Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06SARAJEVO1773
2006-08-07 08:03:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sarajevo
Cable title:  

CORRECTED COPY: RS OFFICIALS PLEDGE ICTY

Tags:  ICTY KAWC PHUM PGOV PREL BK 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2095
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHVJ #1773/01 2190803
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 070803Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4108
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0234
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 0099
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB PRIORITY 0220
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHDC PRIORITY
RUFOAOA/USNIC SARAJEVO PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 SARAJEVO 001773 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR (DICARLO),EUR/SCE (FOOKS, MITCHELL),L/EUR
(K. JOHNSON),D (SMITH),P (BAME),S/WCI (WILLIAMSON,
BERG),INR (BRAUM),USUN (WILLSON),THE HAGUE (SCHLIDGE, C.
JOHNSON),ZAGREB (SELINGER),BELGRADE (CAMPBELL),NSC FOR
BRAUN, USNIC FOR BOALS, OSD FOR FLORY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/02/2016
TAGS: ICTY KAWC PHUM PGOV PREL BK
SUBJECT: CORRECTED COPY: RS OFFICIALS PLEDGE ICTY
COOPERATION TO SWCI AMBASSADOR WILLIAMSON

REF: A. SARAJEVO 1751 B. BELGRADE 1149 C. SARAJEVO 1329

Classified By: Amb. Douglas McElhaney. Reason 1.5 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 SARAJEVO 001773

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR (DICARLO),EUR/SCE (FOOKS, MITCHELL),L/EUR
(K. JOHNSON),D (SMITH),P (BAME),S/WCI (WILLIAMSON,
BERG),INR (BRAUM),USUN (WILLSON),THE HAGUE (SCHLIDGE, C.
JOHNSON),ZAGREB (SELINGER),BELGRADE (CAMPBELL),NSC FOR
BRAUN, USNIC FOR BOALS, OSD FOR FLORY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/02/2016
TAGS: ICTY KAWC PHUM PGOV PREL BK
SUBJECT: CORRECTED COPY: RS OFFICIALS PLEDGE ICTY
COOPERATION TO SWCI AMBASSADOR WILLIAMSON

REF: A. SARAJEVO 1751 B. BELGRADE 1149 C. SARAJEVO 1329

Classified By: Amb. Douglas McElhaney. Reason 1.5 (b) and (d).


1. (U) This cable replaces Sarajevo 1751 (ref. A). This
cable has been cleared by S/WCI Ambassador Williamson's
office.

2. (U) Summary and Comment: On July 28 and from August 1-2
Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues Clint Williamson
met with GBiH and Republika Serpska (RS) officials in
Sarajevo and Banja Luka. Both GBiH and RS officials affirmed
their commitment to ICTY cooperation, and all agreed with
Ambassador Williamson's suggestion that their efforts would
benefit from regional coordination, welcoming S/WCI's
initiatives to assist in this regard. Nonetheless, Bosniak
and Serb politicians, as well as the executive and judicial
officials, stressed different issues in their meetings with
Ambassador Williamson. President Tihic said that BiH police
reform was critical to inter-entity and inter-state efforts
to apprehend war criminals, and was skeptical that Kostunica
was truly committed to implementing Serbia's plan to capture
Mladic. RS Premier Dodik saw ICTY cooperation as an avenue
for improving his relations with the international community.
He characterized the PIFWC support networks in the RS as
decimated by recent arrests. RS President Cavic portrayed
himself as a martyr, claiming that if he lost in the October
election it would be largely due to his support for ICTY
cooperation. RS Interior Minister Cadjo said it was unfair
place all responsibility for apprehensions on the RS, and
that State-level agencies also must pull their weight in the
hunt for PIFWCs. State Intelligence Agency Head Dzuvo said
apprehending PIFWCs was a political issue, suggesting that

Serbian authorities could deliver Mladic and Karadzic
whenever they wished. BiH State Court officials said that
sentencing inequities and lack of resources were the main
challenges facing the War Crimes Chamber.

