 2007. The Ambassador
stressed that the U.S. had not made any decisions about how
to proceed with phase II talks. This included how to
structure the talks and who should lead them. He wondered
how U.S. interest in playing a leadership role could be
squared with an EU-led process that took direction solely
from Brussels. Finally, with regard to a State Legal
representative, the Ambassador noted that it would be
difficult for a USG employee to serve on an informal advisory
group to the HighRep at this point.

Police Reform: "The U.S. Must Make Dodik Agree"
-------------- --


5. (C) Turning to police reform, Schwartz-Schilling
underscored his intention to begin political talks
immediately after the elections even while the Police
Directorate continued its "professional assessment" regarding
a new policing structure for Bosnia (reftel). He asserted
that he had sent several of his advisors to Brussels to
hammer out an agreed approach on police reform with the
Council and the Commission. These exchanges convinced him
that the EU was finally uniting around a common strategy on
police reform, he said. It was important that the U.S. play
a more active role on police reform, he added, arguing that
the U.S. had to use its "special relationship with (Republika
Srpska PM) Dodik" to persuade Dodik that there would be
"serious consequences" unless he compromised on police reform.


6. (C) The Ambassador responded by noting that he regularly
discussed police reform with Dodik, reminding him that the RS
had failed to present serious proposals to the Police
Directorate and that Dodik needed to engage constructively.
That said, from the American perspective, the EU, and by
extension OHR, had failed to come up with clear bottom-lines
on police reform. Nor was it at all clear what sanction,
beyond delaying the Stabilization and Association Agreement,
the EU plans, if Dodik continues to block police reform.
Dodik was hearing conflicting messages from Brussels and
Sarajevo on this issue, the Ambassador noted, adding that the
U.S. could not argue EU conditionality more forcefully than
the Europeans themselves. Brussels and the HighRep needed to
play a more active role on police reform and deliver clearer,
and tougher, messages itself, he concluded.

From OHR to EUSR: "Give Me Bonn Powers"
--------------


7. (C) In a brief one-on-one exchange at the conclusion of
the meeting, Schwartz-Schilling told the Ambassador that the
summer 2007 transition from OHR to EUSR was crucial as a sign
to Bosnians that Europe was their future. The Commission, he
claimed, was concerned about whether Bosnia was ready to
function without OHR supervision, adding that he believed
this was possible provided the PIC found some way to maintain
the Bonn Powers after summer 2007. These might be vested in
him by allowing him to keep his OHR hat and a very small
office of "OHR staff" funded by the EU. This arrangement
would provide the U.S. with a greater voice in his day-to-day
work than it might otherwise have under a purely EUSR
operation, he stressed, adding that he was prepared to stay
on until 2008 to see this work, particularly constitutional
reform, through to the end. He closed by stressing that he
was not asking for formal U.S. views on this proposal, but
suggested it might be discussed on the margins of the October
19-20 PIC.

Comment
--------------

SARAJEVO 00002140 003 OF 003




8. (C) Schwartz-Schilling increasingly sees himself as
leading, on behalf of the EU, Bosnia's constitutional reform
process, and he appears prepared to take what we judge to be
poorly calculated political risks to secure that leadership
position. His willingness to raise constitutional reform
with Bosnian politicians now, despite earlier promises that
he would not do so, could derail U.S. efforts to revive
constitutional reform post-election without achieving the
grand bargain on more sweeping reforms Schwartz-Schilling
claims he seeks. Throughout Schwartz Schilling implied that
he had Brussels imprimatur for his constitutional reform
strategy. Frankly, we doubt it, just as we doubt -- given
Schwartz Schilling's plea to us on Dodik -- that Brussels has
settled on a clear strategy for advancing police reform. We
have heard rumors that Brussels is actually unhappy with
Schwartz-Schilling's performance (for good reason),and his
approach to constitutional reform and suggestion that he keep
Bonn Powers may be part of a larger strategy to lock himself
into job for him for the next two years. Regardless, we
believe it would be worthwhile for senior U.S. officials to
approach Solana and his staff to determine just what Brussels
is thinking about the way ahead in Bosnia and to make clear
that the March package of constitutional amendments should
not be blithely risked in high stakes gamble to launch phase
II talks before it is appropriate and without U.S.
participation.
MCELHANEY