BOSNIA - HIREP LAYS OUT POLICE REFORM STRATEGY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SARAJEVO 001980

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/SCE (HOH/FOOKS); OSD FOR FLORY; NSC FOR BRAUN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/2011
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL KCRM KJUS BI
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - HIREP LAYS OUT POLICE REFORM STRATEGY

REF: SARAJEVO 1747

Classified By: CDA Judith Cefkin. Reason 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: On August 24, OHR High Representative
Schwartz-Schilling and Head of the EU Police Mission Coppola
briefed key Ambassadors, including the U.S., about police
reform. Schwartz-Schilling announced that he planned to
conduct political negotiations on police reform, but only on
the basis of the Police Directorate's final report. Coppola
provided the Ambassadors with a copy of what he termed a
"bottom-line" organigram of what the Directorate was likely
to propose. He also outlined those areas where he thought
Serb interests might be accommodated in the negotiating end
game. END SUMMARY


2. (C) On August 24, High Representative (HiRep)
Schwartz-Schilling hosted the first of what he called a
series of informal meetings on police reform with "key"
members of the PIC Steering Board. Ambassador McElhaney and
British Ambassador Rycroft attended. The German and EU
Ambassadors were invited, but were out of town.
Schwartz-Schilling stressed the need for "total solidarity"
within the international community to bring police reform to
a successful conclusion. He also outlined his reply to a
July 19 letter from EU Common Foreign Security Policy HiRep
Javier Solana and Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn on
policing (copies of both faxed to EUR/SCE).

OHR's Negotiating Strategy
--------------


3. (C) Schwartz-Schilling maintained that his decision to
continue to pursue police reform through the Policing
Directorate had been the right one. Even though the
Republika Srpska (RS) member of the Directorate would now
only participate as an observer, there has still been
progress. With this in mind, he wanted the Directorate to
complete its work, now scheduled for November 30. This
report would provide the basis for OHR-sponsored political
discussions on police reform. Schwartz-Schilling explained
that he believed RS political leaders would soften their
position on police reform after the elections if SAA
conditionality were firmly applied. He will send a team to
Brussels in early September to outline his strategy and
ensure EU support.

A Bottom Line Document
--------------


4. (C) After Schwartz-Schilling concluded, Head of the EU
Police Mission Coppola handed out an organigram of Bosnia's
new police structure that he termed "the bottom-line
document" on police reform (faxed to EUR/SCE). The
organigram, which represents the work of the Directorate,
diagrams a two-tiered police structure -- state and local --
that would report to the BiH Ministry of Security. Core
functions, such as administration and forensics, would be
managed at the state level. Local police forces would
operate within districts, which have yet to be defined, and
would report to a Directorate for Coordination of local
Police at the state level.


5. (C) Coppola claimed that the Directorate's proposed
structure does not exclude any specific RS idea except for
maintaining the status quo. The RS could even keep its
Ministry of Interior (MoI),albeit stripped of its police
function, he said. The new structure is also not a "radical
attempt at centralization," Coppola claimed, adding that it
actually decentralizes many police functions within the RS by
giving local forces greater authority than they currently
enjoy vis-a-vis the MoI in Banja Luka. (Comment: All this
may be true, but the organigram does a poor job conveying
this. 75% of it is devoted to State-level police bodies. End
Comment).

Room for Negotiation
--------------


6. (C) Schwartz-Schilling and Coppola concluded their
presentation by underscoring that OHR has built some
negotiating room into the proposed new policing structure in
order to secure RS agreement. For example, OHR could agree
to locate several state level bodies in Banja Luka, and the
RS MoI could be given a role in policy-making on certain

SARAJEVO 00001980 002 OF 002


issues. Coppola also said that local police areas could be
drawn so that they "largely conform" to the inter-entity
boundary line, except in the Sarajevo region, where it
"simply made no technical sense" to split the area between
and RS and a Federation police district.


7. (C) Ambassadors McElhaney and Rycroft expressed concern
about some of OHR's proposed concessions, arguing that it
made more sense for OHR to hold firm on substantive issues
while conceding on procedural matters, such as the timing of
political negotiations that RS leaders are demanding.
Ambassador McElhaney added that conceding too much to the RS
risked alienating the Croats, who he predicted would be
reluctant to accept dismantling of the Canton police forces,
if the RS police remained essentially in tact. Based on
these comments, OHR agreed to take another look at its RS
negotiating strategy.
CEFKIN