3. (C) Comment: When it comes to PIFWC issues, BiH officials
know exactly what the international community wants to hear.
Therefore, it is no surprise that RS officials responded to
Ambassador Williamson's message about cooperation and
commitment with the same enthusiasm as the GBiH officials.
However, GBiH officials are clearly skeptical that the RS
government is genuinely prepared to commit operational
resources and political capital to this effort, when it has
not done so in the past. They are equally doubtful about
Serbia's sincerity. RS officials' criticisms of State-level
law enforcement institutions have some merit. They must also
pull their weight if in the effort to apprehend PIFWCs and
shut down their support networks is to succeed. Continued
U.S. engagement will be necessary to ensure that all the
players within BiH translate their words into deeds. End
Summary and Comment.

4. (U) During his first visit to Bosnia in his role as
Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, Clint Williamson
met in Banja Luka on July 28 with: RS Premier Milorad Dodik;
RS President Dragan Cavic and his Political and Security
Advisor Darko Matijasevic; and RS Minister of Interior
Stanislav Cadjo. In Sarajevo on August 1-2 he met with: GBiH
Tri-Presidency Chairman Sulejman Tihic; BiH State Court
President Meddzida Kreso and Chief Prosecutor Marinko
Jurcevic; and State Intelligence Service Head Almir Dzuvo.

5. (U) Ambassador Williamson emphasized that resolving
outstanding Balkan war crimes cases was a USG priority, and
underlined the USG's desire to see Bosnia and Herzegovina and
Serbia put this issue behind them and advance their
integration into European and Euro-Atlantic institutions.
Stressing the Secretary's commitment to sustaining the
momentum generated by her positive meeting with Serbian
Premier Vojislav Kostunica in Washington, and the release of
Serbia's action plan for apprehending Ratko Mladic and other
fugitive indictees (ref. B). Williamson recognized the
efforts that led to the transfer of 16 indictees to The
Haugue in 2004-2006, but stressed the need to continue to
act, and said the USG was prepared to commit resources to
enhance Bosnia's ICTY cooperation. New USG initiatives
include organizing a regional war crimes prosecutors'

SARAJEVO 00001773 002 OF 004


conference, and creating a regional S/WCI liaison FSN
position to help embassies and the Department identify
avenues to facilitate internal and cross-border progress on
PIFWCs.
TIHIC: POLICE REFORM CRITICAL TO WAR CRIMES EFFORTS

6. (U) BiH Tri-Presidency Chairman Sulejman Tihic thanked
Ambassador Williamson for the USG's strong and sustained
support to The Hague Tribunal and the BiH War Crimes Chamber.
He expressed appreciation that Ambassador Williamson
recognized the importance of also apprehending Radovan
Karadzic. He said war criminals like Mladic and Karadzic
must not go down in history as heroes, adding that it was
unfortunate Milosevic died before receiving a verdict.

7. (U) Tihic said BiH police reform was critical to the hunt
for war criminals, because at present the confusing
relationship between State, entity and cantonal authorities
was a major impediment to effective law enforcement. While
agreeing that the RS was not doing enough, Tihic also
criticized State-level institutions, specifically SIPA and
OSA, for failing to produce any concrete results.

8. (C) Tihic said he would wait and see how committed
Kostunica was to implementing Serbia's plan to capture
Mladic. He added that if the RS and Serbia would make a full
and honest commitment to the task, it would be easy to
capture the remaining PIFWCs. He cautioned the USG not to
"settle for half" by indicating, as he thought the Europeans
were, that capturing Mladic would enable Serbia to "check
that box" and move forward with the NATO and EU integration
process.

