Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06SARAJEVO2060
2006-09-06 10:16:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sarajevo
Cable title:  

BOSNIA: NATIONAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN CHARACTERIZED

Tags:  PGOV BK 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2084
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHVJ #2060/01 2491016
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 061016Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4320
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RUFOAOA/USNIC SARAJEVO PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SARAJEVO 002060 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT. FOR EUR (DICARLO),D (SMITH),P (BAME),EUR/SCE (HOH,
SAINZ, FOOKS) AND EUR PPD, NSC FOR BRAUN, USNIC FOR WEBER,
GREGORIAN, OSD FOR FLORY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2016
TAGS: PGOV BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA: NATIONAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN CHARACTERIZED
BY DIVIDED BOSNIAKS, CROATS, AND SERBS

REF: A. SARAJEVO 2039

B. SARAJEVO 1762

Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR DOUGLAS L. MCELHANEY, REASONS 1
.4 (B) AND (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SARAJEVO 002060

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT. FOR EUR (DICARLO),D (SMITH),P (BAME),EUR/SCE (HOH,
SAINZ, FOOKS) AND EUR PPD, NSC FOR BRAUN, USNIC FOR WEBER,
GREGORIAN, OSD FOR FLORY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2016
TAGS: PGOV BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA: NATIONAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN CHARACTERIZED
BY DIVIDED BOSNIAKS, CROATS, AND SERBS

REF: A. SARAJEVO 2039

B. SARAJEVO 1762

Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR DOUGLAS L. MCELHANEY, REASONS 1
.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: September 1, the first official day of the
campaign season in Bosnia and Herzegovina, was characterized
by high-profile events emphasizing ethnic interests. Serb
and Croat parties are seeking the support of their
electorates by courting patrons in Belgrade and Zagreb. The
Bosniak political debate is focused on issues of Islamic
identity and the intersection of political and religious
spheres. The common thread in the political discourse is
criticism of the March constitutional reform package as
candidates compete to be seen as the most reliable advocates
for their ethnic group's interests. For now, the pragmatic
approach to reform and capacity building that characterized
constitutional reform negotiations, and will be crucial for
Bosnia after the elections, has fallen victim to
lowest-common-denominator electioneering. END SUMMARY.

RS Premier Dodik in Belgrade
--------------


2. (C) Republika Srpska (RS) Premier Milorad Dodik launched
his electoral campaign with a visit to Belgrade August 31 and
September 1, where he met with Serbian President Boris Tadic
and Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica. Despite conciliatory
joint statements with his Serbian colleagues on their shared
commitment to the prosecution of war criminals, most of
Dodik,s comments were directed towards a pan-Serb
constituency and designed to appeal to RS-based Serb
nationalism. Dodik endorsed Belgrade,s position on Kosovo,
stating that his government believes Kosovo should remain a
part of the Republic of Serbia. He added that citizens of
the RS were watching Kosovo negotiations closely and a
decision creating an independent Kosovo would lead to
"discontent" in the RS. Dodik also joined Serbian PM
Kostunica,s condemnation of Chief Kosovo Negotiator Martti
Ahtisaari,s statements on the collective responsibility of
the Serb people, saying that as a UN representative,

Ahtisaari,s role is to "conduct negotiations in an unbiased
way and to represent both sides equally."


3. (C) Dodik,s appeal to RS nationalism, including his
regular references to a possible referendum on RS
independence, is prompting other RS-based political parties
to ratchet up their nationalist rhetoric as well. Though
Serb Democratic Party leader and RS President Dragan Cavic's
public statements remain relatively conciliatory, SDS Vice
President and SDS Tri-Presidency candidate Mladen Bosic
asserted last week that the RS electorate no longer supported
the package of constitutional reforms agreed to in March. He
went on to suggest that post-election constitutional reform
negotiations should start anew. On August 30, the Serbian
Radical Party of Republika Srpska (SRS-RS),with support from
SDS, sought to convene a special session of the RS National
Assembly (RSNA) to debate several politically explosive
issues related to the RS,s status within BiH, including
constitutional reform and police reform (ref A).