9. (C) Tihic speculated that the Orthodox Church was
supporting Karadzic, and thanked the USG for urging the
Church to speak out against him. Tihic also asked Ambassador
Williamson to press RS and Serbian authorities to divulge the
location of all mass graves, explaining that it was difficult
for Bosnia to look towards a better future when each time a
new grave was found it dragged people back to the painful
past.
DODIK: RS (AND KOSTUNICA) FULLY COMMITTED TO ICTY COOPERATION

10. (U) RS Prime Minister Milorad Dodik, fresh from a meeting
with Serbian Premier Vojislav Kostunica on July 28, assured
Ambassador Williamson that Kostunica was committed to
fulfilling completely Serbia's ICTY responsibilities that
Serbian police were close to locating Mladic and the people
around him. He said that Kostunica had indicated to him that
he believed that resolving the Mladic issue would put Serbia
in a stronger position in the Kosovo negotiations. Dodik
expressed his wish to improve his relations with the
international community, particularly the Europeans, by
seeing all fugitives within the RS transferred to the ICTY
while he was in office. Dodik added that he was also
prepared to take action against Karadzic and Mladic, even
"the day before BiH elections."

11. (U) Dodik expressed concern that once Mladic was
transferred to The Hague, the full burden for apprehending
Karadzic would fall unfairly on the RS. To avoid this
scenario, Dodik proposed the formation of a joint undercover
police unit with members from all of the countries of the
region. Dodik said he was willing to spearhead the effort,
which he also discussed with Kostunica. He assured
Ambassador Williamson that the international community would
have strong oversight over the unit.

12. (C) Dodik described his efforts to enlist assistance from
the Serbian Orthodox Church, particularly Bishop Grigorije of
Trebinje and Bishop Vadilije (Kacavenda) of Bijeljina, on
PIFWCs. Dodik said that during their visit to Bijeljina,
Kacavenda had promised Dodik and Kostunica that he would
appeal to the fugitives to surrender. However, Dodik was
skeptical that such an appeal would work, given that Karadzic
had remained at large even after his own wife called for his
surrender. As an aside, Dodik said Karadzic's daughter asked
him to allow the RS government to resume paying her father's
pension and providing health care to the family. Dodik said
he would like to help her, but worried that such a gesture
might be problematic.

13. (U) Dodik believed that much of Karadzic's support
network in the RS had been shut down. Network kingpin

SARAJEVO 00001773 003 OF 004


Momcilo Mandic was on trial in the BiH War Crimes Chamber,
and two key members of the support network with RS ties were
now in Serbia -- Ljuban Ecim, former Banja Luka police chief,
and Karadzic's Police Minister Dragan Kijac. Dodik added
that Serbia had shown its willingness to hit the support
network by its recent arrest of former RS Premier Gojko
Klickovic. Klickovic was currently in Serbian custody, but
would soon be extradited to the BiH War Crimes Chamber for
trial.
CAVIC: PIFWC ISSUES RIPE FOR POLITICAL MANIPULATION

14. (C) RS President Dragan Cavic told Ambassador Williamson
there was full political consensus in the RS for fulfilling
its responsibilities under the 2004 RS National Assembly
(RSNA) resolution supporting ICTY cooperation, but that the
key would be operational work. He emphasized the need for
greater regional cooperation, stating that neighboring
countries would need to play a role in the successful
implementation of the Serbian Action Plan. Cavic said that
RS officials had located Zupljanin on three separate
occasions, only to see him escape "by millimeters."

15. (U) Cavic recounted the RS efforts to date on ICTY
cooperation, including its role in the recent transfer of
Dragan Zelenovic from Russia to The Hague (ref. C). Cavic
dismissed assertions from RS Auditor in Chief Bosko Ceko that
the government had failed to account for one million BAM in
funds dedicated to ICTY cooperation. He agreed that shutting
down PIFWC support networks was an important issue, but
cautioned that the scope of the networks should not be
overestimated.