Bosnian Croats Compete for Zagreb,s Blessing
--------------


4. (C) As Dodik and his colleagues look to Belgrade,
Bosnia,s Croat parties have been vying for endorsements from
Zagreb, which they see as critical to energizing apathetic
Croat voters (Note: Only 28% of Bosnian Croats voted in the
2002 national election. End Note). Croatian Democratic Union
of Bosnia-Hercegovina-1990 (HDZ-1990),which split from
HDZ-BiH over constitutional reform and built its campaign
around opposition to the March package, has aggressively
courted Zagreb, particularly Croatian PM Ivo Sanader. For
example, in mid-August HDZ-1990 leaders Bozo Ljubic and
Martin Raguz attended mass with Sanader in the southern
Croatian town of Prolozac. Afterwards several Sanader
advisors appeared at HDZ-1990 election rallies. The
courtship paid its biggest dividend at the September 2-3
HDZ-1990 party conference when Sanader addressed the
gathering via video-link and wished Ljubic, Raguz and their
followers "election victory."


5. (C) HDZ-1990,s anti-constitutional reform rhetoric and

SARAJEVO 00002060 002 OF 002


its support from Zagreb have put HDZ-BiH and its leader
Dragan Covic on the defensive. According to press reports,
Covic is "desperately" trying to find political allies in
Croatia to offset Sanader,s support for HDZ-1990. Covic has
also steadily escalated his nationalist rhetoric. In a
meeting with us several weeks ago, Covic privately criticized
Sanader,s proposal to hold an international conference on
the future of BiH in Zagreb (ref. B),but early in the week
of August 28, Covic publicly endorsed it. (Note: Bosnians,
particularly Croats, interpret the Sanader initiative as an
implicit rejection of the March constitutional reform
package. End Note). Covic went a step further in an August
31 interview by claiming, "we, the Croats, will have our own
entity as well" and suggesting that he would seek an end to
entity voting when constitutional reform talks resumed after
the elections.

Tihic Versus Ceric
--------------


6. (C) On August 31, the Islamic Community (IC) leader Reis
Mustafa ef. Ceric chaired a session of the Riaset,
essentially a legislative body that consists of the Reis,
Muftis, Imams, and professors from Islamic schools. The
Riaset announced that the IC would not endorse any political
party or candidate. Despite this, and earlier promises not
to interfere in politics, the Reis has appeared at religious
ceremonies to which government leaders were not invited with
Party for BiH (SBiH) leader and Tri-Presidency candidate
Haris Silajdzic. The appearances with Silajdzic are often
coupled with the Reis, public criticism of the Bosniak
political leadership,s (read President Sulejman Tihic,s)
failure to defend Bosniak interests within BiH (i.e., during
constitutional reform talks). Several of Tihic,s allies
within the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) have begun to
fight back, however. In a letter subsequently leaked to the
press, SDA Main Board President Irfan Ajanovic criticized the
Reis for meddling in Bosniak politics and accused him of
being linked to organized crime.

Comment
--------------


7. (C) As this snapshot of current election-related events
makes clear, the general tone of the campaign (reported
reftels) has not improved. The major political parties
(except the Social Democratic Party) are neglecting
issues-based campaigning in favor of scapegoating ethnic and
religious rivals for the problems facing the country. Ten
years after Dayton we had hoped to see an expansion of
national political discourse, but what we see, in effect, is
three distinct campaigns. Unfortunately, much of the
campaign rhetoric has focused on criticism of the
constitutional reforms negotiated in March rather than
inter-ethnic civic or economic interests. This portends an
election that will have little to do with resolving questions
important to Bosnia,s Euro-Atlantic future, but rather
reinforcing longstanding patterns of fractious identity
politics.
MCELHANEY