16. (C) Cavic noted that the issue of Serbia-RS cooperation
on PIFWCs was ripe for political manipulation. Some
politicians in Sarajevo would be happy to see Belgrade's
efforts fail, as it would result in addition pressure being
placed on the RS. Cavic said he could lose in the October
elections, in large measure because of his positions on ICTY
cooperation, defense reform and admission of the crimes at
Srebrenica, but he was prepared for such an outcome. He
concluded by saying that the USG could be certain that he and
his Security Advisor Matijasevic, and newly-appointed RS
Interior Minister Cadjo, were prepared to offer the U.S.
whatever support was necessary to strengthen ICTY cooperation.
CADJO: STATE INSTITUTIONS HAVE TO PULL THEIR WEIGHT ON PIFWCs

17. (U) During the meeting with RS Minister of Interior
Stanislav Cadjo, Cadjo assured Ambassador Williamson that
apprehending fugitive ICTY indictees was one of the RS
Government's top four priorities, along with fighting
organized crime, combating terrorism and eliminating
corruption. The RS Interior Ministry had formed an elite
special police unit, dedicated to locating and apprehending
ICTY fugitives. This unit, according to Cadjo, was prepared
to work closely with foreign law enforcement services. He
described his current relations with Serbia's Security
Information Agency (BIA) as "correct," and noted also the
importance of establishing cooperative ties with new
Montenegrin institutions.

18. (U) Cadjo pointed out, however, that it was unfair to
place all responsibility in BiH for locating fugitives on RS
authorities. State-level agencies, particularly the State
Information and Protection Agency (SIPA),State Intelligence
Agency (OSA),and the State Border Police (SBP) needed to
pull their weight in the effort to find PIFWCs. Cadjo added
that he had no indication that his units were failing in
their PIFWC responsibilities, and asserted that he would
sanction such failure should it come to his attention.
DZUVO: PIFWCs ARE A POLITICAL, NOT A LAW ENFORCEMENT ISSUE

19. (C) Head of the State Intelligence Agency (OSA) Almir
Dzuvo likened PIFWCs to a cancer that must be removed.
However, he thought ultimately that this was a political,
rather than a law enforcement issue. He suggested that
Serbian authorities knew exactly where Karadzic was hiding,
and could deliver him any time they wished. Dzuvo told
Ambassador Williamson that, according to OSA sources,
Karadzic's support network had been significantly disrupted,
and that Karadzic was "practically alone."

20. (C) Dzuvo identified several challenges within BiH. He
said that there was little communication or cooperation with

SARAJEVO 00001773 004 OF 004


RS security services, that former RS Interior Minister
Matijasevic was all talk and no action, and Dzuvo did not
expect Cadjo to be any better. Consequently, OSA had to
operate on its own in the RS, without local assistance. OSA
had good relations with the State Border Service (SBS),but
the SBS did not control large portions of the RS-Serbia
border, and fugitives could move between the territories
easily. Dzuvo also complained that information received from
The Hague was often not reliable. On the positive side, the
nascent Montenegrin security services appeared receptive to
developing good working relations with OSA.
STATE COURT: SENTENCING INEQUITIES, INADEQUATE RESOURCES ARE
MAIN CHALLENGES

21. (U) BiH State Court President Meddzida Kreso and Chief
Prosecutor Marinko Jurcevic told Ambassador Williamson the
non-extradition provisions in the Croatian and the Serbian
constitutions were a major obstacle to trying cases in BiH.
Kreso said that making the minimum and maximum sentence for
war crimes the same within Bosnia, as well as identical to
those in Serbia and Croatia, would somewhat ameliorate the
problems of forum shopping. (Note: The maximum penalty for
war crimes at the BiH State level is 45 years in prison, as
opposed to 20 years in the RS and 15 years in the Federation.
The maximum penalty in both Serbia and Croatia is 20 years.
End note.)

22. (C) Jurcevic said his office cooperated well with the
ICTY Prosecutor's Office. He supported the creation of a
regional S/WCI liaison, who could identify ways to improve
the State Prosecutor's existing cooperative agreements with
Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia and Macedonia on evidence
sharing. However, Jurcevic told Ambassador Williamson, his
greatest difficulties were internal. In particular, the
resources made available by the GBiH were insufficient, given
the enormity of the task, and the State had not indicated
support for the Prosecutor,s strategy for prosecuting war
crimes cases. Because of this, he questioned the GBiH's
commitment to seeing war criminals brought to justice.
MCELHANEY